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Abstract
This thesis presents four distinct essays that lie at the intersection of economics and
computation.
The first essay constructs an abstract framework for defining skills gaps, mismatches
and shortages geometrically and thinking about these phenomena in a unified, formal
way. It then develops a job matching model with imperfect information, in which
skills mismatches influence the job application decisions of the workers, while skills
gaps and shortages shape the competition for workers on the resulting bipartite job
applications network. The tools proposed in this chapter could in future work be
employed as the main ingredients of an agent-based model used to investigate how
skills gaps, mismatches and shortages affect equilibrium outcomes.
The second chapter designs and tests machine learning algorithms to classify 33
million UK online vacancy postings into STEM and non-STEM jobs based on the key-
words collected from the vacancy descriptions and job titles. The goal is to investigate
whether jobs in “non-STEM” occupations (e.g. Graphic Designers, Economists) also
require and value STEM knowledge and skills (e.g. “Microsoft C#”, “Systems Engi-
neering”), thereby contributing to the debate on whether or not the “STEM pipeline
leakage” – the fact that less than half of STEM graduates in the UK work in STEM
occupations - should be considered as highly problematic.
Chapter 3 relates to empirical growth. It proposes a programming algorithm,
called “iterative Fit and Filter” (iFF), that extracts trend growth as a sequence of
medium/long term average growth rates, and applies it on a sample of over 150 coun-
tries. The paper then develops an econometric framework that relates the conditional
probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth next year to the country’s cur-
rent characteristics, e.g. the growth environment, level of development, demographics,
institutions, etc.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies credit risk spillovers in financial networks by modelling
default as a multi-stage disease with each credit-rating corresponding to a new infection
phase. The paper derives analytical and proposes computer simulation-based indica-
tors of systemic importance and vulnerability, then applies them in the context of the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
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1 Skills Diversity in Unity
Abstract
At any point in time, skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages arise because
of an imperfect correspondence between the singular sets of skills required by
different open vacancies and the unique combinations of capabilities embodied in
every job seeker - skills diversity in unity. This paper first constructs an abstract
framework for defining and thinking about these phenomena in a unified, formal
and objective way. The main building block is a discrete skills space in which the
locations of vacancies and workers are determined by the vectors of skills char-
acterizing them. We define skills gaps and mismatches as two different distance
measures between them, and derive a condition for each vacancy that determines
whether or not it experiences a skills shortage. We then develop a job matching
model with imperfect information, in which skills mismatches influence the job
application decisions of the workers, while skills gaps and shortages shape the
competition for workers on the resulting bipartite job applications network. The
tools proposed in this paper could in future work be employed as the main ingre-
dients of an agent-based model used to investigate how skills gaps, mismatches
and shortages affect equilibrium outcomes in the context of skills diversity in
unity and imperfect information.
1.1 Introduction
“At bottom every man knows well enough that he is a unique
being, only once on this earth; and by no extraordinary chance
will such a marvelously picturesque piece of diversity in unity as
he is, ever be put together a second time.”
Friedrich Nietzsche [129]
There has been a lot of debate around the notions of skills gaps, mismatches, and
shortages. Some academics completely deny these issues, for instance disparaging skills
gaps as a “zombie idea” (Krugman [113]) or “employer whining” (Cappelli [33]).
At the same time, however, numerous surveys conducted by governmental bodies
(e.g. the European Commission [40], the UK Commission for Employment and Skills
(UKCES) [96]), lobbying organisations (e.g. the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) [35]), and consulting companies (e.g. KPMG [35], ManpowerGroup [119], Hays
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and Oxford Economics [91]), have been reporting skills gaps and shortages as main
obstacles to business operations and a “handbrake on global growth” (Cox [91]) for
years. Both public and private sectors spend large amounts of money on investigating
and trying to reduce them. For example, in 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase launched a $250
million initiative “New Skills at Work”, with their CEO Jamie Dimon quoting the
nearly 11 million unemployed Americans and the concurrent 4 million unfilled jobs as
evidence of there being a “gulf between the skills job seekers currently have and the skills
employers need to fill their open positions”[48]. Such concerns also play an important
role in shaping migration policies - e.g. the UKCES reviews were commissioned by the
UK Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). Hence, the evidence is not just a “telephone
survey [with] executives” (Krugman [113]).
On the workers’ side, many labour economists and special institutions (e.g. the
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) [68]) have
extensively studied and documented skills mismatches, the related phenomena of under
and over-education (McGuinness [123], Sattinger [145]), and their dire consequences
for wages, job satisfaction, and career prospects (e.g. Allen & Van der Velden [9]).
In the UK, for instance, according to the ONS [66], 47% of recent graduates were in
non-graduate employment in 2013, and the figure was already high even before the
recession, e.g., at 43% in 2007. This constitutes a substantial waste of resources and
leads to the following puzzle: why aren’t job seekers acquiring the skills needed by
employers, thereby eliminating skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages?
The proponents of the idea that skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages are just a
“myth” add to the perplexity by saying that if these phenomena did exist in reality, we
would observe tight labour market conditions (high wages, low unemployment rates) for
those workers who have the scarce skills, but we do not. In a recent article, Shierholz
[147] shows evidence for the USA that “unemployed workers dramatically outnumber
job openings in all sectors” and “in no occupation is there any hint of wages being bid
up in a way that would indicate tight labor markets or labor shortages”. According to
her, it is therefore “aggregate demand”, and not structural skills issues, that is behind
the weak job recoveries and high non-graduate employment levels of recent graduates.
Although this view is plausible, it seems to ignore the fact that despite recession-
related rises, the numbers and concerns around skills gaps, shortages, and mismatches
have been high throughout the business cycle, and this persistence over time might
actually be the reason why the “zombie idea [...] refuses to die” (Krugman, [113]).
Perhaps all the debate about the existence and importance of skills gaps, shortages,
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and mismatches is the result of the ambiguity in their definitions, and the little attention
paid to the notion of skills diversity in unity. The easiest way to understand the latter
idea, is to talk to an actual recruiter who might tell you a story about overqualified
applicants not being hired because they exhibited a lack of communication skills during
interviews. In general, the “lack” is more substantial, but the key intuition is the
same. At any point in time, skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages arise because of an
imperfect correspondence between the singular sets of skills required by different open
vacancies and the unique combinations of capabilities embodied in every job seeker.
Our paper aims to contribute to this debate by proposing tools, which, in future
work, could be employed as the main ingredients of an agent-based model used to
investigate how skills gaps, mismatches and shortages affect equilibrium outcomes in
the context of skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.
In Section 1.3, we develop an abstract framework for defining skills gaps, mismatches
and shortages geometrically and thinking about these phenomena in a unified, formal
way. The main building block is a discrete skills space in which the locations of vacancies
and workers are determined by the vectors of skills characterizing them. We define skills
gaps and mismatches as two different distance measures between them. Conceptualising
skills shortages - which occur “when there are not enough people available with the
skills needed to do the jobs which need to be done” (British Government’s Training
Agency [4]) - is more complex. The “not enough” notion implies that skills shortages
are not pairwise independent like skills gaps and mismatches. Hence, their existence for
different vacancies, and the policies aimed at eliminating them cannot be considered in
isolation. This highlights the importance and advantage of using a measurable skills
space which directly accounts for interdependencies in a given economy, and provides a
clear condition for each vacancy that determines whether or not it experiences a skills
shortage. We also show how to determine minimum levels of skills mismatches and
skills gaps achievable in an economy if the goal is to simultaneously reduce the number
of unmatched agents (unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies).
The second part (Section 1.4) develops a two-sided job matching model with imper-
fect information, in which skills mismatches influence the job application decisions of
the workers, while skills gaps and shortages shape the competition for workers on the
resulting bipartite job applications network. A preliminary R code file for simulating




This paper can be related to different areas of theoretical and empirical literature
in economics and networks, and management (operations research). In this section, we
outline the main differences and similarities, and motivate our modelling approach.
The first papers in economics that pay attention to the notion of skills are Roy
[142] and Tinbergen [154], both published in 1951. Tinbergen’s discussion of skills
heterogeneity is close to the one we present below. He recognizes that “many types of
employment [...] require certain abilities in varying degrees”, so that “in reality, [...]
multi-dimensional descriptions of the nature of occupations [...] have to be considered”.
However, despite these statements, Tinbergen then assumes that “the nature of the
labour required is a one-dimensional quantity”, summarized by “one number s”, and
interpreted as “physical effort”. Since Tinbergen intends to investigate the distribution
of labour incomes, this simplification seems appropriate and useful in order to get
analytical results. However, for the analysis of skills mismatches, gaps, and shortages,
it is too restrictive because it leads to ignoring a scenario where people have multiple
skills and hence different abilities in performing different jobs. For instance, worker A
may be more productive in job X than worker B, while B would be more productive
than A in another job Y.
Roy [142] was the first economist to clearly understand this, and also to recognise
that this implies self-selection: A would choose to work in job X, while B - in job Y.
The main difference between our conception of skills heterogeneity and Roy’s, is that
in Roy’s multiple-index model workers have several types of skills but can only use one
skill at a time depending on which occupation they choose. By contrast, we assume
that both workers and jobs are characterized by multi-dimensional vectors of skills, and
production is decreasing in the skills gap between the skills required by the vacancy
and those possessed by the worker.
The main contribution of these two early papers is that they generated a substantial
literature in which skills diversity plays a key role.
Assignment models that started with Sattinger [144]1 assume infinite numbers of
worker and job types. However, as in Tinbergen [154], heterogeneity in these models
is typically defined along one dimension only: from low to high ability for workers,
and from easy to complex for jobs/tasks. Another difference with our approach is that
these models usually require perfect information about all employers’ wage offers and
1Teulings & Vieira [153] show how assignment models can be estimated, while Shimer [148] proposes
a version with coordination frictions.
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all workers’ abilities. As discussed below, we assume the worker does not observe the
job requirements and the wage offers of all employers; he just applies to a vacancy
with some probability that is increasing in the ex-ante (before any network-induced
competition for him) utility that he would get if employed in this position. Similarly,
employers are unaware of the distribution of workers, but they can perfectly observe the
skills of those who do apply for their vacancy (by, for instance, inviting the candidates
to interviews).
Despite these differences, assignment models are close to our approach to the extent
that skills diversity in them is also the main driving force behind the matching of work-
ers and jobs. In particular, the allocation of workers to jobs in assignment models is
governed by heterogeneity in either productivities (more able workers have a compara-
tive advantage in more complex jobs, cf. Sattinger [144]), or preferences (workers have
different tastes for performing diverse tasks, cf. Tinbergen [155]). In our model, skills
mismatches influence job application decisions, while skills gaps and shortages shape
the competition for workers on the resulting bipartite job applications network.
The skills space we use to model skills diversity and define skills gaps, mismatches,
and shortages is similar in some respects to the “characteristics” space that forms the
basis of hedonic models. Although the first instances of such models were developed
to study differentiated products (Lancaster [115], Rosen [137]), the same approach has
later been applied to labour markets (e.g. Heckman and Scheinkman [92]). The main
idea is that products (workers) are “collections of characteristics” (Lancaster [115]) that
yield utility (productive efficiency). By assuming n sectors with different production
functions, Heckman and Scheinkman [92] also introduce heterogeneity on the labour
demand side. However, by contrast with our approach, they do not directly map their
jobs onto the same characteristics space as the one used to conceptualize their workers
and do not explicitly model how the different measures of divergences between the skills
vectors supplied and those demanded affect utility and production.
Perhaps the most important difference between the models discussed so far and the
approach we take in this paper lies in the pricing of skills. In both hedonic and assign-
ment models, the prices of different types of skills (characteristics) are determined by
equilibrium between their supplies and demands. Although Heckman and Scheinkman
[92] show that “whenever population skill endowments are “diverse” enough”, skills
bundling matters so that “separate productive attributes” command different prices
in different sectors, they do not depart from the assumption that there exists a direct
mapping from the characteristics of a person to the wage received. After rejecting em-
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pirically the hypothesis of uniform factor prices in US sectoral data, they propose factor
immobility and non-linear hedonic pricing as alternative explanations, and even suggest
that a linear characteristics pricing approach (Lancaster [115]) could still hold within
sectors. The reason we wish to depart from the assumption of a direct mapping from
characteristics to the wages observed, even accounting for bundling, is because it leads
to an important puzzle in the analysis of skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages. If in
equilibrium workers are paid according to the overall marginal product and scarcity of
their bundles of skills within sectors, why don’t rational people recognize the highly
valuable types of sector-specific skills and acquire them, thereby eliminating shortage
related arbitrage opportunities? Preferences, timing, costs are of course potential rea-
sons. However, another possible explanation is that the hedonic approach does not fully
account for the multifaceted role that skills diversity plays in the job matching process
and the formation of competitive wages.
In the spatial competitive labour market model proposed below (Section 1.4), skills
shortages can induce competition for those workers who possess the scarce bundles, but
not necessarily so. The pricing is done through a completely different mechanism in
which workers are not necessarily rewarded according to the value of their marginal
products and the scarcity of their skills combinations.
To reach these conclusions, we start by recognising that, in reality, a firm could
only hire a worker who has applied for its open vacancy. It is important to understand
why workers apply to some jobs and not to others, and why different workers choose
to apply to different numbers of vacancies. In particular, our goal is to investigate how
skills heterogeneity influences such decisions.
Several approaches have been used in the economic literature to model the appli-
cation process (first stage of the job matching). Undirected search models (Pissarides
[131]) assume that workers and firms meet at random, thereby completely ignoring
heterogeneity and the fact that workers should apply with a higher probability to jobs
that would potentially give them higher utility. Directed search models (e.g. Moen
[126], Galenianos & Kircher [79], Shimer [148]) do take this into account. However,
they require workers to be able to observe all job offers, and design application strate-
gies that are optimal given all other agents’ strategies. Hence, when applying to jobs,
workers must not only have perfect information, but also a certain level of strategic
sophistication.
In order to avoid such unrealistic assumptions, we propose a novel approach that
takes inspiration from the literature on spatial networks where link formation depends
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on distances (Janssen [103]). Specifically, we assume that for each worker, there exists
a latent ranking of all vacancies which depends on skills mismatches and base wages
that together determine ex-ante utility as defined in Section 1.4. The worker does not
need to perfectly observe this latent ranking, whose sole function is to determine the
probability distribution over the vacancies with which the worker applies to each of
them. We also extend this basic set-up to allow for several and different numbers of
applications per worker.
The simultaneous application decisions of all workers determine a bipartite network
in which a link from a worker to an open vacancy corresponds to a job application. The
competitive matching of workers and firms as well as the equilibrium wages depend
on this network, as it determines the outside opportunities of both firms and workers.
Firms that receive several applications for a given vacancy have to choose one among
the different candidates, while job seekers who receive multiple offers can only accept
one of them at the end of the negotiations.
Kranton & Minehart [112] provide one of the first analysis of competition on bipar-
tite networks. However, the competitive mechanism devised in their paper would be
inappropriate in our context because of heterogeneity. Although they show how com-
petitive equilibrium outcomes are influenced by the whole structure of the bipartite
buyer-seller network in which the outside opportunities “depend on the entire web of
direct and indirect links”; the good exchanged in the process is homogeneous in the
sense that a buyer’s valuation for the good does not change depending on the seller
from whom he acquires it. Similarly, sellers do not care about the buyers’ identities,
but only the price they receive for their good.
Instead, to model competition on the bipartite job applications network, we use
a two-sided matching model. In existing economic theory, the matching literature
which started with Gale & Shapley [78] probably provides the most general way of con-
ceptualising heterogeneity in market-like settings. The competitive wage-adjustment
mechanism we propose in Section 1.4 is related to the one in Crawford & Knoer [43].
Within the mechanism design literature, the main contribution of their paper is to
recognize that in labour markets, agents’ preferences need to be modelled as flexible
because they can change over the negotiation process in which salaries adjust competi-
tively. Despite being quite general, their model assumes perfect information, and as the
authors argue themselves this is disadvantageous since “imperfect information is an es-
sential characteristic of real labor market”. Indeed, two-sided matching models usually
involve algorithms that require each agent to be able to rank all agents on the opposite
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side, which is implausible in settings with large numbers of heterogeneous agents. This
perfect information assumption might therefore be one of the main reasons why, de-
spite their attractive and intuitive approach in such environments, two-sided matching
models have not been more widely used in studying large real labour markets2.
Furthermore, even though heterogeneity in two-sided matching models has impor-
tant implications for equilibrium outcomes, it remains unfounded, i.e., these models
do not explain why some worker-firm pairs produce more or less, and yield more or
less job satisfaction to the worker. They simply take pair-specific productivity and job
satisfaction levels as exogenously given.
We try to address both issues by modelling skills diversity explicitly in Section
1.3, incorporating it directly into agents’ preferences and job application decisions in
Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 respectively, then building a two-sided matching model on this
spatial framework in Section 1.4.3.
Finally, our paper can also be related to the large empirical literature devoted to un-
derstanding skills mismatches and the related phenomena of under and over-education
(cf., for instance, Sattinger [145] for a very detailed overview of the literature on qual-
itative mismatches, their causes and consequences), while Section 1.3.4 employs some
ideas and techniques from the operations research literature (e.g. Eiselt & Sandblom
[52]).
The discussion presented in this section shows that despite the “little attention
[conventional] economic theory pays to the notion of skill” (UKCES [96]), often treating
labour as a homogeneous good, many economists have actually pondered over skills
and skills diversity/heterogeneity. The differences with our approach arise because the
models reviewed above had been developed for different purposes.
Unfortunately, no clear and objective definitions of skills gaps, mismatches and
shortages exist in the academic literature, where skills shortages, for instance, are often
understood as a phenomenon that “causes vacancies to remain open longer” (Haskel
& Martin [102]) and unfilled vacancies constitute “dynamic shortages”, which only
persist until wages have risen such as to make enough people acquire the scarce skills
and bring the labour market into equilibrium once again (Arrow and Capron [14]).
However, in practice, hiring difficulties, unfilled vacancies, wage rises, etc. are all
2They have been successfully applied in smaller settings, where agents on both sides can provide a
complete ranking of all the agents on the opposite side of the market. See Roth and Sotomayor [139]
for a textbook exposition of two-sided matching models and a discussion of their applications in the
labour market for medical interns and college admissions mechanisms. Such models have also been
used in “repugnant markets”, e.g. kidney exchanges (Roth et al. [138]).
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potential consequences of shortages, not their proper definition. Hiring difficulties and
unfilled vacancies may occur for reasons unrelated to shortages, like inefficient human
resource recruiters, improper advertising of the job, etc., while raising wages is only one
of many responses to shortages. For instance, the 2016/2017 Talent shortage survey
conducted by ManpowerGroup [119] indicates that only 26% of employers respond to
shortages by “paying higher salary packages to recruits”. At the same time, 53% decide
to “offer training and development to existing staff”, 36% “recruit outside the talent
pool”, 28% “explore alternative sourcing strategies”, 19% completely “change existing
work models”, etc.
In the next section, we shall attempt to start filling this theoretical gap by proposing
basic, geometric definitions of skills gaps, mismatches and shortages in a unified setting.
1.3 Modelling and Measuring Skills Diversity in Unity
The purpose of this section is to model skills diversity among workers and vacancies,
and propose clear definitions of skills mismatches, gaps and shortages. Governments
around the world have been concerned about skills gaps and mismatches and also want
to minimize the numbers of unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies. In Section
1.3.4, we show that in an economy with a realistic degree of skills heterogeneity and
no perfect coordination between the combinations of skills supplied and demanded,
there will always be some positive minimum levels of skills gaps and mismatches if the
objective is also to leave as few unmatched agents as possible.
1.3.1 Participants and skills space
The economy is composed of two finite and disjoint sets of open vacancies V =
{V1, V2, ..., VM}, and job seekers (workers) S = {S1, S2, ..., SN}, with cardinalities |V| =
M and |S| = N respectively. We use i and Si, j and Vj interchangeably when referring
to workers and vacancies respectively.
Consider an n-dimensional discrete skills space Ω, where each element is an n × 1
skills vector ~ω =< ω1, ω2, ..., ωn >. Each component of the skills vector ωl ∈ [0, ω¯l], for
l = 1, ..., n, corresponds to some specific type of skills (e.g. presentation skills, computer
skills, teamwork, etc.). We shall assume that ωl is discrete and varies between 0 (no
l-type skills) and ω¯l (expert in l-type skills). For some types of skills, ωl will be a binary
variable {0, 1} indicating whether or not the type of skills is possessed/required, while
in other cases the value of ωl will summarize the level of proficiency in the type of skills
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considered. Concisely, Ω = Cn
⋂
Zn where Cn = [0, ω¯1]× [0, ω¯2]× ...× [0, ω¯n] for some
positive integers ω¯l, l = 1, ..., n.
We map both workers and vacancies onto this skills space, i.e. each worker i ∈ S
corresponds to an n-dimensional non-negative vector of skills or capabilities ~si =<
s1i, s2i, ..., sni > in Ω. Similarly, each vacancy j ∈ V corresponds to an n-dimensional
vector ~vj ∈ Ω of skills required to perform job j, i.e. ~vj is the skills vector that the
benchmark candidate for vacancy j would possess. For simplicity, we assume that one
firm is responsible for one vacancy only and therefore use the terms vacancy, job, firm,
and employer interchangeably.3
Note that although we use ~si and ~vj when referring to workers and vacancies re-
spectively, both types of vectors belong to the same skills space Ω. Moreover, the
characterization of workers and vacancies could be made as precise as needed by simply
increasing the dimensionality of the skills space; e.g. instead of just having “computer
skills”, we could include more skills types to capture proficiency with different types
of computer software. In particular, uniqueness could be reached by setting a degree
of heterogeneity n < ∞ such that no two workers and no two vacancies are the same.
Although this is not necessary, we shall assume such a degree of skills diversity in sec-
tion 1.4 in order to simplify some of the proofs, leaving the more general case as an
extension for future research.
1.3.2 Skills mismatches and skills gaps
Consider an arbitrary job seeker i and an arbitrary vacancy j. As long as the vectors
characterizing them in the skills space Ω do not coincide, it is possible to compute a
distance between them. We define skills mismatches and skills gaps as two different
distance measures:
Definition 1. The skills mismatch between worker i ∈ S and vacancy j ∈ V , smij,
is the Euclidean distance on Ω between the vectors ~si and ~vj:
smij =‖ ~vj − ~si ‖=
√√√√ n∑
l=1
(vlj − sli)2 (1.1)
3A possible extension for future research would be to consider more complex scenarios in which
one firm simultaneously opens several vacancies, and can hire workers such as to compensate to some
extent the skills deficiencies of ones by skills surpluses of others while still minimizing the overall skills
gap of the whole team as defined in eq.1.2.
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Since smij is a measure of the overall distance between worker i and vacancy j, it
increases both when the worker is overskilled and when he/she is underskilled in some
skill type(s).
Definition 2. The skills gap between worker i ∈ S and vacancy j ∈ V , sgij, is a




max {0, vlj − sli} (1.2)
The skills gap only increases when the worker lacks some of the skills that are
necessary for the job (vlj − sli > 0).
The pairwise skills mismatches and skills gaps between all workers and vacancies in







sgN1 . . . sgNM

i.e. the ith row of SG records the skills gaps of worker i with all open vacancies,
whereas column j of SG contains the skills gaps that vacancy j has with respect to all
job seekers.
Letting δl = vlj − sli, it becomes clear that both smij and sgij are specific cases of





where f(.) is a monotonically increasing function in δl.
Skills gaps and skills mismatches therefore correspond to two different ways of per-
ceiving and measuring divergences between the skills combinations embodied in the
workers and those required by the open vacancies. Throughout the paper, we assume
that workers care only about skills mismatches, since being employed in a job that
matches their skills endowments more closely is both more satisfying and requires less
extra effort. At the same time, employers are only concerned with skills gaps because
any skills deficiency negatively affects their productivity.
Of course, in reality each agent probably has his/her own subjective perception of
skills diversity, and the function f(.) in eq.1.3 could be made agent and/or dimension-
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dependent to reflect this. For instance, when thinking about skills gaps, an employer
might allow over-skills in some dimensions to compensate for under-skills in other ones,
or penalize under-skilling in different dimensions differently. However, for simplicity
and clarity purposes, we shall focus on skills mismatches and skills gaps as defined in
equations 1.1 and 1.2.
A simple example that illustrates why it is important to separate skills mismatches
from skills gaps is to consider a higher education graduate and two non-graduate vacan-
cies: a barman and a plumber. Being a barman does not necessitate very specific skills,
hence the skills gap between the higher education graduate and the barman vacancy
is likely to be very small. However, the skills mismatch may be huge since the higher
education graduate won’t be able to use many of his skills if employed as a barman.
By contrast, consider the higher education graduate and the plumber vacancy. This
time, both the skills gap and the skills mismatch are likely to be large if the higher
education graduate happens to know nothing about plumbing because a plumber is a
non-graduate vacancy that requires specific skills.
1.3.3 Measure space and skills shortages
According to the British Government’s Training Agency, a skills shortage occurs
“when there are not enough people available with the skills needed to do the jobs which
need to be done” (British Government’s Training Agency [4]). Using the definitions
introduced previously, a worker who has all the skills needed to do a particular job is
someone who has a zero skills gap with this job. Eq.1.2 implies that such a qualified
worker does not necessarily have to match a vacancy’s requirements perfectly; he/she
can be overskilled in some types of skills. Since a worker can therefore be qualified for
many different jobs at the same time, the question of establishing whether or not there
are “enough” qualified people available in the economy to “do the jobs which need to
be done”, i.e. to fill all open vacancies, seems rather non-trivial.
Indeed, contrary to skills mismatches and gaps, which are both measures that are
specific to a certain worker-vacancy pair - i.e. i′s skills gap and mismatch with vacancy j
are unrelated to his/her skills gap and mismatch with a different vacancy h - the question
of skills shortages cannot be treated in isolation. Hence, before proposing an objective
condition that determines whether or not a vacancy experiences a skills shortage, we
need to characterize the measure space of the economy in which vacancies and job
seekers co-exist. This shall allow us to model their interdependence and conceptualize
the “not enough” notion.
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Measure space The distribution of the combinations of skills available in the labour
market (skills supply) defines a measure P on Ω. For instance, if the pool of job seekers
is such that none of them has a specific combination of skills ~ω, i.e. ~si 6= ~ω for all
i ∈ S , this outcome will have measure zero under P , i.e. P (~ω) = 0. Furthermore, this
measure is such that:
P (~ω) = |{i ∈ S|~si = ~ω}| (1.4)
where |.| is the cardinality of the subset.




P (~ω) = N
In a similar way, we can define a measure Q for the vectors of skills demanded to
fill open vacancies. If none of the vacancies requires some combination of skills ~ω - i.e.
~vj 6= ~ω for all j ∈ V , Q shall assign measure zero to this specific skills vector: Q(~ω) = 0.
Again, this measure is such that:






Consider the subset of all the job seekers whose skills gaps with vacancy j, as defined
in eq.1.2, are zero. Their corresponding skills vectors lie in:
Zj := {~ω ∈ Ω|ωl > vlj,∀l = 1, ..., n} (1.6)
This includes the workers who possess exactly the ~vj skills vector, as well as those who
are overskilled in some type(s) of skills required by vacancy j but underskilled in none
of them.
Let us call a job seeker i with ~si ∈ Zj as qualified for vacancy j. Note that, even
if the benchmark candidate for vacancy j is absent from the labour force (P (~vj) = 0),
vacancy j might still be able to hire a qualified worker as long as P (Zj) > 0.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the idea in a two-dimensional space. The labour market is
composed of one vacancy and two workers characterized by the vectors ~v1 =< 5, 6 >,
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~s1 =< 3, 8 >, and ~s2 =< 7, 7 > respectively. The shaded area to the North-East of
vacancy 1 corresponds to Z1 as defined in eq.1.6. Only worker 2 (~s2) belongs to Z1,
despite worker 1 (~s1) being overskilled for vacancy 1 (~v1) along the vertical dimension.
Figure 1.1 Qualified workers
Notes: The shaded area marks the skills
vectors of all the workers who would be
qualified for vacancy V1. Only worker
S2 has such a combination of skills. S1 is
underskilled along the horizontal dimen-
sion.
Let Z be the σ-algebra (collection of sub-
sets of Ω) generated by the sets Zω :=
{~u ∈ Ω|ul > ωl,∀l = 1, ..., n} for any ~ω ∈ Ω.
The measure space for this economy is defined
as the unique quadruple Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q}.
As long as some workers are qualified for sev-
eral vacancies at the same time, the question of
whether or not a given vacancy is experiencing
a skills shortage, in the sense of there not being
enough qualified job seekers, cannot be addressed
by looking at this specific vacancy in isolation. In-
stead, the vacancy has to be considered within the
complete measure space characterizing the econ-
omy in which it operates Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q}. Both
the locations of all the other vacancies and the
positions of all the job seekers matter when deter-
mining a skills shortage.
Skills shortages
Definition 3. Vacancy j experiences a skills








where Hj := {~ω ∈ Ω|P (Zω ∩ Zj) 6= 0, ~ω 6= ~vj} and Lj := {~ω ∈ Ω|~ω ∈ Zu for ~u ∈
Hj, and ~ω /∈ Zj}.
The left hand side of eq.1.7 gives the total demand for workers qualified for vacancy
j. The first term is j’s own demand. The second one sums up the demands from other
firms in the same economy that also want to hire workers who are qualified for vacancy
j (this is the subset of vacancies with skills vectors in Hj). The first term on the right
hand side is the total supply of workers qualified for vacancy j, while the second one
adjusts this supply for the fact that firms with skills vectors in Hj, i.e. which compete
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Figure 1.2 Skills shortages
Shortage for V2, not for V1 Shortages for both V1 and V2 No shortages
Notes: Three possible scenarios with two workers and two vacancies in a two-dimensional skills space
are illustrated. As S2 becomes qualified for both vacancies (going from the left to the middle panel),
there is no longer “enough” of him, so that both V1 and V2 experience skills shortages. Moving from
the middle to the right panel, both shortages are eliminated by simply making S1 qualified for V1,
so that there are enough qualified workers at the level of the economy to simultaneously fill both
vacancies. Hence, the existence of shortages and the policies aimed at eliminating them cannot be
considered in isolation.
with j for the workers in Zj, also have access to a pool of workers that are qualified for
them but unqualified for vacancy j, and for which they do not compete with j.
To fully understand the condition for a skills shortage contained in eq.1.7, it is useful
to look at an example with two dimensions where the problem can be inspected visually.
Figure 1.2 illustrates three possible scenarios with two vacancies and two workers
on the same square lattice as the one introduced above.
Let the L, M, and R - subscripts stand for left, middle, and right panels of Figure 1.2.
The economy depicted in the left wing panel can be summarized by the quadruple ΨL =
{Ω,Z, PL, QL} where Ω is the square lattice, PL(~s1) = PL(~s2) = 1 with ~s1 =< 0, 2 >,
and ~s2 =< 3, 3 > and P
L(~ω) = 0 for any other ~ω ∈ Ω such that ~ω 6= {~s1, ~s2}. For the
vacancies, QL(~v1) = Q
L(~v2) = 1 with ~v1 =< 2, 2 >, and ~v2 =< 4, 4 > and Q
L(~ω) = 0
for ~ω ∈ Ω such that ~ω 6= {~v1, ~v2}. Furthermore, the qualified subsets are such that
PL(Z1) = 1 and P
L(Z2) = 0.
It is clear that vacancy 2 experiences a skills shortage since both potential applicants,
S1 and S2, lack some of the skills required for V2’s benchmark combination ~v2. Since
PL(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 0, eq.1.7 becomes: 1 + 0 > 0 + 0 so that vacancy 2 experiences a
shortage. By contrast, vacancy 1 does not experience a skills shortage when operating
in ΨL. The qualified candidate is S2, and there is enough of him/her because he/she




L(~s2) = 1 and the second terms on both sides are still equal to 0
because PL(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 0.
Suppose we change the location of S2 from < 3, 3 > to < 6, 6 > while keeping
everything else exactly the same as before. This is illustrated in the middle panel of
Figure 1.2 . Worker 2 is now the only qualified candidate for both vacancies and so
there is no longer enough of him/her. Indeed, now PM(Z1∩Z2) = 1 and eq.1.7 becomes
1 + 1 > 1 + 0 for vacancy 2, and also 1 + 1 > 1 + 0 for vacancy 1, indicating a skills
shortage for both of them.
Finally, the right wing of Figure 1.2 moves job seeker 1 from ~s1 =< 0, 2 > to
~s1 =< 2, 4 >, keeping everything else as in the middle panel. S1 is now in Z1, i.e.
qualified for vacancy 1, while still remaining outside Z2. Graphically, it is obvious that
there are no skills shortages at the level of the economy ΨR because there are enough
qualified candidates to fill both vacancies simultaneously. Simply assign S1 to V1 and
S2 to V2. The condition for a skills shortage in eq.1.7 is violated for both vacancies.
For vacancy 2, the equation reads 1 + 1 ≤ 1 + 1 since QR(~v2) = 1, PR(Z2) = 1, and
PR(Z1∩Z2) = 1. Note how important it is not to forget the right hand side adjustment
PR(~s1) = 1. Indeed, although S2 seems to be over-demanded since he/she is qualified
for both vacancies so that total demand for him/her is QR(~v1) + Q
R(~v2) = 2, while
his/her supply in the economy is only PR(~s2) = 1, it would be wrong to conclude that
V2 experiences a skills shortage because S2 is the only qualified applicant for it. The
reason is that, contrary to the situation in ΨM , in economy ΨR vacancy 1 does have an
alternative qualified candidate: S1. This example illustrates why skills shortages can
never be established in isolation because the “not enough” notion is defined relative to
the space in which many heterogeneous vacancies and job seekers co-exist.
Another point to note when contrasting the middle and right panels of Figure 1.2
is that simply changing the location of worker 1 eliminates skills shortages for both
vacancies. This has an interesting policy implication. In employers’ surveys, financial
services and engineering firms are often among those that are most concerned with
skills shortages, but for different reasons (UKCES [96]). Financial companies often
cite the lack of computer/problem solving skills and the lack of understanding of the
finance industry as the two crucial deficiencies in their job applicants, while many
engineering firms are concerned that their most gifted and best qualified candidates
seek finance jobs because of the wage premium this industry is able to pay by leveraging
talent (Ce´le´rier & Valle´e [36]). Is having more graduates majoring in engineering the
optimal solution in this case? Maybe not. Top engineers would continue flowing into
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finance, while lacking some important finance industry knowledge. A more appropriate
solution might be to restructure finance/economics degrees so that students majoring
in them, who potentially have more of the relevant finance background, also get more
computer/problem solving skills. In terms of the spatial framework, this policy would
correspond to changing the location of finance/economics graduates in the skills space
in order to make them more attractive candidates for the financial industry. This would
create more competition to the best engineering graduates, and force some of them back
into seeking employment at engineering firms. The example is a caricature of reality,
but a useful one to the extent that it illustrates how improving skills shortages for some
industry might also alleviate skills shortages in another industry.
A corollary is that when choosing among policies directed at reducing skills shortages
in different industries, an authority should include in its costs/benefits analysis the
positive externalities that each policy might generate on other industries.
1.3.4 Minimum levels of skills mismatches and skills gaps
We now focus on determining the minimum levels of skills gaps and mismatches
achievable in economy Ψ, when the objective is also to match as many workers and
vacancies as possible. From a policy perspective, this is an interesting and important
question since governments are usually not only concerned with reducing skills gaps and
mismatches, but also want to leave as few unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies
as possible.
We start with the following definitions:
Definition 4. An assignment or matching of workers to firms is a one-to-one
correspondence µ : V⋃S → V⋃S such that:
1. µ(j) ∈ S⋃{j} for any j ∈ V ;
2. µ(i) ∈ V⋃{i} for any i ∈ S;
3. µ(j) = i ⇔ µ(i) = j, j ∈ V and i ∈ S, i.e. µ(µ(j)) = j.
The first two points ensure that a vacancy can either be assigned to a worker in S or
left unfilled (assigned to itself: µ(j) = j). Similarly, a worker can either be assigned to
a vacancy in V or left unemployed (assigned to him/herself µ(i) = i). The last point
tells that if a vacancy is assigned to some worker, the worker has to be assigned to this
specific vacancy. We will sometimes refer to µ(X) as the match of X for X ∈ V⋃S.
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Moreover, every assignment µ has an associated assignment matrix A = [aij] with
entries defined as:
aij =
1 if µ(i) = j0 otherwise
Definition 5. Two measures P and Q defined on a sample space Ω are equivalent if
and only if whenever P (~ω) > 0 we also have Q(~ω) > 0 and vice versa for any ~ω ∈ Ω.
Clearly, given a realistic degree of skills diversity in Ψ, and as long as the formation
of skill combinations on the supply side is not perfectly coordinated with the sets of
skills demanded, the two probability measures P and Q on Ω will not be equivalent.
If P and Q are not equivalent, at least some of the entries in the skills mismatch
matrix SM = [smij], where smij is defined in eq.1.1, will be strictly positive. This
implies that in an assignment which minimizes the number of unassigned agents, the
minimum achievable sum of skills mismatches for the matched pairs - which we denote
by SMmin - will not necessarily be zero.
To find SMmin, we solve a general assignment problem (Kuhn [114]) with an NxM
cost matrix SM. Since in general N 6= M the problem is unbalanced. In labour
markets, the number of unemployed usually outweighs the number of open vacancies,
hence it is plausible to assume that N > M . The mathematical problem is then to
“pick exactly one element in each [column] (fill each open vacancy) in such a way that
each [row] (worker) is used at most once and that the total sum of the [M ] elements thus
chosen is minimal.” (Eiselt & Sandblom [52]). To balance the problem, we introduce
(N−M) dummy open vacancies that have zero skills mismatches with all workers. This
gives the transformed the NxN skills mismatch matrix S˜M. Any worker matched with
a dummy vacancy in the final assignment will be considered as unmatched (µ(i) = i).
The general assignment problem with NxN cost matrix S˜M can be solved as the









i=1 aij = 1 for j = 1, 2, ..., N
(2)
∑N
j=1 aij = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N
(3) aij = 1 or 0 for all i, j
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Several algorithms have been proposed to solve this problem. The Hungarian algo-
rithm (Kuhn [114]) is the most famous and earliest one, but many other methods exist
(cf. Dell’Amico & Toth [12] for an overview).
There can be several different assignments solving eq.1.8 subject to (1), (2), and












for any other assignment µˆ with assignment matrix Aˆ = [aˆij] which also satisfies con-
strains (1), (2), and (3).
Since the dummy vacancies introduced have zero skills mismatches with all workers,
the minimum skills mismatch achievable in the initial economy characterized by the








If all vacancies are to be filled, a lower level of overall skills mismatches could only
be achieved by changing the locations of some agents. However, as soon as at least one
worker or vacancy is moved, the measure space and hence the economy change. For a
given Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} and no unmatched vacancies, SMmin is therefore the minimum
possible sum of skills mismatches for the matched pairs.
From a policy perspective, suppose all vacancies in a given economy Ψ are filled
and the actual sum of skills mismatches is SMR. Knowing SMmin will be useful since
if SMR > SMmin, the policy maker knows that he could achieve a lower overall skills
mismatch level by simply reassigning existing workers among existing vacancies, i.e. the
assignment itself must be inefficient in terms of skills mismatches. On the other hand,
if SMR = SMmin, the matching is already optimal since it also satisfies constrains
(1), (2), and (3). A lower overall skills mismatch level could only be achieved by
implementing policies that change the locations of workers and/or vacancies.
The same exercise could be performed with the skills gap matrix SG instead of
SM. This would yield SGmin - the minimum skills gap level achievable in economy
Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} such that all vacancies are filled. From definitions 1 and 2, it is clear
that SGmin ≤ SMmin since sgij ≤ smij for all i, j. Moreover, if SG 6= SM, the optimal
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assignment(s) giving SMmin could be very different from those resulting in SGmin.
1.4 A Spatial Model of the Competitive Labour Market with
Imperfect Information
The previous section created a framework for thinking about skills diversity and
the way in which it is perceived by opposite sides of the labour market. We shall
now investigate how skills gaps, mismatches, and shortages influence the job match-
ing process and equilibrium outcomes in a competitive labour market with imperfect
information. Imperfect information implies that neither workers nor firms are able to
perfectly observe the measure space of the economy Ψ = {Ω,Z, P,Q} in which they
operate - an assumption that seems reasonable for a labour market with large numbers
of open vacancies and job seekers at any point in time.
We start by determining how skills heterogeneity affects agents’ preferences and
payoffs, then model the job application and competitive wage adjustment processes,
and discuss how skills heterogeneity influences competitive equilibrium outcomes.
1.4.1 Payoffs and rankings
As before, for simplicity, a firm operates exactly one vacancy and can only hire one
worker. Similarly, a worker can only be employed in one vacancy.
Let wij be the wage that worker i ∈ S receives if employed in vacancy j ∈ V . The
determination of the competitive wage is discussed below. For this subsection it is
enough to think of the wage as some positive real number.
As discussed in section 1.3, we continue to assume that, when considering skills
heterogeneity, workers only care about skills mismatches, whereas firms are only affected
by skills gaps.
Specifically, the profit of firm j that hires worker i ∈ S at wage wij is given by:
piij = pjyj(sgij)− wij (1.11)
where 0 < pj <∞ is the price charged by firm j and 0 ≤ yj(.) <∞ is firm j’s specific
production function which is monotonically decreasing in sgij. Moreover, let pijj = ψj ,
i.e. when vacancy j remains unfilled, firm j receives an exogenously given finite amount
ψj. This amount can either be interpreted as the cost (if −∞ < ψj ≤ 0), or as the
present value (if ∞ > ψj > 0) of leaving vacancy j open. In either case, we take ψj as
given, constant, and known by firm j at any point in time.
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Definition 6. At a given wage wij, worker i ∈ S is acceptable to firm j if and only
if piij = pjyj(sgij) − wij > ψj. Conversely, a worker is unacceptable if he/she is not
acceptable.
The definition simply says that at a given wage a worker is acceptable to a firm if the
firm would prefer to employ the worker at that wage rather than leave the vacancy open.
Note that a worker can be acceptable at a given wage w, but become unacceptable at
a higher wage w′ > w.
The utility of worker i ∈ S employed in vacancy j at wage wij is summarized as:
uij = ui(smij, wij) (1.12)
where ∂u
∂w
> 0 and ∂u
∂sm
< 0. Utility is decreasing in the skills mismatch smij because
being employed in a job that requires skills further away from his/her own combination
of skills is both costlier in terms of effort and less satisfying for the worker. Let uii = κi
be the utility that a job seeker gets if he/she remains unemployed.
Definition 7. At a given wage wij, vacancy j ∈ V is acceptable to worker i if and
only if uij = ui(smij, wij) > κi. Conversely, a vacancy is unacceptable if it is not
acceptable.
Akin to definition 6, definition 7 just tells that a vacancy is acceptable to a worker
at a given wage wij if and only if he/she prefers to be employed in that vacancy at
wij instead of being unemployed and receiving utility uii = κi. Again, a vacancy can
be acceptable to a worker at some wage w, but become unacceptable at a lower wage
w′′ < w.
We also assume that profits and utilities are independent across pairs, i.e. a firm
does not directly care about the profits of another firm and a worker’s utility is unrelated
to the utilities of the other workers.
If worker i observes a given vector of wages ~wi =< wi1, wi2, ..., wiM > for all open
vacancies, and the ith row of the skills mismatch matrix ~smi, he/she can rank all the
open vacancies V by utility. Let R(i, ~wi) defined on the set V
⋃{i} record this ranking.
For instance, suppose M = 3 and at the given vector of wages ~wi, worker i prefers
vacancy V2 to V1 and would rather remain unemployed than work for V3. The worker’s
ranking can be summarized as: R(i, ~wi) = {V2, V1, Si, V3}.
Similarly, given a vector of wages ~wj =< w1j, w2j, ..., wNj > and the jth column of
the skills gap matrix ~sgj, firm j can rank all workers S in terms of profits. Let R(j, ~wj)
defined on the set S⋃{j} record this ranking.
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We assume that the rankings R(i, ~wi) for any i ∈ S and R(j, ~wj) for any j ∈ V
satisfy the properties of complete ordering and transitivity. For the workers, complete
ordering implies that for any two open vacancies Vj and Vk, j 6= k, characterized by
benchmark skill requirements ~vj and ~vk and offering wages wij and wik to worker i
respectively, the worker can always rank the two vacancies, and say whether or not
these vacancies are acceptable to him/her at the given wages. Transitivity implies that
if worker i prefers Vj to Vk, and Vk to Vh, j 6= k 6= h, at the current wages offered, he/she
must also prefer Vj to Vh. The explanations of complete ordering and transitivity are
similar on the vacancies’ side.
1.4.2 Job application process
The first step in the job matching process is the job application. For a firm to be
able to hire a given worker, this worker must not only be seeking employment at the
time when the firm opens its vacancy, but he/she must also apply to be considered for
this open vacancy before the closing date. It is thus very important to understand what
drives application decisions.
The outcomes of the application process can be summarized in a bipartite network.
The nodes on the two opposite sides of this bipartite network correspond to the two finite
disjoint sets of open vacancies V = {V1, V2, ..., VM} and job seekers S = {S1, S2, ..., SN}.
A directed link from S to V corresponds to a job application. The network therefore
records the application decisions of all N workers and is the pictorial representation of
the NxM incidence matrix/graph B with entries defined as:
bij =
1 if i applies to j0 otherwise
As an illustration, Fig. 1.3 shows a simple network with only three vacancies and






Modelling the application process is therefore equivalent to modelling the formation
of the links in this bipartite network.
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Figure 1.3 Bipartite job applications network
Notes: A link from a worker to a vacancy corresponds to a job application, e.g. S2 applies to both V1
and V3.
Links originate on the workers’ side and are directed towards the set of open va-
cancies. Hence, those links, which lead to potential employment opportunities yielding
higher utility levels for the workers, should be relatively more likely to occur. This
paper assumes that workers’ utility is increasing in wages and decreasing in skills mis-
matches. A worker should thus be more likely to apply to jobs that pay higher wages
and/or with which he/she has a lower skills mismatch.
Specifically, suppose that there exists a base wage wj for each firm j that can be
publicly observed. Either the firm posts this wage together with the benchmark re-
quirements ~vj when opening its vacancy, or workers can recover it from representative
datasets like the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ONS), or websites like Glass-
door where people share anonymously the salaries that they are being paid in their
jobs.4 The base wage wj therefore corresponds to the typical wage paid for this type of
job and at this specific firm. Later, we shall also interpret wj as the wage that a worker
receives if employed in vacancy j in equilibrium such that there is no network-based
competition for him/her. We take these base wages as given and exogenous, just as a
job seeker would do when looking at what wages different firms typically pay.
We refer to the utility evaluated at the base wage as the ex-ante utility: uij =
ui(smij, wj), to differentiate it from the ex-post utility which is evaluated at the final
competitive wage wij that i receives in case he/she is matched with j in the competitive
equilibrium.
With perfect information about Ψ and wj, each worker i should be able to compute
an ex-ante utility uij = ui(smij, wj) for all j ∈ V and therefore rank all open vacan-
cies. However, in a large real labour market with imperfect information, it would be
unreasonable to expect such a complete preference list from any job seeker. The worker
4See http://www.glassdoor.co.uk/.
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might simply not be able to observe all suitable open vacancies. There could also be
some uncertainty about either smij or wj.
To incorporate imperfect information, uncertainty, and unobserved intrinsic prefer-
ences into the application process, we propose a model for the formation of the bipartite
job applications network that is inspired from the literature on spatial graphs. How-
ever, contrary to the standard spatial model in which “nodes are embedded in a metric
space” and “link formation depends [only] on the relative position of nodes in the
space” (Janssen [103]), we shall assume that link formation is influenced by overall
ex-ante utility levels, and therefore not only the skills mismatches but also the base
wages.
Intuitively, the probability of a link forming from Si to Vj in the bipartite network,
which corresponds to the probability with which worker i applies to vacancy j, shall be
increasing in the utility that i would get if employed at j: pij = pi(ui(smij, wj)) with
∂p
∂u
> 0. We use the ex-ante utility because the worker cannot foresee the competitive
wage he receives in equilibrium. To determine this wage, he/she would need to know
how much competition there will be for him/her, if any. However, the latter will
depend on the outside opportunities of the firms to which the worker applies - the
other applicants for the same vacancies - which the worker cannot observe. Indeed,
the worker is unaware of the application decisions of all the other job seekers because
he/she does not know the complete measure space Ψ.
To some extent, the spatial labour market model presented here can be seen as
a standard spatial model on the skills space, in which the relative positions of the
nodes have been deformed by firms being able to pay different base wages. If wages
did not enter the utility functions, workers would indeed be most likely to apply to
those jobs that match their skills combinations the best. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the base wage a person expects to be paid in a given job is an important
determinant of the application decision. Workers are consciously willing to experience a
higher degree of skills mismatch in exchange for a higher wage, and therefore base their
application decisions on the overall ex-ante utility they could get in the job considered.
In order to overcome the requirement of perfect information, we assume that given
wj and ~vj for all j ∈ V , there does exist for each worker i, a latent ranking of vacancies
R(i, ~wi). Nevertheless, this ranking does not have to be observed or known completely
by the worker, since its sole function is to determine for each worker i, a latent applica-
tion probability distribution over the set of vacancies V . The only requirement is that
application probabilities pij satisfy for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V :
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1. pij ∈ [0, 1];
2. if ui(smik, wk) > ui(smih, wh), k 6= h, then pik > pih;
3. pik(ui(smik, wk)) = 0 for any vacancy k that is unacceptable to worker i at wk.
The resulting bipartite applications network is “self-organizing” because it is “formed by
individual actions of autonomous agents” (Janssen [103]). Furthermore, despite being
driven by skills mismatches and base wages through their effect on utilities and appli-
cation probabilities, the job application process remains stochastic, thereby capturing
unobserved individual intrinsic preferences for certain positions, uncertainty about ei-
ther smij or wj, and/or information frictions (with positive probability workers are
unaware of the best opportunities available to them in the labour market and hence do
not apply for them).
Another characteristic that a realistic application process shall exhibit is a different
number of applications per job seeker. Incorporating this feature and understanding
why some workers only apply to one or two vacancies, while others apply to many,
is important as this plays a crucial role in determining the outside opportunities of
the firms and the workers in the competitive adjustment process analysed below. It
is reasonable to assume that the cost of applying is decreasing in the skills mismatch
(it is easier to write a cover letter for a job that requires your specific combination of
skills). Workers are therefore more likely to apply to jobs where their skills mismatch is
lower, which just reinforces the effect of skills mismatches on application probabilities
that was already present through their effect on utility.
To allow for different numbers of applications per worker, we assume that, for each
Si, the set of links in the bipartite network (the application decisions) is formed by
K random draws with replacement from the worker-specific application probabilities
distribution over the set of vacancies V = {V1, V2, ..., VM}. K is some positive integer
and we erase all multiple applications from one worker to the same vacancy. This last
step not only yields the desired result of having different numbers of applications per
worker, but also the following intuitive insight: those workers for whom there exists a
small number of vacancies that provide much higher utility than all the other ones, will
on average apply to fewer jobs. In some sense, for these workers there exists one best
job profile that acts as a focal point and a larger part of their K applications will be
allocated to applying to the job(s) that correspond(s) to this profile. Since any multiple
applications are erased, the total number of their applications will be smaller than the
average. On the contrary, for those workers who have a relatively general combination
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of skills and for whom there does not exist one best job profile, application decisions
will be more widespread and numerous.
The importance of properly modelling and understanding the application process
cannot be overstated. Indeed, competition for workers does not happen at the level of
the economy, but exclusively on the bipartite network formed through the simultaneous
application decisions of all workers. Hence, the bipartite applications network deter-
mines the outside opportunities of both the workers and the firms in the competitive
adjustment process that leads to the local (network-based) equilibrium outcomes.
1.4.3 Competitive wage adjustment
In the bipartite applications network, whose formation was studied in the previous
subsection, a firm potentially receives zero, one or several applications for its open
vacancy. Similarly, a worker applies to zero, one or several open vacancies. The network
therefore defines the outside opportunities for all agents. The objective is now to model
competition for workers on this bipartite network. We start with several definitions,
then propose a competitive wage adjustment process meant to mimic the way in which
firms compete for the workers who have applied for their open vacancies.
In this section, in order to simplify some of the proofs, we shall assume that the
level of heterogeneity - the n-dimensionality of the skills space Ω - is such that given
a wage vector ~w, a worker is never indifferent between two separate vacancies, or a
vacancy and being unmatched. Similarly, given ~w, an employer can always determine
whether or not a candidate is acceptable, and for any two acceptable candidates, say
which one he prefers.5
Definition 8. An individually rational outcome of the labour market is a one-to-
one assignment of workers to vacancies µ and a wage vector ~w such that:
• At ~w, workers are acceptable to the vacancies they are assigned to at µ:
piµ(j)j = pjyj(sgµ(j)j)− wµ(j)j ≥ ψj
for all j ∈ V , and piµ(j)j = ψj iff µ(j) = j;
• At ~w, vacancies are acceptable to the workers they are assigned to at µ:
5A more general treatment could be undertaken in future research, although this assumption is
probably not too far away from reality; when comparing two alternatives, it is often possible to find
one small extra characteristic that will make us decide in favour of one or the other.
36
uiµ(i) = ui(smiµ(i), wiµ(i)) ≥ κi
for all i ∈ S, and uiµ(i) = κi iff µ(i) = i.
Definition 9. An outcome in the core is an individually rational outcome (µ, ~w) such
that no worker-vacancy pair (i, j), with µ(i) 6= j, can negotiate a salary w˜ij such that:
• Si prefers Vj at w˜ij to his/her match at (µ, ~w):
ui(smij, w˜ij) > ui(smiµ(i), wiµ(i));
• Vj prefers Si at w˜ij to its match at (µ, ~w):
piij = pjyj(sgij)− w˜ij > piµ(j)j = pjyj(sgµ(j)j)− wµ(j)j.
Definition 10. An assignment µ respects an incidence matrix B if for all i ∈ S and
j ∈ V : if µ(i) = j then bij = 1.
In other words, an assignment respects an incidence matrix whenever a firm can
only hire a worker who has previously applied for its open vacancy, i.e. there exists
a directed link from this worker to the open vacancy in the corresponding bipartite
applications network.
Fix an incidence matrix B, formed as described in the previous subsection. The
competitive wage adjustment on the corresponding bipartite network is a discrete N -
dimensional time process [~wij(t)]j, one for each j ∈ V , with wij(t) ∈ N for any t =
0, 1, ..., T , during which wages evolve as follows:6
• t = 0:
wij(0) =
wj if bij = 1∞ otherwise
i.e. firm j starts by considering all received applications at the base wage wj. We assume
that firm j never makes wage offers below this wj for some institutional or reputational
reasons which we do not investigate here. Given the resulting initial vector of wages
~wij(0) and the jth column of the skills gap matrix ~sgj, firm j can rank all acceptable
applicants, if any, in terms of time zero profits:
6Note that the unit of the wage does not matter. It is only necessary that in each time period if
a wage rises, the increase is the same constant discrete amount for all firms and workers concerned.
Similarly, there is no obvious time interpretation for T. It should simply be conceived as the number
of steps necessary for the competitive wage adjustment to converge to an outcome in the core.
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piij(0) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(0)
Let the firm make a job offer to its best candidate at time t = 0, Bj(0), if any,
defined as:
Bj(0) =
max{i|bij=1} piij(0) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(0) if piij(0) > ψjØ otherwise
Note that if the firm receives no acceptable applications for its open vacancy, i.e.
piij(0) < ψj for all i such that bij = 1, it makes no offers at all, Bj(0) = Ø, leaves the
vacancy open and gets pijj = ψj > −∞.
• t ∈ [1, T − 1]:
A worker receives zero, one or several offers. Since in the application process a worker
never applies to an unacceptable job and firms cannot offer wages lower than the base
wages used by the worker to determine whether or not the vacancy is acceptable to
him/her, the worker never receives unacceptable offers. Hence, we condition his/her
choice only on the subset of firms which made him/her an offer in the previous step.
The worker will tentatively hold the best job offer at time t, Hi(t), if any:
Hi(t) =
max{j|Bj(t−1)=i} uij(t) = ui(smij, wij(t− 1)) if {j|Bj(t− 1) = i} 6= ØØ otherwise
(1.13)
The worker tentatively rejects the rest of the offers (if any). Until the very last
period T all rejections and acceptances of offers are tentative because a tentatively
rejected firm can come back to the same worker with a higher wage. Indeed, after each
round of firm offers and worker decisions, wages adjust as follows:
wij(t) =
wij(t− 1) + 1 if Bj(t− 1) = i and Hi(t) 6= jwij(t− 1) otherwise (1.14)
i.e. the wage of worker i at firm j rises by one unit at time t only if firm j made an
offer to i at t− 1 and i tentatively rejected this offer.
Given the new vector of wages ~wij(t), firm j re-optimizes. It recomputes all profits
and makes a job offer to its best candidate at time t, Bj(t), if any:
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Bj(t) =
max{i|bij=1} piij(t) = pjyj(sgij)− wij(t) if piij(t) > ψjØ otherwise (1.15)
Note that if firm j made an offer at t − 1 that was tentatively accepted at t, the
problem at t is exactly the same as the one faced at t − 1. Thus, the firm makes
the same offer to the same worker at t, i.e. Bj(t) = Bj(t − 1). This means that a
tentatively accepted offer remains valid until the worker rejects it for another offer that
gives him/her higher utility, if he/she ever receives such a better offer before T . If this
happens, the problem for the previously tentatively accepted firm changes as the wage
of its previous best match increases. The firm re-optimizes and either chooses to come
back to the same worker with a higher wage offering if at the new higher wage this
worker is still its best alternative, or opts for the new best alternative, which could be
leaving the vacancy open in case all workers (including the one that was the best match
before the wage rise) become unacceptable at the new wage vector.
• t = T :
The competitive wage adjustment process stops when no tentative rejections are issued
so that all wages converge: wij(T ) = wij(T − 1) for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V .
The outcome of this competitive wage adjustment process is a matching µ and a
wage vector ~w, such that:
µ(i) =
j iff Bj(T − 1) = i and Hi(T ) = ji otherwise
µ(j) =
i iff Bj(T − 1) = i and Hi(T ) = jj otherwise
Wages are only defined for the matched pairs, i.e.:
wij(T ) =
wij(T − 1) if µ(i) = jØ otherwise
The payoffs on both sides can be summarized as:
uij(T ) =
ui(smij, wij(T )) if µ(i) = jκi otherwise
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piij(T ) =
pjyj(sgij)− wij(T ) if µ(j) = iψj otherwise
Definition 11. A local competitive equilibrium on a bipartite network with asso-
ciated incidence matrix B is an outcome (µ, ~w), such that (µ, ~w) is in the core and µ
respects B.
Theorem 12. Fix a bipartite network with associated incidence matrix B. The com-
petitive wage adjustment process [~wij(t)]j, j ∈ V, t = 0, 1, ..., T , converges to a local
competitive equilibrium in T <∞ steps.
To prove Theorem, we need to show that the outcome resulting from the competitive
wage adjustment process (µ, ~w) is individually rational, in the core, and the assignment
µ respects the given incidence matrix B. We establish the proof of the theorem through
a series of lemmas.
Lemma 13. A worker who becomes unacceptable to a firm at step t < T, will never
become acceptable to this firm at a later step t′ > t.
Proof. If worker i becomes unacceptable to firm j at t < T, it must be because piij(t) =
pjyj(sgij) − wij(t) < ψj. By eq.1.14, at each iteration step in the wage adjustment
process, i’s wage can either remain constant or rise: wij(t
′) ≥ wij(t) for any t′ > t. This
implies that piij(t
′) ≤ piij(t) < ψj for any t′ > t and completes the proof.
Lemma 14. The wage adjustment process results in an assignment µ that respects the
initially given bipartite applications network with associated incidence matrix B.
Proof. The wage adjustment process starts by setting wij(0) =∞ for all workers i such
that bij = 0. This implies that any worker who has not applied for vacancy Vj in the
initially fixed bipartite network becomes unacceptable already at t = 0 since for any
such i, piij(0) = −∞ < ψj. By eq.1.15, a firm never makes an offer to an unacceptable
worker and by Lemma 13 a worker that becomes unacceptable to a firm at some t < T,
never becomes acceptable to this firm at a later t′ > t. This implies that, during the
wage adjustment process, firms only make offers, if any, to workers who had previously
applied for their open vacancies, i.e. for which bij = 1. Any resulting assignment of
workers to vacancies produced by the wage adjustment process will therefore respect B
by construction.
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Lemma 15. For any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to
firm j at wj, the competitive wage adjustment process {wij(t)} is bounded above.
Proof. The process starts by setting wij(0) = wj for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that
bij = 1. If worker i is acceptable to firm j at wj, the firm could make one or several
different wage offers to i during the wage adjustment process. The maximum wage
that firm j could ever offer worker i is pjyj(sgij) − ψj < ∞. At any higher wage wij,
worker i becomes unacceptable to firm j and by eq.1.15 a firm never makes offers to
unacceptable candidates. Furthermore, by eq.1.13, a worker only rejects a previously
tentatively accepted offer if he/she receives an offer from a different firm which gives
him/her higher utility. Hence, the maximum wage w∗ij that firm j would ever have to






ui(smik, pkyk(sgik)− ψk) + ε (1.16)
where ε→ 0 and k is such that bik = 1 and i is acceptable to k at wk. Since pkyk(sgik)−
ψk is finite for all such k, w
∗
ij is also finite. Hence, for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V , such that
bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to firm j at wj, the competitive wage adjustment
process {wij(t)} is bounded above by
supwij = min{pjyj(sgij)− ψj, w∗ij} (1.17)
where w∗ij is defined by eq.1.16.
Lemma 16. The wage adjustment process converges after a final number of steps T .
Proof. The wage adjustment process converges as soon as no tentative rejections are
issued and wages stop rising for all i ∈ S and j ∈ V .
The wage adjustment process is constant for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such that bij = 0
(wij(t) = ∞ for all t), or such that bij = 1 and worker i is unacceptable to firm j at
wj (wij(t) = wj for all t). This occurs because firm j never makes an offer to such a
worker.
Hence, we just need to show that {wij(t)} converges for any i ∈ S and j ∈ V such
that bij = 1 and worker i is acceptable to firm j at wj. For such (i, j) pairs, eq.1.14
implies that {wij(t)} is monotonically increasing. By Lemma 15, we also know that
{wij(t)} is bounded above by supwij as defined in eq.1.17. Since there are finitely
many links in the bipartite applications network on which competition for workers can
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happen, any {wij(t)} will always either converge to its supremum supwij after finitely
many steps, or the wage will stop rising at a level below supwij which depends on the
amount of competition for worker i in the network.
Lemma 17. The outcome (µ, ~w) to which the competitive wage adjustment process
converges is in the core.
Proof. By Lemma 14, µ respects B. It is trivial to show that µ is individually rational.
Workers never apply for vacancies that are unacceptable to them at the base wages,
and firms never offer wages below the base wages. Hence, µ always assigns workers to
either themselves or to vacancies acceptable at ~w. On the firms’ side, eq.1.15 implies
that firms never make offers to unacceptable applicants at any point during the wage
adjustment process. This proves that (µ, ~w) is individually rational.
Suppose that (µ, ~w) is individually rational, but not in the core. For this, there
must exist a worker-vacancy pair (i, j), with µ(i) 6= j, that can negotiate a salary w˜ij
such that:
• Si prefers Vj at w˜ij to his/her match at (µ, ~w):
ui(smij, w˜ij) > ui(smiµ(i), wiµ(i)) (1.18)
• Vj prefers Si at w˜ij to its match at (µ, ~w):
piij = pjyj(sgij)− w˜ij > piµ(j)j = pjyj(sgµ(j)j)− wµ(j)j (1.19)
Equation 1.19 implies that at some point in the adjustment process, firm j must have
made an offer w˜ij to i. By eq.1.15 a firm’s decision problem remains the same over time
unless the worker rejects its offer. Therefore i must have rejected j’s offer at w˜ij since
otherwise, j would never have made an offer to µ(j). By eq.1.13, workers reject an offer
only if they receive a competing offer that gives higher utility. This implies that i could
only have rejected j’s offer at w˜ij because he/she had a better offer wik from some firm
k at that time. Furthermore, the same argument implies that i’s final offer from firm
µ(i) at wiµ(i) must be at least as good as wik from k (with equality iff µ(i) = k) :
ui(smiµ(i), wiµ(i)) ≥ ui(smik, wik) > ui(smij, w˜ij)
which contradicts eq.1.18 and proves Lemma 17.
Lemma 17 completes the proof of Theorem 12.
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1.4.4 Local competitive equilibrium outcomes
The impact of skills heterogeneity on wages for those workers who are matched to
vacancies in a local equilibrium can be investigated by looking at the difference between
the competitive wage they receive and the base wage for their job: wij(T )− wj.
First, consider the case when wij(T ) = wj. This could happen for several reasons:
worker i applied to one or only a few jobs because his/her utility is very convex in skills
mismatches. Any small skills mismatch reduces utility by a lot. For this worker there
exists a specific job profile to which he/she applies most of the time, thereby willingly
constraining any potential future network-based competition for his/her skills. As a
real world example, think about a PhD mathematician who decides to apply only for
academic positions, thereby constraining himself any potential competition that there
could be for his skills in industry or quantitative finance jobs and that could have
pushed his wage above base levels.
Another scenario for wij(T ) = wj is someone who has a rather general background
and applied to many different jobs. His skills gaps are relatively large with most of the
vacancies to which he applied so that he is not a candidate for whom there would be
a lot of competition (as his wage starts rising he soon becomes unacceptable to many
firms to which he applied). This worker receives one offer from some firm that did not
get any better candidatures and hires him at the base level.
Finally, wij(T ) = wj could also happen if i and j are close to a perfect match for
each other, so that once i gets an offer from j he never wants to reject it for any other
offer, even when j is just offering him the base wage. Potentially j is prepared to
compete for i but this never happens because i never rejects j’s offer.
On the other hand, wij(T ) > wj indicates that there was at least one round of
network-based competition for the worker, i.e. the worker tentatively rejected the offer
of his final employer for a better one at least once in the negotiation process. For this
to happen, the worker must himself be of high calibre so that he gets several offers from
different employers, but also the worker’s final employer must be in a situation where he
does not have better alternatives. This could be the case if the vacancy is experiencing
a skills shortage as defined in section 1.3.3, so that the rest of the applicants have
relatively high skills gaps.
An important insight is that although employers in this model do not care about
the profits of other rival firms, they care about both the skills gaps with their own
applicants and the skills gaps that the rival firms experience in their applicants’ pools.
Consider a firm that receives several applications with only one of them being qualified
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for the vacancy. Even if it is able to hire the qualified candidate in a local equilibrium,
larger skills gaps in other candidates imply that the firm will compete for the qualified
worker more fiercely since the next best alternatives are not so attractive. If rival firms
are in a similar situation and compete for the same qualified worker, his wage could
rise well above the base level, eliminating most of the profit for his final employer.
Similarly, it is not necessary for some firm j to be experiencing a skills shortage (as
defined in eq.1.7) in order to be induced to participate in network-based competition for
its acceptable applicants and potentially lose all of them. The latter could occur if the
firms competing with j for its qualified workers are willing and able to raise their wages
sufficiently high. Vacancy j could also remain unfilled in a local competitive equilibrium
if the workers qualified for j in the economy are relatively unlikely to apply to j. For
instance, despite having zero skills gaps, the qualified workers could have substantial
skills mismatches with j. Even if they do have relatively low skills mismatches, they
could also be poached by other firms that offer higher base wages. Finally, an unfilled
vacancy could simply be an unlucky realisation of the random application process.
1.5 Conclusion & Future Research
This paper designs a unified abstract framework that allows us to conceptualise skills
gaps, mismatches, and shortages geometrically. We then propose a job matching model
meant to mimic the real labour market. In a first step, skills mismatches influence
the job application decisions of the workers, who do not have to possess the levels of
information and strategic sophistication often assumed in standard economic models
reviewed in Section 1.2. Job application decisions result in a bipartite network on which
competition, shaped by skills gaps, mismatches and shortages, takes place in a second
step.
The skills space, job application and competitive wage adjustment processes can
all be simulated as part of an agent-based model, which in future research could be
employed to further investigate how skills gaps, mismatches and shortages affect equi-
librium outcomes in the context of skills diversity in unity and imperfect information.
Another potential direction for future research is to recreate empirically the measure
space for the labour market of higher education graduates, i.e. project real world
descriptions of graduates and relevant job openings, together with quantity data, onto
a skills space whose dimension will be determined by how detailed the descriptions
are. For this, we would need to assemble a detailed list of skills that graduates acquire
while studying at university, i.e. create the skills space and construct the skills vectors
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characterizing higher education graduates. This could be done by looking at specific
programme descriptions for each degree and university or using online datasources
like LinkedIn, where people often provide detailed information on the courses taken
and their own skills. To generate the measure of the combinations of skills supplied
(measure P in Section 1.3.3), we would then need to get data on the actual numbers of
students graduating in a given year by university and degree. A similar exercise would
have to be conducted on the labour demand side, e.g. by using online vacancies data.
The measure Q could be constructed from the numbers of job postings that specifically
offer graduate employment or do not require substantial amount of work experience.
Once this is done, many interesting questions could be addressed and some policies
could be tested employing the techniques developed in Section 1.3. For instance, we
could find out objectively (i.e. without asking the employers themselves) which vacan-
cies are experiencing skills shortages, what the minimum achievable levels of skills gaps
and mismatches are, etc. This approach would also allow us to experiment with nation-
wide or university-level curricula reforms, in order to see how they would reduce skills
gaps, mismatches, shortages, and improve higher education graduates’ employability.
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2 The STEM Requirements of “Non-STEM” Jobs:
Evidence from UK Online Vacancy Postings and
Implications for Skills & Knowledge Shortages
Abstract
Do employers in “non-STEM” occupations (e.g. Graphic Designers, Economists)
seek to hire STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) grad-
uates with a higher probability than non-STEM ones for knowledge and skills
that they have acquired through their STEM education (e.g. “Microsoft C#”,
“Systems Engineering”) and not simply for their problem solving and analyti-
cal abilities? This is an important question in the UK where less than half of
STEM graduates work in STEM occupations and where this apparent leakage
from the “STEM pipeline” is often considered as a wastage of resources. To ad-
dress it, this paper goes beyond the discrete divide of occupations into STEM vs.
non-STEM and measures STEM requirements at the level of jobs by examining
the universe of UK online vacancy postings between 2012 and 2016. We design
and evaluate machine learning algorithms that classify thousands of keywords
collected from job adverts and millions of vacancies into STEM and non-STEM.
35% of all STEM jobs belong to non-STEM occupations and 15% of all postings
in non-STEM occupations are STEM. Moreover, STEM jobs are associated with
higher wages within both STEM and non-STEM occupations, even after con-
trolling for detailed occupations, education, experience requirements, employers,
etc. Although our results indicate that the STEM pipeline breakdown may be
less problematic than typically thought, we also find that many of the STEM
requirements of “non-STEM” jobs could be acquired with STEM training that
is less advanced than a full time STEM education. Hence, a more efficient way
of satisfying the STEM demand in non-STEM occupations could be to teach
more STEM in non-STEM disciplines. We develop a simple abstract framework
to show how this education policy could help reduce STEM shortages in both
STEM and non-STEM occupations.
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2.1 Introduction
“A whole range of STEM skills - from statistics to software
development - have become essential for jobs that never would
have been considered STEM positions. Yet, at least as our
education system is currently structured, students often only
acquire these skills within a STEM track.”
Matthew Sigelman [149]
To what extent do recruiters in non-STEM occupations (e.g. Graphic Designers,
Artists, Economists) require and value knowledge and skills that, within the UK edu-
cation system, are typically acquired in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics) disciplines?
Addressing this question is important because in the UK less than half of STEM
graduates work in STEM occupations.7 This apparent leakage from the “STEM pipeline”
is problematic for two main reasons.
Firstly, it is often considered as the main culprit for the existence of shortages of
qualified workers within STEM occupations (e.g. Scientists, Engineers), which may
have a negative impact on UK’s long term growth, e.g. by hindering investments in
R&D, technology and innovation (cf. for instance Levy and Hopkins [117], Forth &
Mason [69], Harrison [87]).
Secondly, STEM education is more expensive and difficult to acquire than non-
STEM one.8 Hence, if recruiters in non-STEM occupations do not really require and
value STEM knowledge and skills and simply like hiring STEM graduates for their
7This finding is robust to different ways of defining STEM occupations and STEM disciplines, e.g.
Chevalier [38] examines the Longitudinal Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (LDLHE)
survey and finds that 36% of scientific graduates work in scientific occupations six months after grad-
uation. The proportion is 46% three and a half years after graduation. Bosworth et al. [28] find that
core STEM occupations employ only 40% of core STEM degree holders.
8This is especially true for higher education, which is the main object of interest in this paper since,
as we shall see in Section 2.4, most STEM jobs correspond to positions that typically require higher
education nowadays. In the UK, part of the total public funding on higher education is provided by
the Higher Education Funding Council For England (HEFCE) in the form of grants to universities
and colleges. The funds are divided between institutions by using formulae which take into account
several factors, including the subjects taught. In particular, there are four distinct price groupings and
most STEM subjects fall into the “high cost” and intermediate price categories A to C because they
involve some laboratory experiments or fieldwork and are considered as “strategically important” for
the UK economy, while the majority of non-STEM subjects belong to price group D which corresponds
to “classroom-based subjects”. As a concrete example, in 2015-2016, institutions received from the
HEFCE between £10,000 per undergraduate studying a subject falling into price category A and £0
per undergraduate enrolled in a subject from category D (cf. HEFCE [54] for more details).
47
“foundation competencies” (Bosworth et al. [28]), “logical approach to solving prob-
lems” (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) [125]) or just because they
believe that STEM graduates are more capable than their non-STEM fellows, the UK
may be wasting a lot of money and efforts.
Another possibility, however, is that the discrete divide of occupations into STEM
vs. non-STEM is imperfect and does not capture the changing nature of the UK
economy, hit by trends like digitization, the arrival of Big Data, etc. which transform
business operations and infiltrate STEM requirements throughout the economy and, in
particular, outside positions that are typically considered as STEM.9
Indeed, “STEM occupations” are a relatively arbitrary construct. They are identi-
fied using judgment (Mason [120], BIS [125], BIS [26], Greenwood et al. [84], Depart-
ment for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) [65], Chevalier [38]), data-driven
approaches (Bosworth et al. [28], Rothwell [141]), or a combination of both (UK Com-
mission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) [64]). Most studies recognize that “the is-
sue of precisely where to draw the line between STEM and non-STEM never goes away”
(Bosworth et al. [28]), that “neither Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) sys-
tem codes nor Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are particularly valuable
to [classify STEM employment]” (BIS [125]), and that “STEM degree holders working
in a non-STEM occupation may still be using their STEM skills” (Bosworth. et al.
[28]).10
The only way to shed more light on this important issue is to go beyond occupations
9For example, see Brynjolfsson & McAfee [31] for a review of how Big Data is transforming man-
agement practices.
10Mason [120] applies judgment to the list of SOC occupations to identify those in which “the
application of scientific, engineering and/or technological skills and knowledge is central to the job-
holder’s work”. The list in Greenwood et al. [84] “was classified by a panel drawn from across the
STE subjects and disciplines and convened by The Royal Academy of Engineering”. BIS [125] rely
on previous studies, their own judgment, preliminary discussions with key organisations and employer
interviews to classify occupations into STEM Core, STEM related, STEM unrelated, and sectors into
STEM Specialist, STEM Generalist and non-STEM. Bosworth et al. [28] use the Labour Force Survey
to classify an occupation as STEM “if at least 15 per cent of its workforce is a STEM degree holder and
the occupation as a whole employs at least 0.5 per cent of the STEM workforce.” However, the problem
with using the percentage of STEM degree holders as an indicator for whether or not an occupation
is STEM, is that STEM graduates may be attracted to an occupation for reasons that are unrelated
to employers’ demand for STEM knowledge & skills, e.g. high wages. Recognizing this, UKCES [64]
complement the proportion of STEM graduates in an occupation with a combined index for numeracy
and problem solving skills use based on indicators from the UK Skills and Employment Survey. The
“objective analysis” based on these two indicators outputs a list of 61 occupations. UKCES then refine
this list using judgment. For instance, they remove health/medical occupations, teaching occupations
and aircraft pilots as irrelevant, while including other occupations that were not identified as STEM
in the objective analysis but “seem to be core STEM”, e.g. technicians. Rothwell [141] uses O*NET
Knowledge scales.
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and measure STEM requirements at the level of jobs. We shall attempt this by exam-
ining the universe of UK online vacancy postings. Our data comes from Burning Glass
Technologies (BGT), a labour market analytics company that collects and processes
information on all UK online vacancies posted on employer websites, major job boards,
government databases, etc. Where available, BGT collects job titles, occupation, indus-
try and employer identifiers, education, experience and discipline requirements, wages,
geographical locations ... and, most importantly, transforms the job description texts
into sets of keywords, e.g:11
“SAS - Writing - Data Collection - Econometrics - Project Design - Team Building - SQL - R”
“Financial Analysis – Photography – Rehabilitation”
Our goal is to identify STEM jobs as those “involving activities that can only be
satisfactorily carried out by individuals with STEM skills” (Bosworth et al. [28]). A
straightforward approach would therefore consist in classifying as STEM those vacancy
postings that explicitly require applicants to possess a STEM degree/qualification.
However, unfortunately, only around 12% of all vacancy postings in our data con-
tain any explicit discipline requirements. As we shall see below (Section 2.2), this small
subset of postings with explicit discipline requirements is actually very similar to the
rest of the vacancies in other respects (e.g. occupational and geographic distributions,
keywords posted, etc.). The fact that so few postings contain explicit discipline require-
ments therefore happens because most UK recruiters prefer to simply describe the open
position and the candidate that they are looking for directly, employing thousands of
different keywords, and not because the 12% of vacancies with explicit discipline re-
quirements form an inherently distinct subgroup.
Hence, instead of relying on whether or not the posting contains an explicit STEM
qualification requirement, we start by identifying “STEM keywords” - skills and knowl-
edge that are exclusively or much more likely to be taught in STEM disciplines (e.g.
“Systems Engineering”), or job tasks, tools and technologies for which a STEM educa-
tion is typically required (e.g. “C++”, “Design Software”) - using a method that we
call “context mapping” (Section 2.3.1). The key idea in “context mapping”, illustrated
in Figure 2.1, is to classify keywords based on their “steminess” - the percentage of
STEM discipline requirements with which a keyword appears in the subsample with
explicit discipline requirements.
11Figure 2.11 in the Appendix, taken from Carnevale et al. [34], shows how such information is
located and extracted from a specific US job advert.
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Figure 2.1 Intuition behind “Context Mapping”
Notes: Percentages of STEM vs. non-STEM discipline requirements with which a given keyword
appears in the subsample of vacancy postings with explicit discipline requirements. See Section 2.3.1
for more details.
We then propose and evaluate several different ways of employing the steminess of
all keywords in a given vacancy posting to classify it as STEM or non-STEM, as well as
estimate the probability that its recruiter looks for a STEM graduate.12 Our preferred
classification method uses the steminess of keywords from both the vacancy description
and the job title, and achieves an over 90% correct classification rate when tested on
the subsample with explicit discipline requirements, i.e. classifies a job as STEM when
the qualification requirement is a STEM discipline and as non-STEM when it is a
non-STEM one (Section 2.3.2).
Using this method, we classify all 33 million vacancy postings collected by BGT
between January 2012 and July 2016. We find that around 35% of all STEM jobs (i.e.
jobs classified as STEM based on the keywords) belong to non-STEM occupations.
Of course, nothing prevents STEM graduates working in non-STEM occupations from
choosing non-STEM jobs. However, if most of them happen to take up STEM em-
ployment opportunities, the fact that over half of STEM graduates work in non-STEM
occupations may not be as problematic as often thought.
The list of non-STEM occupations with relatively high percentages of STEM jobs
is very diverse and includes Chartered architectural technologists (85.42% in 2015),
Production managers and directors in construction (78.56%), Business, research and
administrative professionals n.e.c. (46.84%), Product, clothing and related designers
(45.62%), and even Artists (23.46%).
Perhaps surprisingly for the literature where financial occupations are typically con-
sidered as the main non-STEM group poaching STEM graduates, none of them is actu-
12For simplicity, throughout this paper, we often use the expression “STEM graduate” to mean
“STEM educated candidate” at any education level. Similarly, we use interchangeably the words
“recruiter”, “vacancy”, “job”, “posting”.
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ally top of the list in terms of the percentage of jobs classified as STEM. For instance,
among the seven occupations defined as financial in Chevalier [38], Management con-
sultants and business analysts was the one with the highest percentage of STEM jobs
in 2015: 25.33%, followed by Financial and accounting technicians with only 11.67%.
The reason may be that, within the UK education system, the “numerical skills” for
which financial occupations are thought to be seeking STEM graduates are actually
also often transmitted to non-STEM graduates in, e.g., Finance or Economics degrees.
Hence, although numerous jobs in financial occupations may end up being filled with
STEM graduates, when posting their vacancy, few financial recruiters describe the job
as one that could only be undertaken by someone with a STEM education.
As expected, most of the jobs within STEM occupations are identified as STEM
(81% of all), while, in non-STEM occupations, STEM jobs remain a minority - around
15% of all. However, even these small percentages add up to a significant number of
STEM employment opportunities outside STEM occupations and ignoring them leads
to underestimating the overall demand for STEM knowledge and skills. For instance,
in 2015, 2.66 million STEM vacancies were advertised online, while the number of jobs
posted in STEM occupations was only 2.15 million. Hence, equating STEM jobs with
STEM occupations would make us underestimate STEM demand by around half a
million vacancies.
An important argument often put forward to defend the view that the breakdown
of the STEM pipeline is problematic, is that STEM graduates receive a wage premium
only if they stay in STEM occupations, i.e. “STEM skills are not particularly valued in
non-STEM occupations” (Levy and Hopkins [117]). The evidence often mentioned is
the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) report [65] which finds
that “science graduates who work in science occupations earn a wage premium even
allowing for other factors. [...] The remainder work in other occupations where they
may well be using the analytical skills acquired during their education; however, they
do not earn a higher wage in these occupations than equivalent people who studied
other subjects”.13
In reality, the DIUS report uses the Longitudinal Destinations of Leavers from
Higher Education (LDLHE) and the Labour Force surveys and therefore cannot distin-
13A similar conclusion is reached by Chevalier [38] who also uses the LDLHE. Accounting for selection
into both science degrees and science occupations, he finds that the returns to a science degree are
small at 2% (and significant at 10% only) and are dominated by the returns to a scientific occupation
at 18% (and highly significant). The findings in Greenwood et al. [84] are more nuanced. They analyse
the Labour Force Survey between March 2004 and December 2010, and find that “degrees in STEM
are valued by the labour market anyway but particularly so in STE occupations.”
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guish between STEM and non-STEM jobs within non-STEM occupations. By contrast,
our approach allows us to make this distinction. Although our results are not directly
comparable because we examine the wage premium for STEM from the labour de-
mand side and we do not claim causality, we find that STEM jobs are associated with
higher wages within both STEM and non-STEM occupations. The premium remains
significant and large even after controlling for a full set of four-digit occupations, edu-
cation and experience requirements, counties, one/two digit industries, employers, etc.
Moreover, conditional on a full set of four-digit occupation fixed effects, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference between the wage premium offered for STEM knowledge
and skills in STEM occupations and the one offered in non-STEM ones.
Note that our results do not necessarily contradict but rather extend previous evi-
dence because, within non-STEM occupations, nothing prevents STEM graduates from
taking up non-STEM jobs, for which non-STEM graduates are also perfectly qualified
and no premium is offered. The distinction with previous studies is the finding that
around 15% of recruiters in non-STEM occupations do require STEM knowledge and
skills and offer to pay a premium when doing so.
Overall, our empirical results therefore suggest that the leakage from the STEM
pipeline may be less problematic than previously thought, because a significant propor-
tion of jobs in non-STEM occupations can only be satisfactorily fulfilled with people
possessing a certain level of STEM knowledge and skills, which, within the UK educa-
tion system, is typically acquired through a STEM education. Moreover, our findings
suggest that STEM shortages may exist not only in STEM occupations but also in
non-STEM ones.
Nonetheless, the STEM pipeline breakdown remains problematic for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, as already mentioned, many STEM graduates working in non-STEM
occupations could still be taking up non-STEM jobs. More importantly, there could
be more efficient ways of satisfying the STEM demand in non-STEM occupations than
training full-time STEM graduates.
In fact, an interesting feature distinguishes STEM jobs in STEM occupations from
their counterparts in non-STEM ones: while 60% of all keywords in the median posting
of a STEM job in a STEM occupation are STEM, this number is only 30% for a STEM
job in a non-STEM occupation. This suggests that STEM recruiters in non-STEM
occupations are in reality looking for a certain combination of STEM and non-STEM
knowledge and skills that lies in-between the STEM-dominated combination required
in STEM occupations and the predominantly non-STEM one asked for in non-STEM
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jobs.
A recent report by General Assembly & BGT [15] calls this type of jobs “hybrid”
since they “blend skills from disciplines which are typically found in disparate silos of
higher education.” They identify six “hybrid” job categories, e.g.: Marketing Automa-
tion, which “blends marketing with information technology”, Product Managers who
“draw from both business / marketing and computer programming”, UI/UX Designers
who “call on skill sets from design, programming and even psychology or anthropology.”
They also note that “while the market increasingly demands these skill cocktails,
higher education programs have been slower to package learning in such cross-disciplinary
ways.” Indeed, the reason why we identify these jobs as STEM occurs precisely because
their recruiters are still looking to hire STEM graduates with a higher probability than
non-STEM ones. This may happen because, within the UK education system, non-
STEM graduates are typically unqualified for such “hybrid” positions: even if they
possess the required non-STEM skills, they do not master the STEM ones, which may
be more difficult and/or expensive for the employer to train and are therefore a prereq-
uisite.
However, digging further into the STEM requirements of “non-STEM” jobs (i.e.
STEM jobs in non-STEM occupations), we find many skills and knowledge that could
certainly be acquired through appropriate training that is less advanced than a full-
time STEM degree - e.g. learning how to code in, say, “C++” or “Python” does not
necessitate a Bachelor in Computer Sciences. This agrees with the General Assembly
& BGT report which also emphasizes that these new hybrid roles “are accessible with
technical training less than a computer science degree.”
Although increasing the number of people studying STEM disciplines is one of the
most popular solutions proposed to reduce STEM shortages (e.g. Rothwell [140]), our
findings suggest that a more efficient way of satisfying STEM demand within non-
STEM occupations may be to teach more STEM in non-STEM disciplines in order to
make non-STEM graduates qualified for a set of jobs within non-STEM occupations for
which they only lack the STEM skills while already possessing the required non-STEM
ones. In Section 2.5, we construct a simple abstract framework to illustrate how STEM
shortages in STEM and non-STEM occupations are related and why this reform could
help alleviate both.
This paper inscribes itself in the literature that employs online vacancies’ data to in-
vestigate labour market dynamics and/or inform education provision policies. Although
this type of data comes with important caveats that we discuss in more details below
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in Section 2.2, it is highly valuable to both academics and policymakers because of its
many advantages over the more constrained and costly surveys which rely on random
sampling and are typically less detailed. Reamer [134], for example, gives an interesting
overview of how real-time labour market information could be used by different fed-
eral agencies and trade associations in the US to better align education programs with
current labor market demand. He also discusses the pros and cons of such usage.
The BGT data itself has already been employed for a variety of internal and external
research projects.
In the UK, BGT have partnered with the Institute for Public Policy Research
(IPPR) to create an online skills calculator that “compares entry-level employer de-
mand and the number of learners completing related programmes of study”.14
In the US, the paper most related to our work is Rothwell [140]. He uses a subset of
the BGT data for which the duration of the vacancy is known to show that STEM job
openings take longer to fill than non-STEM positions at all education levels. Contrary
to our paper, STEM jobs in Rothwell’s paper are still identified at the occupation level.
In particular, he uses O*NET Knowledge scales, as explained in his other paper [141]
that we discuss in some details in Section 2.4. He does not seek to use the keywords from
the vacancy descriptions to classify the job postings as STEM or non-STEM directly.
Instead, he defines the value of each BGT keyword, called “skill”, as the average salary
cited in the postings containing it. He finds that more valuable skills are advertised for
longer and that STEM positions tend to demand more valuable skills.
Several academic papers employ US BGT data to investigate the “upskilling” phe-
nomenon over the business cycle. Ballance et al. [22] find that an increased availability
of workers during downturns leads employers to raise their education and experience
requirements. However, as the authors show in their next paper [21], the upskilling
that happened during the Great Recession has been reversed as the labour market im-
proved from 2010-2014. By contrast, Hershbein and Kahn [93] argue that Ballance et
al. [21] “overstate the degree of downskilling during the later recovery” and provide
evidence that the Great Recession was a time of “cleansing” during which many firms
restructured their production in a manner consistent with routine-biased technological
change, therefore increasing skill requirements permanently.
Deming and Kahn [44] also use US BGT data, but this time the goal is to relate
variation in skill demands to firm performance and wage variation within occupations.
Although the topic of our paper is quite different from what Hershbein and Kahn
14http://wheretheworkis.org/
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[93] and Deming and Kahn [44] investigate, it is important to contrast the way in which
we work with the BGT data to what these authors have done, in particular because one
of the main contributions of our paper is to show how Natural Language Processing
(NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) techniques can be employed in exploring the BGT
data.
Hershbein and Kahn [93] use the keywords from the BGT vacancies data to define
“computer” and “cognitive” skill requirements. They designate an ad as requesting
computer skills if it contains the keyword “computer” or one of the keywords catego-
rized as “software” by BGT themselves (822 keywords in the UK taxonomy). They
consider as “cognitive” skills all BGT keywords that contain “research”, “analysis”,
“decision” and “thinking”, e.g.: “Online Research”, “Logit Analysis”, “Clinical Deci-
sion Support”, etc. In the UK BGT taxonomy, which contains 11,182 distinct keywords
overall, this amounts to 280 keywords. Hence, de facto, Hershbein and Kahn [93] clas-
sify less than 10% of all keywords as either “computer” or “cognitive” skill requirements
((280+822)/11182). The problem is that the unclassified 90% contain many keywords,
like “Algebra”, “Machine Learning”, “Natural Language Processing”, “Graph-Based
Algorithms”, etc. which actually correspond to cognitive skill requirements without
containing the four specific words that Hershbein and Kahn [93] focus on, and may also
require computer skills without being included in the BGT software category. Also,
note that the latter actually includes not only standard software like “Microsoft Ex-
cel” or “MATLAB”, but also many keywords that are not “computer” skills per se,
e.g.: “Flickr”, “LinkedIn”, “Microsoft Live Meeting”. Although the authors argue that
they “ensure that the presence of these keywords correlates with external measures
of cognitive skill at the occupation level”, “many of [their] analyses exploit firm-level
information”, and at this more disaggregated level, such an incomplete classification of
the BGT taxonomy could have tangible consequences. Moreover, on UK data, their
approach gives some surprising results even at the occupation level with, e.g. 65.06%
of Economists postings requiring cognitive skills in 2015, but only 44.39% of Mathe-
maticians doing so.
Deming and Kahn [44] take a similar approach but go a bit further. Although the
authors argue that “the primary contribution of [their] paper is to distill and analyze
the key words and phrases coded from the open text of ads in the BG data”, in reality,
they “distill” less than 20% of the BGT taxonomy by selecting the keywords that
contain around 30 commonly occurring words and phrases, regrouped into 8 categories
corresponding to different types of skills, e.g: cognitive, social, character, writing, etc.
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They also define computer and software skills based on the pre-existing BGT software
category and the words “computer” and “spreadsheets” (cf. Table 1 in [44]).
Neither Hershbein and Kahn [93], nor Deming and Kahn [44] show why the fact that
they work with such incomplete classifications of the BGT taxonomy does not affect
their results.
In this paper, we also do not manage to classify all BGT keywords into STEM and
non-STEM. However, we classify 85.55% of them and the remaining unclassified key-
words appear very rarely in the postings so that, on average, 99.99% of all keywords
collected from a vacancy with at least one keyword are actually classified. We further
implement out-of-sample tests which recreate the situation of having a certain propor-
tion of unclassified keywords to show that the number of misclassifications introduced
by not being able to classify the remaining less than 15% is very small. Finally, we
process the job titles into sets of keywords and add them to the BGT taxonomy, so
that our eventual classification of jobs into STEM and non-STEM is based on 29,831
distinct keywords with 99.82% of all vacancies in our data possessing at least one clas-
sified keyword and the median number of classified keywords per vacancy with at least
one being seven.
Our paper lies at the intersection of Data Science and Labour Economics/Economics
of Education, and therefore mainly relates to the emerging literature that applies ML
and NLP techniques to analyse complex big data and draw novel insights for important
policy issues. ML consists of “flexible, automatic approaches [...] used to detect patterns
within the data, with a primary focus on making predictions on future data” (Chiu
[39]). It is becoming an indispensable toolkit for economists working with big data
where standard approaches, like simply classifying a selected number of keywords, are
unsatisfactory and what is required from the researcher is to design, train and test
algorithms that can automatically perform classification tasks on huge quantities of
data. Varian [157], for instance, calls the tools needed “for manipulating and analyzing
big data” the “new tricks” for econometrics, and argues that they “should be more
widely known and used by economists”.
Einav and Levin [51] provide an interesting discussion and some examples of recent
uses of big data in economics. An example of ML application in labour economics is
Frey and Osborne [73] who examine the susceptibility of jobs to computerisation in
the US. The authors hand-label 70 out of 702 US occupations as either automatable
or not, then employ this sample to train a Gaussian process classifier and estimate
the probability of computerisation for all 702 occupations as a function of nine O*NET
56
variables that reflect bottlenecks to computerisation (e.g. finger dexterity, originality...).
Their findings indicate that about 47 percent of total US employment is at high risk of
computerisation (probability above 0.7).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We start by introducing the UK
BGT data in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we design, test and benchmark ML algorithms
to classify thousands of keywords and millions of online job postings into STEM and
non-STEM.
We then turn to the characteristics of STEM jobs in the UK in Section 2.4. To the
best of our knowledge, we provide the first attempt at going beyond the discrete divide of
occupations into STEM vs. non-STEM and documenting the occupational distribution
of STEM jobs. We look at both - how STEM jobs are distributed across occupations
and the percentage of jobs within an occupation that are STEM (STEM density).
We can think of the latter as a novel continuous way of describing the importance
of STEM requirements at the occupation level. In future work, occupational STEM
densities could potentially be employed to help get more precise estimates of STEM
demand. Currently, benchmark projections of demand for STEM-educated workers (e.g.
Wilson [161], Harrison [87]) are typically developed by combining a historical analysis
of patterns of employment by discipline from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) with the
forecasts of employment growth by broad sectors and major/sub-major occupations
produced in the Working Futures by the UKCES (cf. [63] for most recent report).
However, as noted in Wilson [161], this approach reflects “both supply and demand
influences”. We hope that our STEM density estimates contained in Table 17 could
help future research get rid of the supply influence, and therefore provide a cleaner
estimate of STEM demand.
Section 2.4 also examines the geographic distribution of STEM jobs, the wage pre-
mium for STEM, and closes by painting a more detailed profile of STEM jobs within
“non-STEM” occupations.
In Section 2.5, we design an abstract framework to help us think about the impli-
cations of our empirical findings for the existence of STEM shortages in STEM and
non-STEM occupations, as well as education policy initiatives that could help alleviate
them.
2.2 Data
Nowadays, when wanting to hire someone, employers usually go online and post a
job advert containing information about the vacancy they want to fill and the candidate
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they are looking for.
Burning Glass Technologies (BGT), a US labour market analytics company, has
been collecting and processing information on all online job postings in the UK since
2012. Currently, they “spider” (visit) approximately 5,000 websites including major job
boards (e.g. Career Builder, Universal Job Match), government job databases, direct
sites of employers of all sizes and industries, as well as websites of agencies specialised
in recruitment (e.g. Michael Page, Reed England).15
BGT robots go online on a daily basis. However, the same vacancy ad spidered
several times on the same or different platforms within a period of two months is
removed as a duplicate. BGT regularly upgrades its infrastructure to enhance coding
rules and expand posting sources, in which case it re-parses the entire database to
ensure consistency and comparability of postings over time. The sample used in this
paper runs from January 2012 to and including July 2016.16
Where available, BGT collects the job title, detailed information on occupation and
industry identifiers, the employer, the geographic location, education, experience, and
discipline requirements, wages, pay frequencies, salary types, and keywords from the job
description texts.17 However, since few recruiters explicitly specify all this information
in their vacancy postings and BGT does not impute any missing fields, the data contains
many missing values.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics about the numbers of vacancies and the
percentages of non-missing values in each year. Overall, our sample contains over 33
million of postings. Only 17.5% and 12.3% of them have minimum education and
experience requirements respectively (the percentages are even lower for maximum re-
quirements). The main reason is that employers often believe such information to be
transparent from other characteristics of their job advert. For instance, the recruiter
posting an “Aerospace Engineer” vacancy without an education requirement would not
expect to receive applications from people with GCSE as the highest qualification. It
should also be clear to the job seeker that the experience requirement of the vacancy
whose title reads “Vice President” is different from the one with a title containing
“Analyst”.
There are several other important caveats to bear in mind when working with online
15See http://www.careerbuilder.com/, https://jobsearch.direct.gov.uk/, https://www.reed.co.uk/,
etc.
16The sample was received in September 2016, after the August 2016 update.
17Figure 2.11 in the Appendix, taken from Carnevale et al. [34], shows how such information is
located and extracted from a specific US job advert.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Jan. 2012 - Jul. 2016 BGT sample
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Panel A: Main Table
Number of postings 5939705 7041917 6240340 8173962 5667039 33062963
% with Job Title 100 100 99.99 100 100 100
% with Occupation 99.73 99.54 99.44 99.51 99.48 99.54
% with County 95.55 88.88 80.04 77.8 79.66 84.09
% with Industry 47.08 45.78 46.96 45.37 45.06 46.01
% with Employer 24.86 29.73 30.93 31.85 32.2 30.03
% with Education (min) 16.24 18.28 19.02 17.27 16.85 17.56
% with Experience (min) 11.22 12.22 12.86 12.74 12.34 12.31
% with Salary 63.01 60.05 59.62 60.29 63.04 61.07
Hourly Salary (conditional on posting):
Min 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88
Max 72.12 72.12 72.12 72.12 72.12 72.12
Mean 15.58 16.10 16.50 17.17 17.21 16.54
Panel B: Keywords from Job Postings
% with >= 1 Keyword 92.01 89.71 89.94 89.93 89.11 90.12
No. of unique keywords 9064 9496 9795 9995 9477 11182
Number of Keywords per Vacancy (conditional on posting at least one):
Median 4 4 5 5 5 5
Mean 6.12 6.11 6.29 6.23 6.17 6.19
Max 226 211 115 111 167 226
Number of Vacancies per Keyword:
Median 59 67 56 71 55 173
as % of all postings 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mean 3689.97 4067.25 3605.1 4580.86 3285.9 16482.43
as % of all postings 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Most popular Keyword “Communication Skills”
% of postings 20.59 21.97 24.04 23.25 22.38 22.5
Panel C: Discipline Requirements
% with >= 1 CIP major 11.43 12.04 13.14 11.75 11.74 12.01
of which ...
% with > 1 CIP major 30.72 29.54 30.22 31.04 31.53 30.58
% with >= 1 Keyword 98.87 98.68 98.83 98.76 98.53 98.74
No. unique CIP majors 394 402 403 403 398 425
No. of unique Keywords 8523 8831 8998 9026 8684 9566
as % of all Keywords 94.03 93.00 91.86 90.31 91.63 85.55
Number of Keywords per Vacancy in this subsample (cond. on >= 1):
Median 8 7 8 8 8 8
Mean 9.47 9.04 9.17 9.13 9.21 9.19
Number of Vacancies per Keyword in this subsample:
Median 27.50 29.00 26.00 28.00 25.00 67.00
Mean 871.38 963.66 920.79 1071.34 802.01 3767.79
% with non-mixed disciplines 90.72 91.00 90.60 90.46 90.34 90.63
Correlation with all postings:
Keywords (No. times posted) 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94
Occupations (4-digit SOC, %s) 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81
County (%s) 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes: Occupation (4-digit UK SOC), Industry (SIC at division or section levels), Education and experience requirements
in years, Hourly salary (average of min and max if different). CIP stands for Classification of Instructional Programmes. %
with non-mixed disciplines gives the % of vacancies for which all disciplines posted are either all STEM or all non-STEM.
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postings data. Firstly, some misclassifications are unavoidable when collecting data on
such a grand scale. Moreover, not all vacancies are posted online, not all vacancies
transform into real jobs, and sometimes a recruiter might post one vacancy but in
reality seek to hire several people.
Despite all these shortcomings, occupational and geographic distributions in the
BGT data exhibit high correlations with the occupational and geographic distributions
of official UK employment data (the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS)). Table 15 in the Appendix shows the
distributions across major occupational groups for the 2014 UK BGT sample and the
2014 ONS ASHE. Their correlation is 0.94. However, as with US data, the UK data
also exhibits an over-representation of positions typically requiring higher education
(professional and associate professional occupations), and an under-representation of
those requiring lower levels of education.18
In terms of geographic distributions, the correlation at the regional level is also
very high: e.g. 0.95 for the 2015 sample (Table 16, Appendix). However, London is
over-represented in the BGT sample relative to ONS employment data by 8% pts.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare BGT data directly to the vacancies
data from the ONS Labour Market Statistical bulletins because ONS uses three-month
rolling averages (January-March, February-April, March-May, etc.), whereas BGT has
a two-months deduplication window. Hence, a given posting in the BGT sample could
appear more than once in ONS records. This may explain why, for instance, for 2014,
ONS has 7.9 million vacancies, whereas BGT data contains only 6.24 million postings.
Moreover, it is important to remember that while BGT data contains the universe
of online vacancies, both the ASHE and the Labour Market Statistical bulletins are
based on surveys of households or businesses. For instance, the ASHE is based on a
1% sample of employee jobs, drawn from HM Revenue and Customs Pay As You Earn
(PAYE) records. And as the ONS cautions itself, “results from sample surveys are
always estimates, not precise figures.”
2.2.1 Keywords from job postings
What makes BGT data stand out from more traditional sources of labour market
information is the fact that it also contains keywords and phrases from the vacancy
18For the US, Carnevale et al. [34] estimate that 80 to 90% of openings requiring at least a college
degree are posted online, whereas the numbers for those requiring some college (or an Associate’s
degree) and those only requiring high school are 30-40% and 40-60% respectively.
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description texts. Concretely, in the data, the vacancy description text appears as a
set of keywords taken out of context, e.g.:19
“Adobe After effects - E-Learning - Multi-Tasking - Audio Editing”
These keywords are collected using “a continuously expanding taxonomy” (Carnevale
et al. [34]). We can think of this taxonomy as the “language” that recruiters employ
to describe the job and the candidate they are looking for. It includes:
- Skills: “Organisational Skills”, “Time Management”, “Communication Skills”...
- Job tasks: “Advertising Design”, “Invoice Preparation”, “Lesson Planning”...
- Work styles: “Detail-oriented”, “Creativity”, “Initiative”...
- Software: “Microsoft Office”, “AJAX”, “Adobe Acrobat”...
- Knowledge: “Civil Engineering”, “Accountancy”...
- Other: “Her Majesty’s Treasury”, “FOREX”, ...
Any keyword in the job posting that has a match in the BGT taxonomy gets picked
up. The order and number of times the keywords appear in the original job posting are
ignored.20 The taxonomy expands as BGT robots discover new keywords in job ads.
Once new keywords are added to the taxonomy, all previous postings are re-examined
to ensure consistency and comparability over time.
Currently, the taxonomy contains 11,182 distinct keywords, and 90% of all postings
have at least one keyword (Panel B, Table 1). However, conditional on having at least
one, the median number of keywords per vacancy is only 4-5. More importantly, in a
given year, the median keyword appears in less than 0.001% of all postings. In fact, even
the most popular keyword - “Communication Skills”, appears in less than a quarter of
all postings.
2.2.2 Explicit discipline requirements
Only around 12% of all job adverts contain specific discipline requirements (Panel
C, Table 1), e.g.: “Chemistry”, “Economics”.
19BGT refers to them as “skills”. However, because they also contain many expressions which,
strictly speaking, are not “skills”, we prefer to refer to both single word (e.g. “Research”) and multiple
word phrases (“Academic Programme Management”) as simply “keywords”. In practice, we removed
the white space between the words in multiple word phrases to avoid treating, for instance, “Lotus
Notes” and “LotusNotes” as distinct “keywords”.
20Hence, the vacancy representation in our data is closer to what in the information retrieval liter-
ature is called a “boolean retrieval” rather than a “bag of words” model, although what is collected
are specific keywords and phrases instead of all tokens (cf. Manning et al. [118]).
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The fact that most recruiters prefer to express their skills & knowledge requirements
directly, by simply describing the open position and the candidate that they are looking
for, is an important reason for attempting to identify STEM jobs from the vacancy
description keywords, and not by relying on whether or not the posting contains an
explicit STEM qualification/degree requirement.
However, since our goal is precisely to identify STEM jobs as those whose recruiters
would most likely seek to hire STEM graduates, this sample with explicit discipline
requirements constitutes an important first step in our analysis. Within it, STEM jobs
are already identified because we can directly observe whether the discipline posted is
STEM or non-STEM.
Merging together observations for Jan. 2012 - Jul. 2016, we obtain almost 4 million
vacancies with explicit discipline requirements. The 425 distinct disciplines posted in
these 4 million vacancies correspond to majors from the Classification of Instructional
Programs (CIP) - a taxonomic coding scheme of over 2,000 instructional programs,
developed by the US Department of Education. The CIP has two-digit, four-digit, and
six-digit series, and most of the programs are offered at the post-secondary level.21
We define STEM disciplines as the majors included in the CIP two-digit series cor-
responding to: Biological & Biomedical, Physical, and Computer Sciences, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics & Statistics. Table 18 in the Appendix provides the
full list of disciplines contained within each group and that appear in our sample. All
remaining disciplines in our data belong to different two-digit series and are there-
fore classified as non-STEM. Note that there is disagreement in the literature about
whether Medical programs, Agricultural sciences, Environmental sciences and Archi-
tecture should be classified as STEM or not. In this paper, we decided to take the
STEM acronym literally and therefore exclude these disciplines. However, future re-
search could certainly explore alternative classifications.22
21A small proportion of the CIP corresponds to residency (dental, medical, podiatric, and veterinary
specialties) and personal improvement and leisure programs; and instructional programs that lead to
diplomas and certificates at the secondary level only. The latest 2010 edition of the CIP is available at:
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/cipcode/Default.aspx?y=55. Note that the fact that the discipline is posted
explicitly does not imply that the recruiter also specifies the minimum education level required. Indeed,
in the sample with explicit discipline requirements, 38% of education level requirements are missing.
57.89% of those posted correspond to a minimum NQF level 6 or above (i.e. at least a Bachelor’s
degree).
22Similarly, although the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides a list of CIP pro-
grams that it classifies as STEM, we decided not to use it because it has been created “for purposes of
[a] STEM optional practical training extension” and contains a wide range of STEM-related disciplines
in addition to the core ones, e.g. “Educational Evaluation and Research”. Moreover it is not directly
comparable to the Joint Academic Coding System used in UK studies to classify disciplines as STEM
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of discipline requirements
Notes: 3971988 vacancies with explicit discipline requirements (Jan. 2012 - July 2016).
Around 30% of postings with explicit discipline requirements specify more than
one CIP major. For such postings, we re-weight each major by the number of majors
specified so that the overall discipline requirement sums to one.23
Figure 2.2 shows the resulting distribution of discipline requirements: 50.61% of
CIP majors specified belong to non-STEM fields, while the rest are spread throughout
the STEM domains, with 25.83% belonging to Engineering.
Only 9.27% of postings have mixed discipline requirements, i.e. specify CIP majors
belonging to both STEM and non-STEM domains. 44.55% of vacancies have purely
STEM discipline requirements and 46.17% have purely Non-STEM ones.
Classifying a job as STEM if the percentage of STEM discipline requirements is
above 50, Table 2 shows that over 30% of STEM jobs belong to Non-STEM occupa-
tions.24 Restricting the definition to 100% STEM discipline requirements slightly lowers
this percentage (29.37%).
Although these results are based on only 12% of all UK vacancies, they constitute
or non-STEM.
23This ensures that we do not count such vacancies as many times as the number of disciplines that
they specify instead of one, and also makes intuitive sense since a vacancy with two distinct discipline
requirements is probably looking for a combination of knowledge and skills from both of them.
24Given the lack of a consistent “official” classification of four-digit occupations into STEM and
non-STEM, we decided to merge together the lists from several widely cited UK studies: UKCES [64],
Mason [120], BIS [26] and Greenwood et al. [84], resulting in a list of 73 four-digit STEM occupations:
1121, 1123, 1136, 1137, 1255, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2119, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128,
2129, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2139, 2141, 2142, 2150, 2212, 2216, 2321, 2431, 2432,
2461, 2462, 2463, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3115, 3116, 3119, 3121, 3122, 3123, 3131, 3132, 3217, 3218,
3567, 5211, 5212, 5213, 5214, 5215, 5216, 5221, 5222, 5223, 5224, 5231, 5232, 5233, 5241, 5242, 5243,
5244, 5245, 5249, 5314, 8143.
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Table 2: STEM jobs in the sample with explicit discipline requirements
STEM job = % STEM disciplines >50 % STEM disciplines = 100








STEM occupations 81.64 69.46 78.45 70.63
Non-STEM occupations 24.11 30.54 21.92 29.37
Notes: Based on the sample of 3957387 vacancies with explicit discipline requirements and an
occupation identifier. 1869128 STEM jobs, 1590254 jobs in STEM occupations.
an important robustness check and a preview of some of our findings because the sam-
ple with explicit discipline requirements has a 0.81 occupational correlation with the
complete set of postings at the most refined 4-digit SOC level.
In what follows, our goal will be to classify all UK vacancies as STEM or Non-STEM
based on the keywords collected from their online postings.
2.3 Identifying STEM Keywords and Jobs
Irrespective of the occupations to which they belong, we want to identify STEM
jobs as those whose vacancy descriptions contain “STEM keywords” - knowledge and
skills that are typically acquired through a STEM education, or software/technological
devices/job tasks that require and apply STEM knowledge & skills. Intuitively, re-
cruiters employing STEM keywords when describing the job they want to fill and the
candidate that they are looking for will be much more likely to seek to hire people with
a STEM education even if they do not explicitly post a STEM discipline requirement.
Our approach consists of two steps: in Subsection 2.3.1, we identify STEM keywords
using a method that we call “context mapping”. The key idea in “context mapping”,
illustrated in Figure 2.1, is to classify keywords based on their “steminess” - the percent-
age of STEM discipline requirements with which the keywords appear in the sample
where we observe both keywords and discipline requirements. Subsection 2.3.2 then
proposes and evaluates several different ways of employing the steminess of the key-
words found in an online vacancy posting to classify it as STEM or non-STEM, as well
as estimate the probability that its recruiter looks for a STEM graduate.
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2.3.1 STEM keywords
The classification problem here is very simple: the BGT taxonomy contains 11,182
distinct keywords and we want to label as “STEM” those which correspond to knowledge
and skills that are typically acquired through a STEM education, or software/technological
devices/job tasks for which a STEM background is typically required in the labour mar-
ket.
In theory, we could inspect all the keywords one by one and manually select those
that seem to be STEM. In practice, this exercise is infeasible because of the thousands
of technical terms, which may or may not be related to STEM, and that would require
expert knowledge in order to be correctly classified, e.g.:
“Leachate Management”, “Olas”, “Step 7 PLC”, “NASH”, “Antifungal”, “800-53”...
Even reading about these terms still leaves a lot of uncertainty and subjectivity
in deciding on how to classify them. By contrast, this classification decision would
be obvious to the recruiters employing these terms in their job descriptions since they
should not only have a precise understanding of what these technical terms mean but
also know the education background that successful job applicants for their advertised
positions typically possess.
Luckily, 85.55% of all the BGT taxonomy (9566 keywords) ever appears in the
subsample of vacancies with explicit discipline requirements (cf. Panel C, Table 1).
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2.2, for a vacancy selected at random from this sample, there
is a roughly equal chance of finding a STEM or a non-STEM discipline requirement.
Hence, a simple strategy, illustrated in Figure 2.1, is to separate the 9566 “classifiable”
keywords into STEM, Neutral and Non-STEM depending on the discipline “contexts”
in which they appear. Intuitively, a proper STEM skill, knowledge, task should rarely
appear together with a non-STEM degree because it requires a proper STEM education
and a STEM qualification. Similarly, non-STEM skills (e.g. “Cooking”), knowledge
(e.g. “French”), tasks (e.g. “Account Reconciliation”) would rarely appear in STEM
contexts since they require a non-STEM education. At the same time, “Communication
skills”, “Leadership”, “Research”, “Presentation skills” are neither STEM, nor non-
STEM specific skills, and therefore should not appear more often in vacancy descriptions
of jobs requiring a STEM education than those requiring a non-STEM one. These are
the “neutral” keywords.
Figure 2.1 shows some concrete examples: 95% of all disciplines with which the key-
word “C++” appears are STEM. By contrast, “English” appears with STEM discipline
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requirements less than 30% of the time.
Let us refer to the percentage of STEM discipline requirements with which a key-
word appears in the sample with both keywords and discipline requirements as its
“steminess”.25
After computing the steminess of all keywords, clustering techniques can be used
to separate them into STEM, Neutral, and non-STEM, then further disentangle the
STEM domain to which a STEM keyword is most likely to be related.
An important implicit assumption behind our strategy is that the subsample used
to classify the keywords has the same underlying properties as the sample of all UK
vacancies. As shown at the bottom of Panel C in Table 1, this seems to be the case
since there is a 0.94 correlation between the frequency of posting a given keyword in
the subsample with explicit discipline requirements and the sample of all postings. The
correlations between the occupational and geographic distributions in the two samples
are also very high: 0.81 and 0.99.
The insert on the next page shows the detailed steps of our strategy. We call it
“context mapping” because the idea comes from Ethnography - the study of people and
cultures. Ethnographers often seek to understand human behaviour by investigating
“the environment in which the behaviour under study takes place”, i.e. creating a
“context mapping”.26 In our case, to understand whether a keyword should be classified
as STEM, neutral or non-STEM, we look at whether the keyword appears more often
with explicit STEM education requirements than with non-STEM ones, i.e. record
the distribution of STEM vs. non-STEM discipline “contexts” in which the keyword
appears.
In Step 1, we simply record, for any vacancy j that belongs to the sample with
both keywords and explicit discipline requirements (VD ∩ VK), the distribution of j’s
disciplines over the six STEM domains and the non-STEM one in the vector cj. This
step is necessary because 30% of vacancies post multiple disciplines. We then focus
on the 9566 keywords K C that ever appear in VD ∩ VK - the “classifiable” keywords.
Whenever a keyword appears in a vacancy with discipline requirements, it appears in a
“context” in which the distribution of disciplines over the STEM domains and the non-
STEM one is given by cj. Step 2 records the average distribution of disciplines among
all the contexts in which k appears as xk. The steminess of a keyword is simply the
25Credit to Rob Valletta for coining this term at the IZA Workshop. Also, we do not use “stemness”




Algorithm 1 Context Mapping
Notation: Let V = {j} denote the set of vacancies (empty jobs), K = {k} the set of keywords,
D = {d} the set of disciplines.
Vacancy j’s online description contains keywords Kj and discipline requirements Dj .
Define VD ⊂ V as the subset of vacancies that post at least one discipline requirement:
VD := {j|Dj 6= Ø}
Similarly, VK ⊂ V the vacancies with at least one keyword:
VK := {j|Kj 6= Ø}
Let C = {C1, ..., C7}, with C1 = Biology, C2 = Physics, C3 = Computer Sciences, C4 = Technology,
C5 = Engineering, C6 = Mathematics, and C7 = Non-STEM.
Step 1: For all j ∈ VD ∩ VK , record the distribution of j’s discipline requirements over C as







where p = 1, ..., 7, I(.) is the indicator function and |.| denotes the cardinality of a set.
Step 2: Consider the set of keywords K C ⊂ K such that:
K C := {k ∈ Kj |j ∈ VD ∩ VK}
For any k ∈ K C , let Vk ⊂ VD ∩ VK be the subset of vacancies with discipline requirements that
post k:
Vk := {j ∈ VD ∩ VK |k ∈ Kj}
Call Vk the “contexts” in which k appears and create a context mapping for k by taking the average
distribution of disciplines in Vk:






The steminess of keyword k is defined as steminessk = 1− xk,7.
Step 3: Classify the “classifiable” keywords K C into three clusters G1 = {G1, G2, G3} with G1 =












k∈Gl steminessk. The optimal parition is found using the algorithm
described in Hartigan and Wong [88] with initial centroids selected as 0 (Non-STEM), 0.5 (Neutral)
and 1 (STEM).
Step 4: Let K STEM be the keywords identified in Step 3 as belonging to the STEM cluster.
Classify K STEM into six clusters G2 = {G1, ..., G6} where G2 are the six STEM domains, e.g. G1=










The solution is found as in Step 3 but with initial centroids selected as [I6;0] with I6 being the 6×6
identity matrix.
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proportion of STEM domains in xk. Steps 3 and 4 implement a K−means clustering
where we specify both the number of centers and their initial locations. In Step 3,
we use the steminess of the keywords to partition them into STEM, neutral and non-
STEM. The initial centroids are therefore 0, 0.5, and 1 corresponding to 0% STEM
(Non-STEM cluster), 50% STEM (Neutral cluster) and 100% STEM (STEM cluster).
Step 4 classifies the STEM keywords into different STEM domains. The six initial
centroids allocate 100% to each of the STEM domains.27
Figure 2.3 shows examples of randomly selected keywords from the resulting clusters.
The method does not claim to be perfect. Nevertheless, “context mapping” does have
the advantage of systematically classifying over 85% of all the BGT taxonomy, including
many technical terms. More importantly, as Fig. 2.3 and further manual checks suggest,
the resulting classification does seem fairly plausible.
For instance, “Step 7 PLC” is classified into the Technology cluster because it is
an “engineering system in industrial automation”.28 “NASH” has nothing to do either
with John Nash, or with STEM, or with non-STEM; it is the acronym for either “Non
Alcoholic Steato Hepatitis”, or “News About Software Hardware”, or “Nashville”...
Given this ambiguity, “NASH” cannot help us understand whether or not a job requires
STEM knowledge and skills, hence the algorithm correctly classifies it as a neutral key-
word. “800-53” is allocated to the Computer Sciences cluster since the “NIST Special
Publication 800-53” is a catalog of security controls for federal information systems in
the US. It is highly probable that people who would be referring to this publication
in their jobs would also be required to understand how information systems work and
are secured - knowledge that can be acquired through a degree like “Computer and
Information Systems Security/Information Assurance” (cf. Table 18 in the Appendix).
Note that keywords like “Mathematics”, “Computer Skills”, “Problem Solving” all
appear in the neutral cluster. This is precisely because within the UK education sys-
tem, such skills are not exclusively taught in STEM tracks. For instance, “Mathe-
27Usually, in K-means clustering, the number of clusters is unknown. Researchers “try several
different choices, and look for the one with the most useful or interpretable solution” (James et al.
[98], chapter 10). Moreover, given a number of clusters, their initial locations (the centroids) are
picked randomly and the resulting partition depends on this initial random selection. In our case
both problems are avoided since the choices of the number of clusters and their locations are dictated
by the type of information that we wish to extract. However, future research could explore more
refined clustering or even other approaches: “with these methods, there is no single right answer—any
solution that exposes some interesting aspects of the data should be considered.”[98] Similarly, while
the objective function in K-means clustering is the residual sum of squares, it would certainly be
possible to try different criteria.
28http://w3.siemens.com/mcms/simatic-controller-software/en/pages/default.aspx
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Figure 2.3 Examples of STEM (by cluster), non-STEM and neutral keywords
Biological & Biomedical Sciences Physical Sciences
Computer Sciences Technology
Notes: Continued on next page.
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Engineering Mathematics & Statistics
Non-STEM Neutral
Notes: Random samples of around 100 distinct keywords collected from UK online vacancies and
classified using context mapping and clustering. Size and color are by frequency of being posted.
Figures created using wordcloud R package by Fellows [62].
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Table 3: Steminess in STEM, Neutral and Non-STEM clusters
Cluster Steminess No. Keywords
Mean Median Min
STEM 0.89 0.91 0.69 3685
Neutral 0.49 0.50 0.29 2491
Non-STEM 0.10 0.08 0.00 3390
Notes: Summary statistics from the classification of 9566 keywords into STEM,
Neutral and Non-STEM clusters.
matics” on its own is often mentioned as a general basic skill requirement by many
different recruiters looking for STEM and non-STEM graduates alike. It seems that
a recruiter looking specifically for a Mathematics/Statistics graduate, would use much
more precise keywords like “Mathematical Modelling”, “Statistics”, or technical terms,
e.g. “Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID)”, “Stochastic Optimisa-
tion”, etc. Indeed, the steminess of “Mathematics” is only 0.395, while it rises to 0.738
for “Statistics” and 0.892 for “Mathematical Modelling”.
BGT themselves classify 822 keywords as “Software and Programming”. However,
some of the software included in this category could be relatively easily learned/operated
with no STEM background, e.g. “Microsoft Excel”, enterprise software like “Oracle Hu-
man Resources”, etc., or do not have much to do with a STEM education, e.g. “Flickr”,
“LinkedIn”, etc. Context mapping classifies these keywords as either neutral or even
non-STEM and clearly separates them from software and programming that do require
advanced STEM knowledge and skills, e.g. “Microsoft C#”, “UNIX Administration”.
Interestingly, among STEM software, statistical packages like “SAS” and “R” are as-
signed to the Mathematics & Statistics cluster because they mainly require knowledge
of statistical analysis rather than very advanced computer programming skills. Other
types of statistical software like “Stata” and “E-Views” are assigned to the neutral
cluster because they are not more often taught in STEM disciplines than non-STEM
ones. Hence, if such software were the only requirement the recruiter had, he would
not be seeking STEM graduates with a higher probability than non-STEM ones.
Tables 3 and 4 provide further details on the distribution of discipline requirements
within each cluster identified. For instance, the mean, median and min steminess of
STEM keywords are 0.89, 0.91, and 0.69 respectively, while they are only 0.10, 0.08,
and 0 for Non-STEM keywords respectively. Table 4 suggests that the Biology cluster
is the best identified and most coherent with a 73% average loading on the Biological &
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Table 4: STEM domains clusters (STEM keywords only)
Cluster Average distribution of disciplines No. Keywords
Biology Computer Engineering Maths Physics Technology Non-STEM
Biology 0.73 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.11 754
Computer 0.01 0.53 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.13 639
Engineering 0.01 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.10 1266
Maths 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.49 0.05 0.02 0.13 152
Physics 0.12 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.45 0.05 0.11 372
Technology 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.55 0.09 502
Notes: Summary statistics from the classification of 3685 STEM keywords into six STEM domains.
Biomedical Sciences for the 754 keywords belonging to it. The Mathematics & Statistics
cluster is the worst identified with only a 49% average loading on Mathematics &
Statistics.
Note that although overall 85.55% of the BGT taxonomy are classified through
Algorithm 1, the percentage of classified keywords in any given year actually ranges
between 90.31% for 2015 and 94.03% for 2012 (cf. Table 1, Panel C). More importantly,
Table 5 shows that, on average, 99.99% of all keywords posted in a vacancy with at
least one are classified. A median vacancy has all 100% of its keywords classified.
This happens because the unclassified keywords are precisely those that are posted
least frequently: within the total sample of 33 million postings, the mean and median
unclassified keywords appear respectively in 13.57 and 5 job ads, whereas for classified
keywords the numbers are 19264.55 and 322 respectively.
2.3.2 STEM jobs
Steminess-based approaches Having classified individual keywords in the previous
subsection, we now turn to the classification of jobs. And, since in our data jobs are
nothing more than sets of keywords, e.g.:
“Training Programmes - Decision Making - Rugby”
classifying them is equivalent to labelling sets of keywords as STEM or non-STEM.
Perhaps the simplest way of doing this is to label those sets that contain at least one
STEM keyword as STEM and the rest as non-STEM. Intuitively, since we identified
STEM keywords as the skills and knowledge that are typically taught within STEM dis-
ciplines, or software/tools/technological devices/job tasks that apply STEM knowledge
and skills, the presence of a STEM keyword in the vacancy description could well serve
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Table 5: Classified vs. Unclassified Keywords
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
% of Classified Keywords in a posting with >= 1 Keyword:
Mean 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.99
Median 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of Vacancies per Unclassified Keyword:
Mean 4.20 4.34 3.75 9.26 6.05 13.57
Median 2 2 2 3 3 5
Number of Vacancies per Classified Keyword:
Mean 3923.93 4373.20 3924.09 5071.65 3585.40 19264.55
Median 77 90 80 102 78 322
Notes: The classified keywords correspond to the 85.55% of the BGT taxonomy that ever appear
in the sample with explicit disciplines and can therefore be classified using Algorithm 1.
as an indicator for the fact that its recruiter is going to look preferably for someone
with a STEM education.
How well would this simple strategy work if implemented to recognize STEM and
non-STEM jobs within the sample where discipline requirements are posted explicitly,
i.e. the truth is known?
To address this question, we can create a so-called “confusion matrix”:
True outcome
Prediction Non-STEM disciplines STEM disciplines
Non-STEM job Correct classification Misclassified into Non-STEM
STEM job Misclassified into STEM Correct classification
We classify jobs correctly if we predict STEM when the disciplines posted are indeed
STEM and non-STEM when the explicit discipline requirements are also non-STEM.
If our strategy predicts non-STEM (STEM) whereas the actual disciplines required are
STEM (non-STEM), we have misclassified the job into non-STEM (STEM).
Hence, three indicators that tell us how well our strategy is at classifying jobs are:
the percentage of jobs classified correctly, the % of non-STEM jobs misclassified into
STEM and the % of STEM jobs misclassified as non-STEM.
To avoid ambiguity, we focus on the subsample with non-mixed discipline require-
ments (i.e. either all STEM or all non-STEM) when computing the correct classification
and misclassification rates in Table 6. To gauge the performance of our classifier on the
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Panel A: Direct Methods
(1) STEM Keyword 84.04 23.27 8.44 0.665
(2) Average Steminess 89.21 9.70 11.92 0.762
(3) Weighted Av. Steminess 89.20 9.70 11.92 0.762
(4) Naive Bayes 89.38 9.26 12.02 0.787
Predictors Panel B: Logistic regressions
(5) Mean Steminess 89.17 9.41 12.29 0.799
(6) % STEM Keywords 87.02 7.87 18.25 0.754
(7) Median Steminess 86.57 8.92 18.07 0.760
(8) Max Steminess 85.83 17.31 10.93 0.740
(9) Mean + % STEM 89.18 9.40 12.28 0.799
(10) Mean + Median 89.32 9.70 11.70 0.802
(11) Mean + Max 89.48 9.63 11.43 0.803
(12) Mean + % STEM 89.47 10.02 11.06 0.804
+ Median + Max
Panel C: Including Job Titles
(13) Naive Bayes 90.80 8.20 10.23 0.809
(14) Mean + Max reg. 90.82 8.64 9.74 0.829
Notes: First three columns based on the sample of 3,554,318 vacancies with keywords and
non-mixed discipline requirements. The correlation column employs the whole training sample
(3,921,917 vacancies). In % STEM keywords we only consider classified ones. Weighted Average
Steminess assigns a weight of 1 to any keyword that has been defined using at least 50 vacancies,
then a weight of 0.5 + (No. vacancies/100) to all those that have been classified with less. All
regression models (Panel B) include a constant and are estimated using a logit link function on
the sample with non-mixed discipline requirements. The dependant variable is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if all the discipline requirements are STEM and 0 if they are all non-STEM. Including
job titles (Panel C) increases the training sample by 49,891 vacancies.
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sample with both mixed and non-mixed requirements, the last column of Table 6 shows
the correlation of the predicted outcome with the % of STEM discipline requirements.
Also note that the tests conducted in Table 6 are in-sample because the sample with
explicit discipline requirements and keywords (VD∩VK) used to evaluate our jobs clas-
sification strategies is the same sample that we used in the previous section to compute
steminess and classify keywords. We implement out-of-sample tests in the following
subsection.
The first proposed strategy corresponds to model (1). It classifies over 84% of
vacancies correctly. Disagreggating the 16% error rate, the next two columns of the
Table show that the “STEM Keyword” strategy misclassifies over 23% of non-STEM
jobs into STEM, but has a much lower misclassification rate for STEM vacancies into
non-STEM: only 8.44%. The relatively high misclassification rate into STEM occurs
both because our classification of keywords is imperfect, but also because the meaning
of a given keyword may be nuanced by the other keywords that appear with it in the
job’s description. In order to improve our correct classification rate, we therefore need
an approach that somehow incorporates together all the keywords in the set that we
want to label.
A direct approach here is to take the average steminess of all keywords in the
job’s description, then classify it as STEM if this average is above a certain threshold.
Figure 2.4 shows that the correct classification rate peaks at 89.21% for a threshold
of ≥0.49. Model (2) in Table 6 employs this optimal threshold. Misclassification into
STEM drops substantially, from 23% to 9.7%. However, the misclassification into non-
STEM rises by 3.5% pts. Note that average steminess (model 2) performs better than
an indicator for the presence of at least one STEM keyword (model 1) not only in terms
of overall correct classification, but also in terms of correlation with the % of STEM
discipline requirements: 0.762 vs. 0.665.
An important concern is that the steminess of different keywords is computed using
samples of different sizes with a median of 67 postings (cf. Panel C of Table 1). Taking a
plain average gives equal weight to all keywords in the job description. On the one hand,
down-weighting keywords that are defined using smaller sets could improve accuracy
because their steminess is estimated less precisely. On the other hand, however, these
keywords often correspond to some technical STEM terms and down-weighting them
could make us believe that the average steminess of the job description is lower than it
actually is. We tried several different weighting schemes. Overall, results are not very
sensitive to the precise weighting. If anything, accuracy goes slightly down, suggesting
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Figure 2.4 Using average steminess above a certain threshold to classify jobs as STEM
Notes: The correct classification rate peaks at 89.21% for a threshold of an average steminess greater
than or equal to 0.49.
that the technical terms argument may be more important than the precision one. For
instance, in model (3) we assign a weight of 1 if a keyword’s steminess is computed
using at least 50 vacancies. Otherwise the weight is 0.5 + |Vk|/100. These weights are
then normalized by the total weights’ sum before taking the weighted average.
Although the simple unweighted average steminess performs surprisingly well with
an almost 90% correct classification rate, there are several disadvantages of employing
it. The first one can be seen from comparing the first two histograms in Fig. 2.5.
The relatively high 0.762 correlation of average steminess with the true percentage of
STEM degree requirements conceals the fact that the distributions in reality look quite
different.
The second disadvantage is interpretation. The intuition is that a job description
with a higher average steminess entails a more advanced requirement of STEM knowl-
edge and skills. Its recruiter would therefore be more likely to want to hire a worker
with a STEM education. Hence, ideally, we would like to use steminess to build an
estimate of the probability of looking for a STEM graduate.
There are two ways of doing this. Firstly, instead of using mean steminess directly,
we can employ it as the predictor in a regression that models the probability of requiring
a STEM degree. In practice, to ensure that predicted probabilities lie between 0 and
1, we use a logistic link function and estimate the following regression on the sample
76
Figure 2.5 Comparison of classification strategies with the actual % of STEM disci-
plines required
Notes: Based on the sample with keywords and discipline requirements.











k∈K Cj steminessk andK
C
j := {Kj∩K C} are the classified
keywords in j’s description. The dependent variable is an indicator for 100% STEM
disciplines posted. We then use the estimated relationship to predict class probabilities
for the complete sample (mixed and non-mixed disciplines) and classify jobs as STEM
if Pr(STEM | steminessj) > 0.5.30
Note that the logistic regression allows for a non-linear relation between average
steminess and the percentage of STEM degrees required which seems to fit the data
better than a linear one since, even though the overall correct classification rate remains
almost the same, the correlation between the predicted probabilities and the percentage
of STEM disciplines posted is higher: 0.799 vs. 0.762. More importantly, the third
histogram in Fig. 2.5 shows that the predicted probabilities match the distribution of
the actual percentages of STEM disciplines required much better than raw average
steminess.
Nothing prevents us from modelling the right hand side in eq.2.1 differently. For
instance, instead of mean steminess, models (6), (7), and (8) use respectively the per-
29Using a probit link function instead of a logit one yields very similar results. All detailed regression
results are available on request.
30This is equivalent to imposing a symmetric loss function on both the misclassification of non-STEM
jobs into STEM and of STEM jobs into non-STEM (cf. Friedman et al. [101], chap. 2).
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% STEM Disciplines 1.000 0.762 0.702 0.727 0.703
Mean Steminess 0.762 1.000 0.914 0.975 0.858
% STEM Keywords 0.702 0.914 1.000 0.903 0.741
Median Steminess 0.727 0.975 0.903 1.000 0.798
Max Steminess 0.703 0.858 0.741 0.798 1.000
Notes: Correlations based on whole training sample (3,921,917 vacancies). In % STEM
Keywords, only classified ones considered.
centage of STEM keywords, the median and the maximum steminess as predictors.
Interestingly, all these models achieve lower overall correct classification rates and cor-
relations than mean steminess on its own. Trying to combine them with the latter
is also not very fruitful: overall precision does not rise by much in models (9), (10),
(11) and (12). The reason is that, as shown in Table 7, all these predictors are highly
correlated.
The regression that performs the best is the one with mean and max steminess as the
predictors (model 11). Including maximum steminess is intuitively appealing because it
helps ensure that we do not classify as STEM a vacancy description that just happens to
only contain keywords with slightly above average steminess, but no keyword with really
high steminess. Hence we keep model (11) as our preferred regression specification.
The second way of getting from steminess to the probability of requiring a STEM
degree is to treat the steminess of each keyword k as the maximum likelihood estimate
of Pr(STEM | k) - the probability of observing a STEM degree requirement conditional
on observing k.
Let K Cj = {k1, k2, ..., knj}, with nj being the number of keywords collected from j’s
vacancy description. By Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(STEM | K Cj ) =
Pr(STEM, k1, k2, ..., knj)
Pr(k1, k2, ..., knj)
=
Pr(STEM) · Pr(k1|STEM)...Pr(knj |STEM, k1, k2, ..., knj−1)
Pr(k1, k2, ..., knj)
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Assuming that keywords are posted independently of each other, this expression
simplifies to:
Pr(STEM | K Cj ) =








where the last expression follows from observing that Pr(k|STEM) = Pr(k)·Pr(STEM|k)
Pr(STEM)
.
Similarly, the probability of looking for a non-STEM graduate is
Pr(Non-STEM | K Cj ) =
∏
k∈K Cj (1− Pr(STEM|k))
(1− Pr(STEM))nj−1 (2.4)
We can then classify a job as STEM if Pr(STEM | K Cj ) > Pr(Non-STEM | K Cj ).
In text classification, this approach is known as the “multinomial Naive Bayes classi-
fier”, also sometimes called the “unigram language model” in the Information Retrieval
literature (cf. Manning et al. [118], chapters 12 and 13). “Multinomial” because the
ordering of the keywords does not matter, “naive” because of the naive assumption of
independence.31 Although this assumption is clearly wrong, in practice, there is simply
no way of estimating more complex relationships between keywords given how sparsely
31Strictly speaking, the standard implementation of Naive Bayes (NB) uses eq.2.2 and a similar
expression for Pr(Non-STEM | K Cj ) instead of equations 2.3 and 2.4. The reason we prefer the latter
expressions is because they clearly show the link between steminess of keywords and the probability of
looking for a STEM graduate, thereby empowering NB with our usual intuition that recruiters posting
keywords with higher steminess look for STEM graduates with a higher probability. By contrast, the
main input into the standard way of implementing NB is Pr(k|STEM) interpreted as “a measure of
how much evidence k contributes that STEM is the correct class” (Manning et al. [118]), i.e. the
keywords are not of interest on their own, they are just a means of achieving the classification of jobs.
The distinction is subtle but important since our logic is that the probability of looking for a STEM
graduate and therefore of being classified as a STEM job is the direct consequence of the level of
STEM skills and knowledge requirements implied by the keywords posted in the description (keyword
steminess), i.e. the keywords are of primary importance.
In any case, we implemented both approaches to confirm that they give the same results which led
us to realize that there is also a small “computational” advantage of implementing NB in the way
we propose. Keywords appear in very few vacancies. Hence Pr(k|STEM) are much smaller objects
than Pr(STEM|k). For example, Pr(C + +|STEM) = 0.00598, while Pr(STEM|C + +) = 0.95. This
is why the standard way of implementing NB often leads to a floating point underflow problem and
is implemented by using a log transform. The log function is monotonic, hence the transform is not
a problem if the only goal is classification. In our case, however, it is a problem because we also
want the probability estimates. The floating point underflow problem is much less severe when NB is
implemented using Pr(STEM|k).
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they appear in the data and with each other.
Another practical issue is that because of multiplication, if any of the keywords in
the description has a steminess (non-steminess) of zero, the predicted probability of
looking for a STEM (non-STEM) graduate will be zero no matter the steminess (non-
steminess) of the rest of the keywords. To remedy this issue, we simply need to smooth
the steminess and non-steminess estimates so that they always lie in (0,1).







where cj,STEM is the proportion of j
′s posted disciplines that are STEM and Vk is
just the set of vacancies in which k appears in the sample with explicit discipline
requirements.
Non-steminess is just 1− steminessk:




because cj,STEM + cj,Non−STEM = 1.
A simple way of smoothing is just to add a number to both steminess and non-
steminess (Manning et al. [118], chap. 11). In our case, we can always let the keyword















Smoothing in this ways is like putting a uniform prior on whether the keyword
appears with STEM or non-STEM disciplines and then letting the data update it. In
any case, the correlation between smoothed and unsmoothed estimates for the 9566
classifiable keywords is over 0.98.
Note that because of smoothing and violations of the independence assumption, the
probability estimates from equations 2.3 and 2.4 may be above one and not sum to one.
However, we can simply normalize them as follows:
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P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) =
P̂r(STEM | K Cj )
P̂r(STEM | K Cj ) + P̂r(Non-STEM | K Cj )
(2.9)
where:






P̂r(Non-STEM | K Cj ) =
∏
k∈K Cj (non− steminessk)
(1− P̂r(STEM))nj−1
(2.11)
and similarly for P˜r(Non-STEM | K Cj ). The correlations reported in Table 6 are with
these normalized probability estimates.
As we can see the Naive Bayes approach (model 4) does quite well on our data: a
correct classification rate of 89.38% and a correlation of 0.787. The last histogram in
Fig. 2.5 suggests that the pattern of predicted probabilities matches the distribution of
the percentages of STEM discipline requirements quite well.
Another remarkable finding is that the correlation between STEM jobs identified
using Naive Bayes and those identified using our preferred logistic regression with mean
and max steminess as the predictors is 0.963. The correlation between their predicted
probabilities is even higher: 0.968. This indicates that the two methods identify almost
the same jobs as STEM and gives us confidence that a classification established with
either of them will be accurate.32
Out-of-sample performance & benchmarking against other ML algorithms
At this point, the reader may have the following concerns about our strategy of classi-
fying jobs into STEM and non-STEM:
1. Endogeneity: the tests conducted in Table 6 are in-sample because the sample
with explicit discipline requirements and keywords (VD∩VK) used to evaluate our
jobs classification strategies is the same sample that we use to compute steminess.
How well do our preferred algorithms perform out-of-sample, i.e. on data that
32We tried an ensemble classifier which labelled a job as STEM only if both methods agreed on its
classification. However, the performance of this ensemble classifier was not better in terms if overall
classification: 89.41%. Hence, there seems to be no point in pursuing in this direction.
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(1) Mean + Max reg. 89.53 9.71 11.26 00:05:35 4.70 0
[0.134] [0.198] [0.191] [00:00:43] [0.001]
(2) Naive Bayes 89.60 9.22 11.62 00:05:44 4.54 0
[0.138] [0.221] [0.201] [00:00:48] [0.001]
(3) Logistic Regression 87.16 6.39 19.50 04:57:26 14.91 0
with Keywords [0.176] [0.332] [0.562] [00:44:20] [0.046]
(4) Linear Discriminant 89.95 7.77 12.41 08:31:57 95.79 36
Analysis [0.140] [0.212] [0.277] [00:59:47] [6.645]
(5) Support Vector 90.24 6.59 13.04 09:25:42 14.81 2
Machines [0.128] [0.211] [0.237] [00:51:54] [0.705]
(6) Tree 72.92 2.65 52.26 04:05:38 52.46 8
[0.410] [6.578] [6.725] [00:36:51] [0.490]
(7) Boosting Tree 77.04 3.03 43.50 05:43:40 56.10 16
[1.763] [1.047] [4.425] [01:00:04] [3.308]
(8) Bagging Tree 100
(9) Random Forests 100
(10) Neural Networks 100
(11) k-Nearest Neighbours 100
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Averages over 50 runs of the experiment shown. The
same set of 50 randomly selected samples of 250,000 vacancies each (split into 200,000 vacancies for the
training sample and 50,000 for the test one) was used to evaluate all methods. All R scripts were
submitted to the same High Performance Computing cluster and the statistics presented here are those
that were output by the system once the jobs had been completed. The RTextTools package (Boydstun
et al. [29]) was used for the implementation of the standard classification methods (models 3-10). As
discussed in [29], this package employs a set of optimized algorithms, in particular the SparseM package
by Koenker and Ng [111]. The R code for the implementation of all the algorithms is available on
request. Computing time corresponds to the user time which is the time spent on executing the script’s
code lines. “User time” is typically reported for algorithmic benchmarking and performance analytics
because it does not count the “System time” - time spent by the system on opening the files (which in
our case was 8 sec or less for the first two methods that employ steminess and between 33 sec and 3 min
45 sec for the standard algorithms).
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has not been used to estimate steminess? This is an important question since
our ultimate goal is to classify all 33 million UK vacancies in our data, most of
which do not have explicit discipline requirements, i.e. won’t be used to estimate
steminess for the final classification.
2. Unclassified keywords: 15% of all keywords in the BGT taxonomy never appear
with explicit discipline requirements and are therefore unclassified. How does this
affect the performance of our algorithms?
3. Steminess vs. keywords: our classification methods employ the steminess of all
keywords in a vacancy description to either compute the mean and max steminess
and use them as predictors in a logistic regression model, or to construct the
probability estimate using Bayes formula and the naive assumption. A valid
question is why not simply use the keywords directly instead of steminess to
estimate the probability of looking for a STEM graduate?
We address these concerns by implementing and replicating 50 times the following
experiment: we select 250,000 unique vacancies at random from the sample with non-
mixed discipline requirements and keywords and split them into training (200,000 va-
cancies) and test (50,000) samples. To achieve a fair comparison, all methods discussed
in this subsection are implemented on the same set of 50 randomly selected samples of
250,000 vacancies each.
The results are summarized in Table 8 which reports the average correct classifica-
tion and misclassfication rates over all the replications and the bootstrapped standard
errors in brackets. We now discuss in turn why this out-of-sample experiment addresses
each point just identified:
Issue (1) is addressed directly since we are implementing out-of-sample tests. Each
time, the 200,000 vacancies in the training sample are used to train the algorithm,
e.g. for the first method, to estimate steminess for all keywords, then run the logistic
regression with mean and max steminess as the predictors. The trained model is then
used to predict the outcomes for the test sample of 50,000 vacancies. The statistics
reported in Table 8 are based on the performance of our algorithms on these latter test
vacancies only. It is reassuring to see that both of our preferred methods perform as
well out-of-sample as they did in-sample, with almost 90% correct classification rates.
For the second issue, note that out-of-sample tests recreate the situation of having
a certain proportion of unclassified keywords and therefore allow us to gauge the extra
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degree of misclassification generated by not being able to classify all keywords. Con-
cretely, in our experiment, the training samples contained an average of 6810 distinct
keywords. The test samples had on average 5210 distinct keywords, of which an average
244 were undefined. On average, 49999 vacancies were classified each time (i.e. one of
the vacancies could not be classified because none of its keywords could be defined).
The extra misclassification introduced by not being able to define all keywords happens
to be very small since the average percentages of vacancies classified correctly in-sample
are only slightly higher than the out-of-sample ones shown in Table 8: 89.73% for the
logistic regression with mean and max steminess as the predictors, and 89.78% for Naive
Bayes.
To address issue (3), we implemented several standard machine learning algorithms,
often employed for supervised text classification.33 The one thing they have in common
is that they use the keywords directly, i.e. their implementation starts with the creation
of a so-called “document-term” matrix (more precisely a “vacancy-keyword” matrix in
our case) whose elements are 0-1 vectors that record for each vacancy the keywords
collected from its description. The idea is then to divide the keywords (“the input
space”) into a collection of regions labelled as STEM and non-STEM (cf. Friedman
et al. [101], chapt. 4). The methods differ in how exactly this division is made.
For instance, logistic regression with keywords as predictors (and regularized versions
thereof) or linear discriminant analysis (LDA) have linear decision boundaries. In
support vector machines (SVM), a non-linear hyperplane separates STEM and non-
STEM regions, allowing for some misclassifications that we can control with a cost
parameter. Tree-based methods are called so because they try to segment the input
space into a number of non-overlapping regions through a set of splitting rules that can
be summarized in a tree. Bagging, Boosting and Random Forests are just more complex
variants of the plain tree, which involve producing multiple trees, then combining them
in order to yield consensus predictions.
A remarkable finding in Table 8 is that a logistic regression with almost 7,000
distinct keywords as the predictors (model (3)) achieves a 2.4% pts. lower correct
classification rate than a logistic regression with just two predictors: the mean and
the max steminess (model (1)). Moreover, it is much more computationally intensive:
when the keywords are used directly in the logistic regression, the average run of the
33Gareth et al. [98] is an excellent introduction into statistical learning. Friedman et al. [101]
provide a more advanced treatment of a similar set of topics. In terms of books specifically focused on
text analysis, we refer the reader to Feldman and Sanger [61] and the fascinating book on information
retrieval by Manning et al. [118].
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experiment takes almost 5 hours instead of a bit more than 5 minutes, and consumes
over 10 more gigabytes.
Tree methods perform worse than our preferred algorithms. Although they misclas-
sify very few non-STEM vacancies into STEM, this comes at a high price of mislabelling
around half of STEM vacancies as non-STEM. The very large misclassification into
non-STEM occurs because of the way in which trees work: they use the presence of a
keyword in a vacancy description as a split condition. Hence, many STEM vacancies
are mistakenly assigned to the non-STEM group simply because they contain certain
keywords that also happen to be often found in non-STEM vacancies.
The only two methods that seem to perform slightly better than the steminess-
based classification algorithms are LDA and SVM . However, this performance comes
at a much higher computational cost: 8h32 and 95.8 gigabytes on average for LDA, 9h26
and 14.8 gigabytes for SVM. By contrast, our preferred methods take on average less
than 6 minutes and less than 5 gigabytes in each replication of the experiment. We relied
on the RTextTools package by Boydstun et al. [29] for the implementation of models
(3) to (10). Although, this package employs a set of optimized algorithms, in particular
those developed by Koenker and Ng [111] and contained in the SparseM package, there
could certainly be more efficient ways of implementing the standard machine learning
algorithms considered here both in R or other programming environments. Nonetheless,
the computational complexity of these methods is well studied and documented (cf.
Manning et al. [118] and Friedman et al. [101], as well as references therein). The
problems become especially acute when the input space is high dimensional and sparse,
which is precisely our case: as both the number of distinct keywords and vacancies grow,
the “vacancy-keyword” matrix becomes increasingly sparse because even the median
keyword appears in very few postings (less than 0.002% in the sample of vacancies with
explicit discipline requirements and keywords, which is the sample on which the final
classification method is trained). Note that regularization (e.g. Lasso, Ridge) here
does not help for two reasons: the optimally selected penalty (though cross-validation)
is close to zero. More importantly, even if we remove the 50% least frequently posted
keywords, we are still left with a very sparse matrix.
This “sparse sampling in high dimensions” is often referred to as the “curse of
dimensionality” (Friedman et al. [101]) and is also the reason why many methods
(models (8)-(11) in Table 8) simply fail. For instance, we tried k-Nearest Neighbours
(kNN) with different numbers of neighbours; however the method failed because in our
data few vacancies have many overlapping keywords so that the nearest neighbours are
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numerous but not “close to the target point” (Friedman et al. [101]).
Indeed, a conceptually more important problem with using the keywords directly is
that this approach treats all the thousands of distinct keywords as completely separate
dimensions, i.e. it does not allow a keyword like “Budgeting” to be closer to “Budget
Management” or “Costing” than to “Java”.
Employing keyword steminess instead of using the keywords directly is like introduc-
ing one extra step in-between the keywords and the prediction about whether the job is
STEM or not. However, this extra step solves all the problems. The vacancy-keyword
matrix is not needed which saves a lot of computing power. The logistic regression
problem is much simpler in model (1) than model (3) because the predictive relation-
ship is built from just two continuous predictors (mean and max steminess) instead of
several thousands of dummy variables. In terms of steminess, “Budgeting” (34.41%) is
indeed much more similar to “Budget Management” (36.20%) and “Costing” (52.28%)
than to “Java” (90.49%).
Finally, throughout this section, we spent a lot of effort building the intuition be-
hind the concept of steminess, the context mapping method for classifying keywords
and eventually the steminess-based classification methods for the jobs. By contrast, the
intuition underlying most standard machine learning methods presented here seems less
straightforward since many of them were developed with the only goal of yielding accu-
rate predictions, not necessarily being used for inference (Gareth et al. [98]). They treat
the keywords as simple features, with no interest in classifying them or understanding
how and why they should or should not be associated with the probability of looking
for a STEM graduate, while the precise mechanisms used to split these keywords so as
to form predictions for the jobs remain a bit of “black boxes”.
Job titles While 90% of vacancies have at least one keyword collected from their
online description, the job title is available in 100% of the cases (cf. Table 1). Employing
keywords from the job titles could therefore not only improve our classification accuracy,
but, more importantly, should allow us to classify more vacancies.
Unlike the vacancy descriptions which are already in the form of sets of keywords in
our data, the job titles appear as sentences, e.g.: “Principal Civil Engineer”, “Uk And
Row Process Diagnostic Business Manager”, “Nurse Advisor”...
We therefore start by tokenizing them, i.e. “chopping character streams into tokens”
(Manning et al. [118]). For instance, tokenizing:
“Uk And Row Process Diagnostic Business Manager”
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Table 9: Including keywords from job titles
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% with >= 1 Classified Keyword 99.92 99.79 99.83 99.85 99.82
No. of unique keywords 27025 28218 28485 29567 27599
Number of Keywords per Vacancy (conditional on at least one classified):
Median 7 7 7 7 7
Mean 8.72 8.65 8.91 8.89 8.72
Notes: 2016 includes data up to (and excluding) August only. Classified Keywords include
9566 keywords from the BGT taxonomy and 20,265 tokens from the job titles.
gives the following set of keywords:
“Uk - And - Row - Process - Diagnostic - Business - Manager”
This produces a list of over 143,000 distinct keywords which contains a lot of noisy
terms, e.g. “aaa”. To reduce and clean it, we implement several natural language
processing steps. Firstly, we match whatever we can with the keywords from the BGT
taxonomy. Another advantage of doing this is to increase the number of vacancies in
which a given keyword from the BGT taxonomy appears. For the remaining keywords,
we only focus on those appearing in at least 10 postings. These simple steps already
remove a lot of idyosincratic noise and reduce the list down to 20,615 unique keywords.
We then remove punctuation marks, numbers, special characters, transform the tokens
to lower space, and delete English stop words (e.g. “and”, “I”, “very”, “after”, etc.).34
For instance, the above title becomes:
“uk - row - process - diagnostic - business - manager”
We add the resulting tokens to the BGT taxonomy as extra features, so that the
final classification of vacancies is based on 29,831 unique keywords - 9566 from the
original BGT taxonomy and 20,265 from the job titles.
As shown in Panel C of Table 6, in-sample performance of our preferred classification
methods jumps above 90%. However the real advantage of including keywords from job
titles can be seen by comparing Tables 1 (Panel B) and 9. Now almost 100% of all
34Sanchez [143], Baayen [17] and Feinerer et al. [60] are excellent references on text processing and
analysis in R. Natural language processing R packages used in this project include stringi (Gagolewski
and Tartanus [76]), stringr (Wickham [159]), tm (Feinerer et al. [59]), NLP (Hornik [97]), and quanteda
(Benoit [24]).
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vacancies have at least one classified keyword. The mean and median numbers of
classified keywords per vacancy increase from to 5 and 6 to 7 and almost 9 respectively.
In what follows we use the Naive Bayes method with keywords from both the BGT
taxonomy and the job titles to classify vacancies. The results employing the mean and
max steminess regression for the classification of jobs are almost identical, since, as
already discussed, both methods have an above 0.96 correlation for both the STEM
jobs identified and the probability estimates.
2.4 STEM Jobs in the UK
Having designed and tested algorithms that classify both keywords and jobs into
STEM and non-STEM with a 90% correct classification rate for the jobs, we can now
finally start exploring our main questions of interest: what percentage of STEM jobs
are in non-STEM occupations? Are STEM jobs associated with higher wages? What,
if anything, distinguishes STEM jobs in STEM vs. non-STEM occupations?
When documenting occupational and geographic distributions, we consider the fol-
lowing two indicators of STEM importance.
Let A be an occupation or a county:
1.
STEM density of A = 100× #(STEM jobs in A)
#(jobs in A)
2.
% STEM jobs in A = 100× #(STEM jobs in A)
#(STEM jobs)
While the percentage of STEM jobs simply describes how STEM jobs are distributed
across occupations/counties, the STEM density measures the relative importance of
STEM within an occupation/county. The higher the STEM density, the bigger the
proportion of recruiters within this occupation/county that require STEM skills and
knowledge.
2.4.1 Occupational distribution
The first goal of this paper is to go beyond STEM occupations and quantify the
demand for STEM at the level of jobs. Table 10 therefore presents our main results
which indicate that it is wrong to equate STEM demand with STEM occupations.
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Table 10: STEM jobs vs. STEM occupations
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
No. STEM jobs 1949791 2235445 1815294 2655532 1865435 10521497
No. STEM jobs in Non-STEM occ. 633578 798933 643232 914609 645961 3636313
No. STEM jobs in STEM occ. 1316213 1436512 1172062 1740923 1219474 6885184
No. jobs in STEM occ. 1580088 1764163 1495158 2146155 1500800 8486364
% of STEM jobs in
STEM occupations 67.51 64.26 64.57 65.56 65.37 65.44
Non-STEM occupations 32.49 35.74 35.43 34.44 34.63 34.56
STEM density of
STEM occ. 83.30 81.43 78.39 81.12 81.25 81.13
Non-STEM occ. 14.59 15.23 13.66 15.27 15.61 14.89
Notes: Based on the sample of vacancies with a UK SOC identifier (99.5% of all vacancies posted). For
the list of STEM occupations cf. Footnote 24. 2016 includes data up to August only.
Firstly, the overall number of STEM jobs is larger than the number of jobs in STEM
occupations. For instance, in 2015, focusing exclusively on STEM occupations leads to
understimating the true demand for people with a STEM education by half a million
employment opportunities.
Secondly, around 35% of all STEM jobs are in non-STEM occupations. Hence,
the fact that over half of STEM graduates work in non-STEM occupations may be
less problematic than often thought if most STEM graduates working in non-STEM
occupations are actually in STEM jobs.
As expected, a much larger proportion of jobs within STEM occupations are STEM
than within non-STEM ones: 81% vs. 15%. However, these aggregate numbers con-
ceal an important amount of heterogeneity illustrated in Figure 2.6 which shows the
distribution of STEM densities at the four-digit UK SOC level.
Table 17 in the Appendix contains the precise numbers for 2015. The third column
in this table is a dummy indicator for whether or not the occupation is typically clas-
sified as STEM. Given the absence of a consistent “official” classification of four-digit
occupations into STEM and non-STEM, we decided to merge together the lists from
several widely cited UK studies: UKCES [64], Mason [120], BIS [26] and Greenwood et
al.[84] (for the resulting full list of STEM occupations, cf. Footnote 24).
When interpreting the STEM densities of various occupations, it is important to
remember that while we take the STEM acronym literally, some of these studies have
a broader definition of STEM, which goes beyond Sciences, Technology, Engineering
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and Mathematics and also includes subjects like Medicine, Architecture, Environmental
Studies, Psychology etc. Hence, in some cases, for instance Pharmaceutical technicians
(3217), we find a low STEM density in a STEM occupation precisely because of this
broader STEM definition effect. In other cases, however, e.g. Information technology
and telecommunications directors (1136), Quality assurance and regulatory profession-
als (2462), the relatively low STEM density suggests that the occupation is less STEM
intensive than typically thought.35
The list of non-STEM occupations with relatively high STEM densities is very
diverse. For instance, in 2015, 46.84% of Business, research and administrative profes-
sionals n.e.c. jobs were identified as STEM. 45.62% of Product, clothing and related
designers, and even 23.46% of Artists looked for STEM graduates. This finding recalls
another passage from Matthew Sigelman’s inspiring essay on “Why the STEM Gap is
Bigger Than You Think” [149] where the opening quote also comes from: “the list [of
job categories where employers demand coding skills] includes Artists and Designers,
which once would have been considered the antithesis of STEM roles.”
Perhaps surprisingly for the literature, where financial occupations are typically
considered as the main non-STEM group poaching STEM graduates, none of them is
actually top of the list in terms of STEM density. For instance, among the seven oc-
cupations defined as financial in Chevalier [38], Management consultants and business
analysts is the one with the highest percentage of STEM jobs in 2015: 25.33%, fol-
lowed by Financial and accounting technicians with 11.67%. Only 7.59% of Finance
and investment analysts and advisers specifically look for STEM graduates. The rea-
son may be that, within the UK education system, the “numerical skills” for which
financial occupations are thought to be seeking STEM graduates are actually also often
transmitted to non-STEM graduates in, e.g., Finance or Economics degrees. Hence,
although numerous jobs in financial occupations may end up being filled with STEM
graduates, when posting their vacancy, not many financial recruiters actually describe
the job as one that could only be undertaken by someone with a STEM education.
The main focus of this paper is on “high-level” STEM jobs - STEM jobs belonging
to Managerial, Professional and Associate professional positions which typically require
a university degree - because they constitute 74% of all STEM jobs (cf. fourth column
of Table 11, occupation codes 11 - 35), but also because this is where the biggest
35Another caveat to bear in mind is that there may be some misclassifications in our data because
of imperfections in the collection process and/or errors in the online postings themselves. Moreover,
as established in the previous section, our classification algorithm has a 90% correct classification rate,
hence it misclassifies around 10% of jobs.
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Figure 2.6 STEM density of STEM and Non-STEM Occupations
Notes: STEM density is the percentage of jobs within an occupation that are STEM. All years
combined: an observation is a four-digit occupation-year STEM density.
expenses on STEM education are and where the STEM pipeline leakage is therefore
most problematic.
However, Table 11, which compares the occupational distributions of STEM jobs vs.
jobs in STEM occupations at the two-digit level of the UK SOC, suggests that many
lower skill occupations with relatively high STEM densities are completely missed in
the existing classifications of STEM occupations. Indeed, almost all four-digit occupa-
tions identified as STEM in the studies by BIS [26] and Mason [120] that investigate
vocational STEM skills and apprenticeship training, belong to Skilled Metal, Electrical
and Electronic Trades (cf. Table 11, fifth column). However, our analysis suggests that
STEM skills required in Skilled Construction and Building Trades and Process, Plant
and Machine Operatives occupations should also receive more attention in future work
since they represent together around 7% of STEM jobs and have STEM densities above
60%.
These findings echo a recent US study by Rothwell [141] who argues that: “previ-
ous reports on the STEM economy indicate that only highly educated professionals are
capable of mastering and employing sophisticated knowledge in STEM fields. Classi-
fying STEM jobs based on knowledge requirements, however, shows that 30 percent of
today’s high-STEM jobs are actually blue-collar positions. As defined here, blue-collar
91









11 Corporate Managers and Directors 24.31 4.33 15.82 5.82
12 Other Managers and Proprietors 29.59 2.79 0.16 3.07
21 Science, Research, Engineering and Technology
Professionals
85.26 39.73 99.77 15.21
22 Health Professionals 1.63 0.24 3.23 4.86
23 Teaching and Educational Professionals 2.99 0.3 0 3.28
24 Business, Media and Public Service Professionals 25.45 6.82 14.8 8.75
31 Science, Engineering and Technology Associate
Professionals
76.12 11.46 100 4.91
32 Health and Social Care Associate Professionals 5.92 0.23 15.22 1.26
33 Protective Service Occupations 24.47 0.13 0 0.17
34 Culture, Media and Sports Occupations 15.73 0.98 0 2.03
35 Business and Public Service Associate Professionals 16.04 6.97 1.93 14.18
41 Administrative Occupations 5.93 1.27 0 7.02
42 Secretarial and related Occupations 4.05 0.28 0 2.26
51 Skilled Agricultural and related Trades 20.58 0.09 0 0.14
52 Skilled Metal, Electrical and Electronic Trades 89.79 9.23 94 3.35
53 Skilled Construction and Building Trades 61.92 2.29 24.33 1.21
54 Textiles, Printing and other Skilled Trades 8.45 0.57 0 2.19
61 Caring Personal Service Occupations 1.61 0.18 0 3.67
62 Leisure, Travel and related Personal Service
Occupations
7.44 0.26 0 1.15
71 Sales Occupations 12.53 1.88 0 4.91
72 Customer Service Occupations 6.93 0.43 0 2.04
81 Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 60.38 4.74 0.21 2.56
82 Transport and Mobile Machine Drivers and
Operatives
35.88 2.25 0 2.05
91 Elementary Trades and related Occupations 57.81 1.4 0 0.79
92 Elementary Administration and Service
Occupations
12.21 1.16 0 3.11
Notes: Based on the sample of vacancies with a UK SOC identifier (99.5% of all vacancies posted). Note that
the % of jobs in STEM occ. equals zero if none of the 4-digit SOCs in the respective 2-digit subgrouping is
typically classified as STEM.
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occupations include installation, maintenance, and repair, construction, production,
protective services, transportation, farming, forestry, and fishing, building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance, healthcare support, personal care, and food preparation.”
The reason why Rothwell identifies this category of STEM employment is because
he uses a very different way of identifying STEM occupations, based on data from
the O*NET (Occupational Information Network Data Collection Program) - a com-
prehensive database developed by the US Department of Labor, “which uses detailed
surveys of workers in every occupation to thoroughly document their job characteris-
tics and knowledge requirements.” Rothwell focuses on O*NET Knowledge scales for
Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Computers and Electronics, Engineering and Technology,
and Mathematics. These scales are constructed by asking around 24 workers from each
occupation to rate the level of knowledge required to do their job. For instance, the
survey asks the worker: “What level of knowledge of Engineering and Technology is
needed to perform your current job?” It then presents a 1-7 scale and provides exam-
ples of the kinds of knowledge that would score a 2, 4, and 6. Installing a door lock
would rate a 2; designing a more stable grocery cart would rate a 4; and planning for
the impact of weather in designing a bridge would rate a 6 (O*NET [67]). In some
sense, our keywords-based approach of identifying STEM jobs is akin to surveying not
workers as in O*NET, but employers, and this explains why our results also reflect all
the “diversity and depth of the STEM economy”.
2.4.2 Spatial distribution
Existing studies indicate that London is a “magnet of STEM workers at the expense
of other parts of the country”. For instance, Bosworth et al. [28] analyse commuting
data and find that London has a net gain of 87,000 Core STEM workers, while the
South East, East of England and East Midlands record substantial net losses.
As discussed in Section 2.2, London is over-represented in the BGT sample relative
to official employment data (cf. Table 16 in the Appendix), hence we decided to re-
weight the spatial distribution of STEM jobs, using the weights shown in the last column
of Table 16.36 The first map in Figure 2.7 shows that even after re-weighting, London
still has by far the greatest concentration of all STEM vacancies, explaining why it may
be so attractive to STEM educated job seekers. In 2015, London concentrated 14.5%
of all STEM vacancies with the next biggest demand for STEM knowledge and skills
36The un-weighted map is available on request. Note that weighting only matters for the left map
in Figure 2.7. When computing STEM density, weights cancel out (cf. STEM density formula above).
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Figure 2.7 The geographical locations of STEM vacancies in 2015
% of STEM jobs in each county STEM density of each county
Notes: Based on the sample of 77.8% of all vacancies with County identifiers in 2015. London includes
the 32 London boroughs and the City of London. STEM density is the % of jobs within a county
that are classified as STEM. The left map is re-weighted using the 2015 Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings produced by the Office for National Statistics (cf. Table 16 in the Appendix).
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coming from West Midlands (which includes Birmingham and Coventry) with only
4.8% of STEM vacancies, followed by Greater Manchester (4.1%) and West Yorkshire
(3.96%). Less than 3% of STEM vacancies were located in any other county.
In terms of STEM density (second map), the picture is less clear-cut. In 2015,
London had a STEM density of 29.97%, while Cambridgeshire came top with 45.51%.
Note that none of the counties had a STEM density below 10%, suggesting that at least
some STEM knowledge and skills are required in every UK county.
Interviews with STEM employers, analysed in Bosworth et al. [28], reveal that
some of them experience hiring difficulties “because their location is outside of Lon-
don”. Hence, the overall message from previous studies and the spatial distribution of
STEM vacancies analysed here could be that many STEM workers may move to Lon-
don thinking that it would be easier for them to find a STEM job there since London
concentrates over 20% of all STEM vacancies. This, however, induces shortages in some
areas since most UK counties need at least a certain proportion of their workforce to
possess STEM knowledge and skills.
2.4.3 The wage premium for STEM
To examine whether or not STEM jobs are associated with higher wages in the
labour market, we run simple linear regressions like:
logwj = α + βSTEMj + γXj + εj (2.12)
logwj = α + βP˜r(STEM | K Cj ) + γXj + εj (2.13)
where wj is the hourly wage, STEMj is an indicator for whether the job is classified
as STEM, P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) is the probability that the recruiter for vacancy j seeks a
STEM graduate conditional on the classifiable keywords K Cj collected from j’s online
job advert, and Xj includes controls, e.g. the pay frequency (daily, weekly, monthly...),
the salary type (base pay, commission, bonus...), the month and year of the posting,
whether the job is located in London, etc.
As shown in Table 1, the wage is posted explicitly in 61% of all job ads. However,
introducing controls dramatically reduces the sample size, since, for instance, only 17%
and 12% of the postings have minimum education and experience requirements, 46%
have industry identifiers, etc. Hence, we present three sets of results: one obtained
on a sample of almost 20 million vacancies, where we only require the vacancies to
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possess wage and four-digit UK SOC occupation identifiers in addition to some basic
controls (Table 12). The second set of results, presented in Table 13, uses a much
smaller sample of 222,451 postings in which we also observe the one/two-digit industry
identifier, the precise county, and minimum education and experience requirements,
and such that each occupation/industry combination has at least 2 observations. In
the final set (Table 14), we do not require the industry identifier but require all the other
controls already mentioned as well as the employer’s name. This time, we ensure that
each occupation/employer cell has at least 2 observations, which results in a sample
of 62,511 observations.37For each year, we also drop the postings with the 1% lowest
wages to remove outliers.
The first column of Table 12 is a plain regression of log hourly wages on the STEM
job dummy with no controls. It suggests that, unconditionally, STEM jobs are asso-
ciated with 28% higher wages. Remember that we define STEM jobs as those whose
recruiters look for STEM educated candidates with a higher probability than for non-
STEM educated ones:
STEMj = I(P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) > P˜r(Non-STEM | K Cj ))
Hence, not all STEM jobs are such that the recruiters seek STEM graduates with a
100% probability. A more flexible approach is therefore to use the probability of looking
for a STEM graduate instead of the discrete STEM job indicator, i.e. the specification
in eq.2.13 instead of eq.2.12. As shown in column (2), the premium offered for seeking a
STEM graduate relative to a non-STEM one sharpens: a 10% pts. rise in the probability
of looking for a STEM graduate is associated with a 3% pts. rise in the wage, so that as
we go from looking for a non-STEM educated worker to seeking a STEM educated one,
the wage offered rises by 32%. Note that this latter specification with the continuous
probability instead of the discrete indicator also seems to provide a better description
of the labour market dynamics since the R2 rises from 5.5% to 5.9%.
The next column contrasts these results to the unconditional wage premium asso-
ciated with working in a STEM occupation: 29%.
Columns (4) to (6) replicate these three specifications but now introducing some
basic controls: a dummy for whether the job is located in London, the number of
keywords in the description and the job title, the month and year of the posting,
37Requesting both the employer’s name and the industry identifier, and ensuring that each unique
occupation/industry/employer combination has at least two observations leads to a very small and
unrepresentative sample dominated by a few large employers, like the NHS.
96
the pay frequency and the salary type. All estimates drop in size but remain highly
significant. One of the reasons is probably that, as indicated in the previous subsection,
a substantial part of STEM jobs are located in London, where wages are higher anyway
because of higher living costs. Hence part of what appears as the STEM premium in
columns (1) to (3) is the London premium, which disappears once we introduce the
London dummy.
Columns (7) and (8) consider specifications where we include together the STEM
job indicator or P˜r(STEM | K Cj ), the STEM occupation dummy and an interaction
between them. Note that we are still not controlling for a full set of four-digit UK
SOC occupations. The results seem to indicate that there is a difference between the
STEM premium offered in STEM and non-STEM occupations. For instance, column
(8) suggests that the recruiter looking for a STEM graduate in a non-STEM occupation
offers a 25.9% wage premium, whereas in a STEM occupation, he would offer a 16.2%
wage premium for the fact that this is a STEM occupation and an additional 12.7%
premium if looking for a STEM graduate, i.e. a 28.9% wage premium overall for a
STEM job in a STEM occupation. However, as we introduce a full set of 368 four-
digit UK SOC occupation dummies in columns (9) and (10), the interaction term
becomes insignificant suggesting that the premium for STEM in STEM occupations
is not statistically significantly different from the one in non-STEM occupations once
we account for occupation fixed effects (note that standard errors in columns (9) and
(10) are also clustered at the occupation level).
We continue by investigating whether different STEM domains command distinct
premia in columns (11) and (12). This is an interesting question in itself which has
already been investigated from the labour supply side in numerous papers. For instance,
Greenwood et al. [84], who analyse the Labour Force Survey between March 2004 and
December 2010, find that many qualifications have a higher labour market value if they
are in a STEM subject. However, this general finding conceals an important amount
of heterogeneity in returns to different STEM domains at different NQF levels. The
authors conclude that “it is not enough to urge young people to study STEM subjects:
they also need to understand that some STEM qualifications are more valuable than
others.”
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Table 12: The wage premium for STEM: regressions with basic controls
Dependent variable: log(wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
STEM job 0.279∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) 0.319∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.026)
STEM occupation 0.293∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
STEM job -0.104∗∗∗ -0.021
*STEM occ. (0.001) (0.031)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) -0.132∗∗∗ -0.047 −0.059
*STEM occ. (0.001) (0.039) (0.038)
Biology/Biomedicine 0.024∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)










London 0.278∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No. Keywords 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupation dum. No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pay Frequency No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Salary Type No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered s.e. No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,856,575
R2 0.055 0.059 0.053 0.239 0.243 0.230 0.244 0.246 0.441 0.443 0.438 0.445
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.059 0.053 0.239 0.243 0.230 0.244 0.246 0.441 0.443 0.438 0.445
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the four-digit occupation level in columns (9) to (12). The wage is the average of the minimum and maximum hourly salaries
posted. STEM job is a dummy for whether the job is classified as STEM. STEM occ. is a dummy for whether the job belongs to a STEM occupation. Regressions (1)-(3) include
constants. Four-digit UK SOC occupations used. No. Keywords is the number of classified keywords collected from the job description and the job title.
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Other interesting contributions include, for instance, Webber [158] who looks at
how average earnings vary by discipline in the US. Bratti et al. [30] use a British
cohort study from 1970 to estimate wage returns by major studied. Gabe [75] takes
a different approach. Instead of the discipline studied, he combines worker knowledge
requirements from the O*NET with wage and demographic information from the U.S.
Census American Community Survey. Although the results from all these papers are
not directly comparable because of different data and methods, a general finding seems
to be that sciences, especially Biology, Physics and Chemistry, are typically associated
with lower earnings than Computer Sciences and Engineering.
In our case, we investigate the heterogeneity in STEM wage premia by defining Biol-
ogy/Biomedicine, Computer Sciences, Engineering etc. indicators which are just equal
to 1 if the vacancy description contains keywords belonging to the respective clusters
(cf. Algorithm 1 for how keywords are classified into different STEM clusters). Column
(11) includes occupation fixed effects and basic controls, but excludes the probability of
looking for a STEM graduate. Technology and Physics/Chemistry seem to be associ-
ated with negative wage premia, while the rest of STEM disciplines command positive
ones. However, introducing the STEM probability and its interaction with the STEM
occupation dummy in column (12) attenuates all coefficients and turns the one on Bi-
ology/Biomedicine negative. Further research could perhaps investigate heterogeneity
in STEM wage premia in more details, however it is also important to remember that
the separation of keywords into different clusters is imperfect and the results presented
here are therefore only indicative.
In Tables 13 and 14, we decided to concentrate on the continuous measure of STEM
requirements; the results with the discrete STEM job indicator are similar and avail-
able on request. We start by reproducing the analogues of columns (2), (3) and (10)
from Table 12 to show what these specifications give on these much smaller and less
representative samples. Columns (4) correspond to a regression that only includes
full controls: education and experience requirements (in minimum years), a full set of
counties instead of the London dummy, four-digit UK SOC occupations, and either
one/two-digit industry identifiers in Table 13 or 6054 unique employers in Table 14.
Columns (5) add the STEM probability and its interaction with the STEM occupation
indicator terms. Finally, the specification in columns (6) also contains the different
STEM domain dummies.
The main purpose of these sets of results is to show that the wage premium for STEM
does not disappear even after introducing detailed controls for many other observable
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Table 13: The wage premium for STEM: regressions with industry controls
Dependent variable: log(wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) 0.236∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
STEM occ. 0.167∗∗∗
(0.002)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) −0.050 −0.037 −0.036















No. Keywords 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Education 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.031∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupation dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes
County dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pay Frequency No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Salary Type No No Yes Yes Yes Ye
Clustered s.e. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 222,451
R2 0.038 0.020 0.427 0.496 0.498 0.499
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.020 0.426 0.494 0.497 0.497
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the occupation. The wage is the
average of the minimum and maximum hourly salaries posted. Education & experience
requirements are in years (minimum required). Four-digit UK SOC occupations and
one/two-digit SIC industries used.
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Table 14: The wage premium for STEM: regressions with employer controls
Dependent variable: log(wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) 0.306∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.033) (0.014) (0.015)
STEM occ. 0.222∗∗∗
(0.005)
P˜r(STEM | K Cj ) 0.0003 −0.039 −0.037















No. Keywords 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Occupation dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes
County dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pay Frequency No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Salary Type No No Yes Yes Yes Ye
Clustered s.e. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,511
R2 0.062 0.035 0.476 0.749 0.749 0.749
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.035 0.473 0.719 0.719 0.719
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the employer level (6054 unique
employers). The wage is the average of the minimum and maximum hourly salaries posted.
Education & experience requirements are in years (minimum required). Four-digit UK SOC
occupations.
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characteristics that affect wages. It certainly drops in magnitude as the influence of all
these other factors is taken into account, but remains highly significant. The interaction
term also remains insignificant. Most of the coefficients on the STEM domains in
columns (6) go in the same direction as before, even though statistical significance
drops, especially in the regression with employer fixed effects.
It is important to remember that all the results presented in this section are not
causal as there could be an unobserved omitted variable - an analogue of the “ability”
bias on the demand side, that is correlated with both wages and the probability of
looking for a STEM graduate and is confounding our estimates even conditional on all
the controls introduced in Tables 13 and 14.38
Nevertheless, this section does provide evidence that controlling for detailed occupa-
tions, industries, employers, geographical locations, education and experience require-
ments, STEM jobs are still associated with higher wages in both STEM and non-STEM
occupations, and that, conditional on occupation fixed effects, the premium for STEM
does not differ depending on whether the occupation is STEM or non-STEM.
As discussed in the introduction, previous studies often find that “STEM graduates
[...] earn more than non-STEM graduates - but only if they work in science or finance
occupations” (DIUS [65]). This finding is based on looking at the wages earned by
STEM graduates without distinguishing between those among them who take up STEM
jobs and those who end up in non-STEM ones. When looking from the labour supply
side without making this important distinction, the wage premium for STEM that
exists within non-STEM occupations could therefore be obscured since nothing prevents
STEM graduates to take up non-STEM jobs, for which non-STEM graduates are also
perfectly qualified and for which they therefore receive no premium. And, actually, 85%
of all jobs within non-STEM occupations are non-STEM and therefore do not offer any
wage premium for STEM skills even if they end up being filled with STEM graduates.
Hence, our results do not directly contradict, but rather extend previous findings.
They are important because they suggest that STEM skills are valued and continue to
contribute positively to productivity even within non-STEM occupations. Moreover,
on the basis of conventional supply and demand, our results seem to be consistent with
a shortage of STEM knowledge and skills across the economy and not only in STEM
occupations.
38It does not seem very plausible though that a recruiter would simply post, say, “C++” in his job
advert, just because he thinks that a candidate who knows how to code in C++ is more able than one
who does not, and not because the job genuinely requires knowledge of C++ or some other equivalent
software that someone with knowledge of C++ could certainly easily learn.
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2.4.4 The STEM requirements of “Non-STEM” jobs
We close this section by painting in more details the profile of STEM jobs belonging
to non-STEM occupations which constitute our main object of interest.
In particular, let us start by examining the top STEM requirements of STEM jobs
belonging to:
• Chartered architectural technologists: “Mechanical Engineering”, “Engineering Man-
agement”, “Civil Engineering”, “Auto CAD”, “Computer Aided Draughting/Design
(CAD)”, “Machinery”, “HVAC”, “Electrical Engineering”, “Engineering Design”, “Re-
vit”, “Concept Development”, “Technical Support”, “Engineering consultation”, “Sys-
tems Engineering”, “Preventive Maintenance”, “Mechanical Design”, “Product Devel-
opment”, “Engineering Projects”, “Engineering Support”, “Lean Methods”, “Process
Design”, “Manufacturing Industry Experience”. . .
• Product, clothing and related designers: “Computer Aided Draughting/Design(CAD)”,
“Concept Development”, “Auto CAD”, “Package Design”, “Process Design”, “Digital
Design”, “Product Development”, “Product Design”, “Concept Design and Develop-
ment”, “JavaScript”, “User Interface (UI) Design”, “Materials Design”, “Java”, “Pro-
totyping”, “Design Software”, “Information Technology Industry Experience”, “Revit”,
“Technical Drawings”, “SQL”, “Instrument Design”, “CAD Design”, “Set Design” . . .
• Management consultants and business analysts: “SQL”, “SAS”, “Information Tech-
nology Industry Experience”, “Data Warehousing”, “Unified Modelling Language (UML)”,
“Scrum”, “SQL Server”, “Systems Analysis”, “Data Modelling”, “Extraction Transfor-
mation and Loading (ETL)”, “Visual Basic”, “SQL Server Reporting Services (SSRS)”,
“Validation”, “Optimisation”, “Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC)”, “Java”,
“Data Mining”, “Process Design”, “Agile Development”, “Transact-SQL”, “Extensi-
ble Markup Language (XML)”, “Product Development”, “Statistics”, “Microsoft C#”,
“Relational Databases”, “Big Data”. . .
• Graphic designers: “Digital Design”, “Concept Development”, “Computer Aided Draugh-
ting/Design (CAD)”, “Materials Design”, “JavaScript”, “AutoCAD”, “HTML5”, “Pro-
cess Design”, “User Interface (UI) Design” “Concept Design and Development”, “Web
Site Development”, “jQuery”, “Package Design”, “Design Software”, “Product De-
sign”, “Product Development”, “Computer Software Industry Experience”, “Technical
Support”, “Interface Design”, “Prototyping”, “Set Design”, “Hypertext Preprocessor
(php)”, “3D Design”, “3D Modelling”, “Web Application Development”. . .
• Actuaries, economists and statisticians: “Statistics”, “SAS”, “Biostatistics”, “SQL”,
“VisualBasic”, “Bioinformatics”, “Validation”, “R”, “Epidemiology”, “Python”, “C++”,
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“Product Development”, “Biology”, “Optimisation”, “PERL”, “MATLAB”, “Physics”,
“Mathematical Modelling”, “Technical Support”, “Pharmaceutical Industry Background”,
“Java”, “Genomics”, “Genetics”, “UNIX”, “Calibration”, “LINUX”, “Data Mining”,
“Model Building”, “Experimental Design”, “SIMULATION”, “Predictive Models”, “Re-
lational Databases”, “Experiments”, “MySQL”. . .
• Artists: “Concept Development”, “JavaScript”, “Game Development”, “Computer
Aided Draughting/Design (CAD)”, “Python”, “Auto CAD”, “3D Modelling”, “Digi-
tal Design”, “User Interface (UI) Design”, “3D Design”, “Autodesk”, “Optimisation”,
“C++”, “Microsoft C#”, “3D Animation”, “Technical Support”, “Computer Software
Industry Experience”, “Troubleshooting”, “Process Design”, “Concept Design and De-
velopment”, “Game Design”, “ActionScript”, “Materials Design”, “Prototyping”. . .
Despite the fact that these recruiters are looking for STEM graduates with a higher
probability than for non-STEM ones, it seems that many of the STEM skills and knowl-
edge they require could actually be acquired with less training than a full-time STEM
degree, and could therefore be taught to non-STEM graduates in order to make them
suitable candidates for such positions.
Moreover, another interesting feature that distinguishes STEM jobs in STEM oc-
cupations from STEM jobs in non-STEM occupations is the percentage of keywords in
the job description that are STEM. In STEM occupations, 60% of all keywords posted
in a median STEM job advert are STEM, while in non-STEM occupations, this number
is only 30% (means are 59.38% and 35.29% respectively).
This suggests that STEM recruiters within non-STEM occupations actually seek
to combine STEM and non-STEM knowledge and skills in a certain combination that
lies in between the STEM-dominated combination required in STEM occupations and
the predominantly non-STEM one asked for in non-STEM jobs (cf. our discussion of
“hybrid” jobs in the Introduction).
2.5 Implications for STEM Skills & Knowledge Shortages
The previous section documents that a significant proportion of “non-STEM” em-
ployers may specifically look for STEM graduates not because they simply value their
“foundation competencies”, “logical approach to solving problems” or believe that
STEM graduates are intrinsically more capable, but because a STEM education has
equipped them with the skills and knowledge needed to write programs in C++ and
JavaScript, create digital designs, develop user interfaces, work with Big Data, perform
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statistical analysis in SAS ... The jobs these employers advertise require and value
STEM knowledge and skills despite being classified into “non-STEM” occupations. In
reality, however, many of these STEM skills and knowledge could be learned with train-
ing that is less advanced than a full-time STEM degree and these “non-STEM” STEM
recruiters actually want to combine them with non-STEM knowledge & skills.
In this section, we develop an abstract framework to think about the implications of
these findings for higher education policies aimed at reducing STEM shortages. In par-
ticular, we illustrate how the STEM shortages experienced by “non-STEM” employers
with STEM requirements and those that persist in traditional STEM occupations are
related, and how teaching more STEM in non-STEM disciplines could help alleviate
both.
2.5.1 The geometry of skills & knowledge shortages
The first step in analyzing skills and knowledge shortages is to define them.
Unfortunately, no clear and objective definition exists in the academic literature
where shortages are often understood as a phenomenon that “causes vacancies to re-
main open longer” (Haskel & Martin [102]). Unfilled vacancies constitute “dynamic
shortages” which only persist until wages have risen such as to make enough people ac-
quire the scarce skills and bring the labour market into equilibrium once again (Arrow
and Capron [14]).
However, hiring difficulties, unfilled vacancies, wage rises, etc. are all potential
consequences of shortages, not their proper definition. Hiring difficulties and unfilled
vacancies may occur for reasons unrelated to shortages, like inefficient human resource
recruiters, improper advertising of the job, etc., while raising wages is only one of many
responses to shortages. For instance, the 2016/2017 Talent shortage survey conducted
by ManpowerGroup [119] indicates that only 26% of employers respond to shortages
by “paying higher salary packages to recruits”. At the same time, 53% decide to “offer
training and development to existing staff”, 36% “recruit outside the talent pool”,
28% “explore alternative sourcing strategies”, 19% completely “change existing work
models”, etc.
Indeed, in practice, there is a great deal of confusion about both the meaning of
shortages and the reactions to them on both sides of the labour market.
Green et al. (1998) [83] analyse the Employer Manpower and Skills Practices Survey
(EMSPS) where employers were asked separate questions about experiencing (a) skills
shortages, (b) difficulties in filling vacancies, and (c) deficiencies in the ‘qualities’ of
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their existing workforce. They find only a partial overlap in the responses to these
questions, concluding that “to equate ‘skill shortage’ with ‘hard-to-fill vacancy’ may be
a very risky assumption which, if falsely made, could lead to unsafe conclusions”.
On the labour supply side, interviews and surveys of STEM students and gradu-
ates, analysed in BIS [125], reveal that most of them “start university with few career
ideas”. They typically choose to study a STEM discipline because of personal interest,
enjoyment and/or aptitude. In their sample, less than a quarter of STEM graduates
chose their degrees for “improved job prospects” and most of those who originally had
career purposes in mind when enrolling in a STEM discipline, did so to keep their ca-
reer options open. When it comes to applying for jobs, expected pay is certainly an
important factor, but not the main motivating force. STEM graduates look primarily
for “interesting work”.39
Overall, it therefore remains unclear whether or not the potentially equilibrating
wage adjustment mechanism is being used by employers and/or actually translating into
more people acquiring the scarce skills and knowledge. In what follows, we therefore
completely set these mechanisms apart and start from a basic definition of what a
shortage is.
According to the British Government’s Training Agency [4], a shortage occurs “when
there are not enough people available with the skills needed to do the jobs which need to
be done”. We shall now try to translate this definition into an abstract framework, then
employ it to conceptualize our empirical findings and think about education policies that
could help reduce STEM shortages experienced in STEM and non-STEM occupations.
Vacancies & Job seekers Let V denote the set of vacancies (empty jobs). The skills
& knowledge requirements of any vacancy j ∈ V have two components:
• an absolute amount φvj
• a composition θvj : if skills & knowledge are m-dimensional, the composition re-












jl = 1 and θ
v
jl ∈ [0, 1] ∀l is the proportion of j’s overall requirements in
the l−dimension.
39The academic literature also contains many contributions showing that financial incentives have
little or no impact of student learning choices at all education levels, e.g. cf. Fryer [74] and references
therein.
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Let Ω be the m-dimensional skills & knowledge space. The location of vacancy j in









Figure 2.8 illustrates the idea on a two dimensional lattice.
Figure 2.8 Skills & Knowledge
space
Notes: V2 and V3 require the same
amount of skills & knowledge but dif-
ferent compositions. V1 and V2 ask
for the same composition but differ-
ent amounts.
Along each blue line (and we have only shown two
for clarity), the same amount of skills & knowledge
but a different composition are required. As we move
from the left to the right, the composition is tilted
towards the X dimension because its loading on the
latter increases, while the share allocated to the Y
dimension decreases.
Along each green line, the same composition but
a different amount are required. As we move towards
the North-East, the amount of skills & knowledge
required increases.
For example, vacancies V2 and V3 require the same
amount of skills & knowledge φv2 = φ
v
3 = 6 but dif-
ferent compositions. Vacancies V1 and V2 have the
same compositions θv1 = θ
v
2 = (0.5, 0.5) but require
different amounts.
Let S denote the set of job seekers. As with va-
cancies, the location of candidate i in the space Ω is






i is the amount of
skills & knowledge possessed and θsi the m-dimensional composition vector.
An employer requiring amount φvj and composition θ
v
j to fill vacancy j might be
indifferent between a certain subset of candidates located in Zj ⊂ Ω, where Zj could be
influenced by many things but, for clarity, is assumed to only depend on the vacancy’s
location here, i.e. Zj := Z(vj).
Formally, let ω = φθ be a generic element of Ω (which we denote as v and s when
referring to vacancies and graduates respectively).
Definition 18. The qualified subset for vacancy j, Zj is such that for any two elements
ω 6= ω′ with ω ∈ Zj and ω′ ∈ Zj:
ω ∼j ω′
i.e. the recruiter for vacancy j is indifferent between the two in terms of knowledge and
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skills.
In practice, we could think of Zj as the subset of candidates for vacancy j such that
it is no longer differences in the knowledge & skills that these candidates possess which
will be the main determinant of the hiring decision. Other worker characteristics such
as work styles, personality will allow the recruiter to select the best fit for his vacancy.
However, here we abstract from all this and concentrate on skills & knowledge in terms
of which the candidates all seem equally qualified to the employer.
The existence of such subsets implies that a candidate may be simultaneously qual-
ified for several vacancies belonging to the same or different occupations. In this case,
the question of establishing whether or not there are “enough” qualified people avail-
able to “do the jobs which need to be done”, i.e. to fill all open vacancies, becomes
non-trivial as we cannot simply count the numbers of vacancies and job seekers at every
ω and declare a shortage if vacancies outnumber candidates.
To determine whether vacancies located at a specific point in the skills & knowledge
space experience a shortage, we start by characterizing the measure space in which
vacancies and job seekers coexist.
For simplicity, suppose that Ω is discrete.
The distribution of the job seekers defines a measure P on Ω. For instance, if the
pool of job seekers is such that none of them is located at ω, i.e. si 6= ω for all i ∈ S,
we have P (ω) = 0. More generally:
P (ω) = |{i ∈ S|si = ω}| and P (Ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω) = |S| (2.14)
where |.| denotes the cardinality of a set.
In a similar way, we can define a measure Q for the distribution of the vacancies:
Q(ω) = |{j ∈ V|vj = ω}| and Q(Ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
Q(ω) = |V| (2.15)








where H∆ := {ω ∈ Ω|P (Zω ∩ Z∆) 6= 0, ω 6= ∆} and L∆ := {ω ∈ Ω|ω ∈ Zu for u ∈
H∆, ω /∈ Z∆}. Note that since Zj := Z(vj), Zj = Zh = Z∆ for any j 6= h such that
vj = vh = ∆.
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The left hand side of eq.2.16 gives the total demand for candidates qualified for
vacancies located at ∆. The first term is simply the number of vacancies at ∆. The
second one counts all the other vacancies that also want to hire job seekers qualified
for vacancies at ∆. This subset of vacancies is denoted by H∆. On the right hand side,
the first term gives the number of candidates qualified for vacancies at ∆, while the
second one adjusts this number for the fact that vacancies in H∆, i.e. which compete
with vacancies at ∆ for the job seekers in Z∆, also have access to a pool of candidates
that are qualified for them but unqualified for vacancies at ∆, and for which they do
not compete with ∆-vacancies.
Example 20. To fully understand the condition for a shortage contained in eq.2.16,
we can look at a simple example with a two-dimensional space in which the problem
can be inspected visually.
For clarity, let’s also assume the following specific form for the qualified subsets,
illustrated in Figure 2.9:
Zj = {ω ∈ Ω|ωl > vjl, ∀l = 1, ..., n} (2.17)
Intuitively, eq.2.17 corresponds to the subset of candidates who have at least as much
skills & knowledge in each dimension as what the vacancy requires.
Figure 2.9 Qualified subset
Notes: The shaded area marks the
subset of candidates who would be
qualified for vacancy V1 according
to eq. 1.6
In Figure 2.9, vacancy 1 is located at (5, 6), while
the job seekers are at s1 = (3, 8) and s2 = (7, 7).
The shaded area to the North-East of vacancy 1 cor-
responds to Z1 as defined in eq.2.17. Only candidate
2 belongs to Z1. Candidate 1 is unqualified because
s11 < v11. In particular, s1 has the right amount of
skills & knowledge (φs1 = φ
v
1 = 11) but the wrong com-
position: θs1 = (3/11, 8/11) versus θ
v
1 = (5/11, 6/11).
The skills & knowledge composition of s2 assigns equal
weights to both dimensions. Although the composition
required by the vacancy is slightly tilted towards the
vertical dimension compared to the one possessed by
s2, he is still qualified for the job according to eq.2.17
because he has more overall skills & knowledge and is
located such that s21 > v11 and s22 > v11.
Example 21. Figure 2.10 illustrates how the condition
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Figure 2.10 Illustrating the condition for shortages in eq. 1.7
Shortage for V2, not for V1 Shortages for both V1 and V2
No shortages
Notes: Three possible scenarios with two workers and two vacancies in a two-dimensional skills &
knowledge space are illustrated. As S2 becomes qualified for both vacancies (going from the left to
the middle panel), there is no longer “enough” of him, so that both V1 and V2 experience shortages.
Moving from the middle to the right panel, both shortages are eliminated by simply making S1 qualified
for V1, so that there are enough qualified workers at the level of the economy to simultaneously fill
both vacancies.
for determining the presence of a shortage in eq. 1.7 works in this simple abstract setting
by presenting three possible scenarios with two vacancies and two job seekers. Let the
L, M, and R - subscripts stand for its left, middle, and right panels.
In the left wing panel we have PL(ω) = 1 for ω = {s1, s2} with s1 = (1, 6) and
s2 = (4, 5) and P
L(ω) = 0 for any other ω ∈ Ω. For the vacancies, QL(ω) = 1 for
ω = {v1, v2} with v1 = (2, 4) and v2 = (5, 1) and QL(ω) = 0 for ω 6= {v1, v2}. Note that
vacancies require exactly the same amount of skills & knowledge (φv1 = φ
v
2 = 6) but
different compositions: θv1 = (1/3, 2/3) and θ
v
2 = (5/6, 1/6). Furthermore, the qualified
subsets are such that PL(Z1) = 1 and P
L(Z2) = 0. Vacancy 2 experiences a shortage
since both potential candidates have inadequate compositions despite having more skills
& knowledge that what v2 requires: φ
s
1 = 7 and φ
s
2 = 9. Since P
L(Z1 ∩Z2) = 0, eq.2.16
reads: 1 + 0 > 0 + 0 at ∆ = v2 signaling a shortage for vacancy 2. By contrast, vacancy
1 does not experience a shortage; the qualified candidate is s2, and there is enough of
him because he is not also qualified for vacancy 2. Eq.2.16 in this case gives 1+0 ≤ 1+0
since QL(v1) = P
L(Z1) = P
L(s2) = 1 and the second terms on both sides are still equal
to 0 because PL(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 0.
In the middle panel, we simply change the location of s2 from (4, 5) to (5, 4), i.e.
keeping φs2 = 9 but slightly changing his skills & knowledge composition. Candidate 2
is now the only qualified candidate for both vacancies and so there is no longer enough
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of him. Indeed, now PM(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 1 and eq.2.16 becomes 1 + 1 > 1 + 0 for both
vacancies, indicating shortages.
Finally, in the right wing of fig 2.10 we move job seeker 1 from (1, 6) to (2, 5), keeping
everything else as in the middle panel. s1 is now in Z1, i.e. qualified for vacancy 1,
while still remaining outside Z2. Graphically, it is obvious that there are no shortages
because there are enough qualified candidates to fill both vacancies simultaneously.
Simply assign s1 to v1 and s2 to v2. The condition for a shortage in eq.2.16 is violated
for both vacancies. For vacancy 2, the equation reads 1 + 1 ≤ 1 + 1 since QR(v2) = 1,
PR(Z2) = 1, and P
R(Z1 ∩ Z2) = 1. It is important not to forget the right hand side
adjustment PR(s1) = 1. Indeed, although s2 seems to be over-demanded since he is
qualified for both vacancies so that total demand for him is QR(v1) + Q
R(v2) = 2,
it would be wrong to conclude that v2 experiences a shortage because s2 is the only
qualified applicant for it. The reason is that, contrary to the situation depicted in the
middle panel, vacancy 1 now has an alternative qualified candidate: s1.
2.5.2 Implications for Higher Education provision policies
We can think about s2 as the STEM graduate and s1 as the non-STEM graduate,
X as the STEM dimension and Y as the non-STEM dimension, v2 as the traditional
STEM occupation STEM job, and of v1 as a “non-STEM” STEM job.
The above example illustrates two points:
• the existence of a shortage cannot be established by looking at some vacancies
and job seekers in isolation, it has to take into account their interdependence at
the level of the economy. Hence, in order to understand why STEM shortages
arise and propose adequate policies to eliminate them, we need to go beyond
STEM graduates and STEM occupations, and include non-STEM graduates and
non-STEM occupations.
• shortages can be solved by changing the location of “not-in-shortage” graduates:
in the middle panel of fig. 2.10, the skills & knowledge composition of s1 allocates
too little to the STEM dimension for him to be qualified even for v1- the “non-
STEM” job that nevertheless requires a certain amount of STEM knowledge and
skills. Hence both v1 and v2 have to compete for s2. In the right panel, we simply
change the composition of s1 from (1/7, 6/7) to (2/7, 5/7) without adding any
skills & knowledge. This solves shortages for both v1 and v2 because they no
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longer have to compete for the STEM graduate s2, and also gives a job to the
non-STEM graduate.
These points imply that STEM shortages are not only about “not enough” STEM
graduates, but also about “not enough” STEM skills & knowledge taught in non-STEM
disciplines.
A key implication is that the solution to STEM shortages is not only and necessarily
to encourage more students to enroll into STEM degrees, which many of them will
avoid, however high the rewards may be, because following advanced STEM classes
for several years of their lives might be too difficult and/or uninteresting. Instead,
introducing more mandatory, or at least optional, STEM modules into non-STEM
disciplines could help alleviate shortages by allowing students to enroll in non-STEM
degrees while still graduating with the employer-desired amount of STEM knowledge
and skills. Furthermore, this policy could help alleviate shortages in traditional STEM
occupations, since if there are more non-STEM graduates with appropriate STEM
training, “non-STEM” STEM employers will be less likely to look specifically for STEM
graduates, who may therefore have to seek jobs in the traditional STEM occupations
more often.
2.6 Conclusion & Future Research
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on whether the fact that, in the UK, less
than half of STEM graduates work in so-called “STEM” occupations (e.g. Scientists,
Engineers) should be considered as a problem or not necessarily so, and, if yes, what
type of education provision policy initiatives could help resolve it.
We develop a new approach to identifying STEM jobs through the keywords col-
lected from online vacancy descriptions, and not, as is typically done, by classifying
occupations discretely into STEM vs. non-STEM, then considering all the jobs belong-
ing to the first group as “STEM” and the rest as “non-STEM”. This approach is made
possible by having access to a large dataset, collected by the firm Burning Glass Tech-
nologies, which contains information on all vacancies posted online in the UK between
2012 and 2016.
Our job level analysis shows that it is wrong to equate STEM jobs with STEM occu-
pations: 35% of all STEM jobs belong to non-STEM occupations. Moreover, this leads
to underestimating the overall demand for STEM knowledge and skills since STEM
jobs outnumber jobs in STEM occupations, e.g. by half a million STEM employment
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opportunities in 2015. We also find that when seeking STEM graduates, recruiters in
non-STEM occupations offer to pay higher wages and, conditional on occupation fixed
effects, this premium is not statistically significantly different from the one offered for
STEM knowledge and skills within STEM occupations.
Although, these findings suggest that the leakage from the STEM pipeline may be
less problematic than typically thought because around 15% of all recruiters in non-
STEM occupations do require and value STEM knowledge and skills, the issue remains
problematic for two main reasons.
Firstly, nothing prevents STEM educated job seekers to take up non-STEM jobs
within non-STEM occupations, for which non-STEM graduates are also qualified and
no STEM premium is offered.
Secondly, we find that the STEM skills and knowledge posted in STEM vacancies
within non-STEM occupations go beyond “Problem Solving”, “Analytical Skills”... but,
in many cases, could be acquired with less training than a full time STEM degree. More-
over, STEM recruiters within non-STEM occupations actually wish to combine STEM
knowledge and skills with non-STEM ones to a larger extent that their counterparts
in STEM occupations. Hence, a more efficient way of satisfying STEM demand within
non-STEM occupations could be to teach more STEM in non-STEM disciplines, so as
to make non-STEM graduates qualified for a set of jobs within non-STEM occupations
for which they only lack the STEM skills, while already possessing the required non-
STEM ones. We construct an abstract framework to illustrate how this reform could
reduce STEM shortages in both STEM and non-STEM occupations.
Although the main focus of this paper is on “high level” STEM jobs – jobs that
belong to managerial, professional and associate professional occupations for which a
university degree is typically required, our analysis indicates that 25% of all STEM
employment opportunities in the UK are not “high level”. Examining the O*NET
Knowledge scales, Rothwell [141] gets a similar result for the US, finding that 30% of
STEM positions there are “blue-collar”. He argues that “the excessively professional
definition of STEM jobs has led to missed opportunities to identify and support valuable
training and career development.” This could also be the case in the UK. Hence, future
research should spend more time investigating non-graduate STEM job openings in the
UK as well.
Other potential extensions of our work include using the occupational STEM density
estimates, presented in Section 2.3.2 and Table 17, to get more precise projections of
STEM demand, or combining them with the Labour Force Survey to construct an
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estimate of the percentage of “STEM wastage”, by e.g. subtracting the STEM density
estimate (STEM demand) from the percentage of people with STEM degrees working
in an occupation (STEM supply).
Another interesting direction is to spend more time investigating the spatial distri-
bution of STEM jobs and relating it to measures of regional development, innovation,
unemployment, etc..
Finally, future research could also try to merge the analysis of STEM demand pre-
sented here with a similar analysis on the labour supply side, perhaps using a dataset
like LinkedIn. Nowadays, many people acquire STEM human capital not through for-
mal education but other channels like self-study, online courses, internships. . . This
makes the assessment of the actual supply of STEM knowledge & skills more complex
than simply counting the number of STEM graduates. Although, the existing STEM
literature recognizes this as a problem, so far, no attempts seem to have been made
to deal with it and “STEM skills and knowledge” continue to be used interchangeably
with “STEM qualifications”. Clearly, this has the same flaws as equating “STEM jobs”
with “STEM occupations”.
2.7 Appendix
Table 15: Comparison of occupational distributions, UK 2014
Major SOC Code Major SOC Name ASHE BGT Data
1 Managers, directors and senior officials 9.6 9.9
2 Professional occupations 21.5 28.1
3 Associate professional and technical occupations 14.5 22.5
4 Administrative and secretarial occupations 12.1 9.9
5 Skilled trades occupations 8.0 6.5
6 Caring leisure and other service occupations 9.5 6.6
7 Sales and customer service occupations 8.1 6.2
8 Process, plant and machine operatives 6.0 4.2
9 Elementary occupations 10.7 6.1
Correlation 0.94
Notes: Produced by BGT. ASHE is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS).
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Figure 2.11 Extracting information from online job ads (from Carnevale et al. [34])
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Table 16: Comparison of geographic distributions, UK 2015
BGT Data ONS ASHE Weight
East Midlands 6.23 6.96 1.12
East of England 9.18 9.28 1.01
London 22.69 14.77 0.65
North East 2.09 3.79 1.82
North West 9.24 10.71 1.16
South East 16.01 13.47 0.84
South West 8.09 8.44 1.04
West Midlands 9.83 8.59 0.87
Yorkshire and The Humber 6.7 7.93 1.18
Northern Ireland 1.58 3.05 1.92
Scotland 6.13 8.63 1.41
Wales 2.22 4.38 1.97
Correlation 0.95
Notes: Produced by the author. ASHE is the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (ASHE) from the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
Table 17: Occupational distribution of STEM jobs, 2015 (4-digit UK SOC)






1115 Chief executives and senior officials 0 15.1 0.07
1116 Elected officers and representatives 0 63.06 0.04
1121 Production managers and directors in manufacturing 1 60.06 1.41
1122 Production managers and directors in construction 0 78.56 1.09
1123 Production managers and directors in mining and energy 1 64.5 0.05
1131 Financial managers and directors 0 3.88 0.09
1132 Marketing and sales directors 0 16.61 0.54
1133 Purchasing managers and directors 0 15.83 0.13
1134 Advertising and public relations directors 0 2.06 0.01
1135 Human resource managers and directors 0 2.94 0.03
1136 Information technology and telecommunications directors 1 33.39 0.13
1139 Functional managers and directors n.e.c. 0 16.32 0.08
1150 Financial institution managers and directors 0 9.12 0.02
1161 Managers and directors in transport and distribution 0 25.19 0.08
1162 Managers and directors in storage and warehousing 0 29.86 0.14
1171 Officers in armed forces 0 13.81 0.02
1172 Senior police officers 0 19.4 0
1173 Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services 0 51.46 0.06
1181 Health services and public health managers and directors 0 9.24 0.08
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1184 Social services managers and directors 0 1.24 0
1190 Managers and directors in retail and wholesale 0 10.57 0.27
1211 Managers and proprietors in agriculture and horticulture 0 5.82 0
1213 Managers and proprietors in forestry, fishing and related
services
0 30.49 0
1221 Hotel and accommodation managers and proprietors 0 10.38 0.02
1223 Restaurant and catering establishment managers and pro-
prietors
0 1.7 0.01
1224 Publicans and managers of licensed premises 0 3.21 0
1225 Leisure and sports managers 0 5.53 0.01
1226 Travel agency managers and proprietors 0 3.6 0
1241 Health care practice managers 0 0.04 0
1242 Residential, day and domiciliary care managers and propri-
etors
0 0.27 0
1251 Property, housing and estate managers 0 23.43 0.25
1252 Garage managers and proprietors 0 13.74 0
1253 Hairdressing and beauty salon managers and proprietors 0 0.75 0
1254 Shopkeepers and proprietors - wholesale and retail 0 12.87 0.02
1255 Waste disposal and environmental services managers 1 47.04 0.01
1259 Managers and proprietors in other services n.e.c. 0 42.66 2.44
2111 Chemical scientists 1 93.39 0.2
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists 1 64.12 0.54
2113 Physical scientists 1 75.65 0.1
2114 Social and humanities scientists 0 7.62 0.01
2119 Natural and social science professionals n.e.c. 1 88.69 0.27
2121 Civil engineers 1 98.66 1.72
2122 Mechanical engineers 1 99.39 1.15
2123 Electrical engineers 1 99.66 1.15
2124 Electronics engineers 1 98.19 0.3
2126 Design and development engineers 1 99.11 2.5
2127 Production and process engineers 1 94.62 0.5
2129 Engineering professionals n.e.c. 1 80.37 0.97
2133 IT specialist managers 1 54.71 0.69
2134 IT project and programme managers 1 50.92 1.06
2135 IT business analysts, architects and systems designers 1 79.28 5.36
2136 Programmers and software development professionals 1 91.41 14.61
2137 Web design and development professionals 1 90.87 5.18
2139 Information technology and telecommunications profession-
als n.e.c.
1 77.7 3
2141 Conservation professionals 1 49.7 0.05
2142 Environment professionals 1 57.44 0.1
2150 Research and development managers 1 58.88 0.25
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2211 Medical practitioners 0 5.42 0.15
2212 Psychologists 1 0.14 0
2213 Pharmacists 0 4.98 0.02
2214 Ophthalmic opticians 0 0.6 0
2215 Dental practitioners 0 0.31 0
2216 Veterinarians 1 0.3 0
2217 Medical radiographers 0 4.28 0.01
2218 Podiatrists 0 0.07 0
2219 Health professionals n.e.c. 0 6.75 0.03
2221 Physiotherapists 0 0.07 0
2222 Occupational therapists 0 0 0
2223 Speech and language therapists 0 0 0
2229 Therapy professionals n.e.c. 0 8.18 0.01
2231 Nurses 0 0.18 0.02
2232 Midwives 0 0.56 0
2311 Higher education teaching professionals 0 10.63 0.04
2312 Further education teaching professionals 0 6.21 0.04
2314 Secondary education teaching professionals 0 4.54 0.13
2315 Primary and nursery education teaching professionals 0 0.15 0
2316 Special needs education teaching professionals 0 0.54 0
2317 Senior professionals of educational establishments 0 2.99 0.02
2318 Education advisers and school inspectors 0 6.05 0.01
2319 Teaching and other educational professionals n.e.c. 0 3.01 0.05
2412 Barristers and judges 0 19.02 0.01
2413 Solicitors 0 2.8 0.07
2419 Legal professionals n.e.c. 0 2.85 0.04
2421 Chartered and certified accountants 0 0.35 0.01
2423 Management consultants and business analysts 0 25.33 1.23
2424 Business and financial project management professionals 0 13.84 0.22
2425 Actuaries, economists and statisticians 0 34.69 0.13
2426 Business and related research professionals 0 33.76 0.24
2429 Business, research and administrative professionals n.e.c. 0 46.84 0.43
2431 Architects 1 65.89 0.42
2432 Town planning officers 1 65.14 0.24
2433 Quantity surveyors 0 29.96 0.58
2434 Chartered surveyors 0 64.7 0.66
2435 Chartered architectural technologists 0 85.42 0.24
2436 Construction project managers and related professionals 0 56.19 0.14
2442 Social workers 0 0.15 0
2443 Probation officers 0 0.16 0
2444 Clergy 0 4.58 0
2449 Welfare professionals n.e.c. 0 2.51 0
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2451 Librarians 0 8.89 0.01
2452 Archivists and curators 0 11.76 0.01
2461 Quality control and planning engineers 1 90.78 1.11
2462 Quality assurance and regulatory professionals 1 49.94 0.87
2463 Environmental health professionals 1 15 0
2471 Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors 0 20.48 0.14
2472 Public relations professionals 0 2.61 0.01
2473 Advertising accounts managers and creative directors 0 0.91 0
3111 Laboratory technicians 1 54.29 0.38
3112 Electrical and electronics technicians 1 97.63 0.11
3113 Engineering technicians 1 93.59 2.09
3114 Building and civil engineering technicians 1 93.89 0.2
3115 Quality assurance technicians 1 85.95 0.5
3116 Planning, process and production technicians 1 81.93 0.18
3119 Science, engineering and production technicians n.e.c. 1 75.11 1.24
3121 Architectural and town planning technicians 1 53.66 0.15
3122 Draughtspersons 1 84.23 0.58
3131 IT operations technicians 1 72.12 2.74
3132 IT user support technicians 1 71.93 3.3
3213 Paramedics 0 1 0
3216 Dispensing opticians 0 0.35 0
3217 Pharmaceutical technicians 1 2.88 0
3218 Medical and dental technicians 1 34.27 0.16
3219 Health associate professionals n.e.c. 0 2.42 0.03
3231 Youth and community workers 0 0.69 0
3233 Child and early years officers 0 0.6 0
3234 Housing officers 0 2.4 0.01
3235 Counsellors 0 1.14 0
3239 Welfare and housing associate professionals n.e.c. 0 2.83 0.03
3311 NCOs and other ranks 0 9.7 0.02
3312 Police officers (sergeant and below) 0 28.89 0.02
3313 Fire service officers (watch manager and below) 0 61.55 0.01
3314 Prison service officers (below principal officer) 0 5.25 0
3315 Police community support officers 0 8.06 0
3319 Protective service associate professionals n.e.c. 0 41.16 0.07
3411 Artists 0 23.46 0.04
3412 Authors, writers and translators 0 12.13 0.15
3413 Actors, entertainers and presenters 0 11.36 0.08
3414 Dancers and choreographers 0 1.01 0
3415 Musicians 0 12.41 0.02
3416 Arts officers, producers and directors 0 10.58 0.05
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3417 Photographers, audio-visual and broadcasting equipment
operators
0 18.05 0.05
3421 Graphic designers 0 18.53 0.25
3422 Product, clothing and related designers 0 45.62 0.31
3441 Sports players 0 11.39 0.01
3442 Sports coaches, instructors and officials 0 5.63 0.02
3443 Fitness instructors 0 0.2 0
3511 Air traffic controllers 0 42.98 0
3512 Aircraft pilots and flight engineers 0 35.17 0.01
3513 Ship and hovercraft officers 0 26.74 0.02
3520 Legal associate professionals 0 1.52 0.02
3531 Estimators, valuers and assessors 0 45.21 0.97
3532 Brokers 0 14.29 0.05
3533 Insurance underwriters 0 14.56 0.06
3534 Finance and investment analysts and advisers 0 7.59 0.19
3535 Taxation experts 0 6.03 0.03
3536 Importers and exporters 0 11.58 0.01
3537 Financial and accounting technicians 0 11.67 0.03
3538 Financial accounts managers 0 9.05 0.22
3539 Business and related associate professionals n.e.c. 0 31.93 0.99
3541 Buyers and procurement officers 0 17.66 0.28
3542 Business sales executives 0 20.56 1.6
3543 Marketing associate professionals 0 2.76 0.13
3544 Estate agents and auctioneers 0 4.27 0.04
3545 Sales accounts and business development managers 0 17.84 1.05
3546 Conference and exhibition managers and organisers 0 3.8 0.03
3550 Conservation and environmental associate professionals 0 20.29 0.01
3561 Public services associate professionals 0 12.54 0.05
3562 Human resources and industrial relations officers 0 4.69 0.24
3563 Vocational and industrial trainers and instructors 0 16.2 0.26
3564 Careers advisers and vocational guidance specialists 0 18.78 0.04
3565 Inspectors of standards and regulations 0 60.79 0.15
3567 Health and safety officers 1 60.95 0.51
4112 National government administrative occupations 0 4.36 0.01
4113 Local government administrative occupations 0 2.87 0
4114 Officers of non-governmental organisations 0 1.27 0
4121 Credit controllers 0 2.33 0.02
4122 Book-keepers, payroll managers and wages clerks 0 0.73 0.02
4123 Bank and post office clerks 0 7.69 0.04
4124 Finance officers 0 0.1 0
4129 Financial administrative occupations n.e.c. 0 2.86 0.03
4131 Records clerks and assistants 0 18.07 0.2
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4132 Pensions and insurance clerks and assistants 0 2.89 0.02
4133 Stock control clerks and assistants 0 29.61 0.23
4134 Transport and distribution clerks and assistants 0 15.72 0.14
4135 Library clerks and assistants 0 3.23 0
4138 Human resources administrative occupations 0 0.33 0
4151 Sales administrators 0 1.63 0.02
4159 Other administrative occupations n.e.c. 0 3.88 0.28
4161 Office managers 0 6.66 0.09
4162 Office supervisors 0 11.34 0.15
4211 Medical secretaries 0 1.39 0
4212 Legal secretaries 0 0.05 0
4213 School secretaries 0 1.79 0
4214 Company secretaries 0 1.75 0.02
4215 Personal assistants and other secretaries 0 8.32 0.21
4216 Receptionists 0 0.72 0.01
4217 Typists and related keyboard occupations 0 10.93 0.03
5111 Farmers 0 40.64 0.05
5112 Horticultural trades 0 19.6 0
5113 Gardeners and landscape gardeners 0 10.69 0.03
5114 Groundsmen and greenkeepers 0 13.22 0
5119 Agricultural and fishing trades n.e.c. 0 12.87 0
5211 Smiths and forge workers 1 23.12 0
5212 Moulders, core makers and die casters 1 91.81 0.03
5213 Sheet metal workers 1 79.34 0.07
5214 Metal plate workers, and riveters 1 72.4 0.01
5215 Welding trades 1 98.87 0.5
5216 Pipe fitters 1 98.31 0.01
5221 Metal machining setters and setter-operators 1 96.16 0.7
5222 Tool makers, tool fitters and markers-out 1 91.97 0.14
5223 Metal working production and maintenance fitters 1 90.27 1.17
5224 Precision instrument makers and repairers 1 70.7 0.09
5225 Air-conditioning and refrigeration engineers 0 99.8 0.15
5231 Vehicle technicians, mechanics and electricians 1 78.85 1.61
5232 Vehicle body builders and repairers 1 70.06 0.16
5234 Vehicle paint technicians 0 18.37 0.01
5235 Aircraft maintenance and related trades 0 93.74 0.02
5236 Boat and ship builders and repairers 0 78.05 0.01
5237 Rail and rolling stock builders and repairers 0 61.65 0.01
5241 Electricians and electrical fitters 1 98.79 1.28
5242 Telecommunications engineers 1 95.4 0.99
5244 TV, video and audio engineers 1 82.26 0.02
5245 IT engineers 1 96.31 0.32
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5249 Electrical and electronic trades n.e.c. 1 98.47 1.71
5250 Skilled metal, electrical and electronic trades supervisors 0 62.15 0.23
5311 Steel erectors 0 94.43 0.04
5312 Bricklayers and masons 0 30.94 0.05
5313 Roofers, roof tilers and slaters 0 79.03 0.09
5314 Plumbers and heating and ventilating engineers 1 73.49 0.66
5315 Carpenters and joiners 0 56.21 0.51
5316 Glaziers, window fabricators and fitters 0 71.84 0.11
5319 Construction and building trades n.e.c. 0 81.45 0.54
5321 Plasterers 0 33.25 0.03
5322 Floorers and wall tilers 0 46.23 0.04
5323 Painters and decorators 0 4.93 0.02
5330 Construction and building trades supervisors 0 87.19 0.2
5411 Weavers and knitters 0 22.3 0
5412 Upholsterers 0 40.9 0.02
5413 Footwear and leather working trades 0 22.68 0.01
5414 Tailors and dressmakers 0 37.88 0.02
5419 Textiles, garments and related trades n.e.c. 0 43.37 0.02
5421 Pre-press technicians 0 33.54 0.02
5422 Printers 0 24.19 0.04
5423 Print finishing and binding workers 0 32.04 0.02
5431 Butchers 0 9.33 0.01
5432 Bakers and flour confectioners 0 8.46 0.01
5433 Fishmongers and poultry dressers 0 13.91 0
5434 Chefs 0 0.04 0
5435 Cooks 0 1.81 0.02
5436 Catering and bar managers 0 0.94 0
5441 Glass and ceramics makers, decorators and finishers 0 49.16 0.02
5442 Furniture makers and other craft woodworkers 0 41.36 0.03
5443 Florists 0 2.27 0
5449 Other skilled trades n.e.c. 0 52.89 0.33
6121 Nursery nurses and assistants 0 0.05 0
6122 Childminders and related occupations 0 0.08 0
6123 Playworkers 0 4.32 0.01
6125 Teaching assistants 0 0.14 0
6126 Educational support assistants 0 1.85 0.01
6131 Veterinary nurses 0 0.64 0
6132 Pest control officers 0 38.58 0.01
6139 Animal care services occupations n.e.c. 0 5.74 0.01
6141 Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 0 2.1 0.02
6142 Ambulance staff (excluding paramedics) 0 29.74 0.03
6143 Dental nurses 0 0.01 0
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6144 Houseparents and residential wardens 0 14.09 0.04
6145 Care workers and home carers 0 1.11 0.05
6146 Senior care workers 0 2.07 0.01
6147 Care escorts 0 2.5 0
6148 Undertakers, mortuary and crematorium assistants 0 3.94 0
6211 Sports and leisure assistants 0 2.94 0.01
6212 Travel agents 0 1.1 0.01
6214 Air travel assistants 0 10.6 0
6215 Rail travel assistants 0 31.68 0.01
6219 Leisure and travel service occupations n.e.c. 0 18.17 0.02
6221 Hairdressers and barbers 0 0.49 0
6222 Beauticians and related occupations 0 3.55 0.01
6231 Housekeepers and related occupations 0 2.43 0.01
6232 Caretakers 0 11.2 0.13
6240 Cleaning and housekeeping managers and supervisors 0 20.03 0.07
7111 Sales and retail assistants 0 9.35 0.38
7112 Retail cashiers and check-out operators 0 9.07 0.01
7113 Telephone salespersons 0 1.66 0.02
7114 Pharmacy and other dispensing assistants 0 0.44 0
7115 Vehicle and parts salespersons and advisers 0 10.6 0.03
7121 Collector salespersons and credit agents 0 33.89 0.08
7122 Debt, rent and other cash collectors 0 22.21 0.08
7123 Roundspersons and van salespersons 0 20.96 0.01
7124 Market and street traders and assistants 0 22.15 0.02
7125 Merchandisers and window dressers 0 4.94 0.02
7129 Sales related occupations n.e.c. 0 14.86 0.71
7130 Sales supervisors 0 16.96 0.52
7211 Call and contact centre occupations 0 4.85 0.12
7213 Telephonists 0 48.85 0.13
7214 Communication operators 0 20.53 0.03
7215 Market research interviewers 0 3.28 0.01
7219 Customer service occupations n.e.c. 0 2.96 0.07
7220 Customer service managers and supervisors 0 10.76 0.08
8111 Food, drink and tobacco process operatives 0 46.16 0.16
8112 Glass and ceramics process operatives 0 30.33 0.01
8113 Textile process operatives 0 42.4 0.35
8114 Chemical and related process operatives 0 49.65 0.32
8115 Rubber process operatives 0 57.63 0.01
8116 Plastics process operatives 0 88.58 0.07
8117 Metal making and treating process operatives 0 42.9 0.13
8118 Electroplaters 0 65.45 0.02
8119 Process operatives n.e.c. 0 65.86 0.02
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8121 Paper and wood machine operatives 0 38.83 0.1
8122 Coal mine operatives 0 44.76 0.01
8123 Quarry workers and related operatives 0 56.61 0.05
8124 Energy plant operatives 0 40.94 0.05
8125 Metal working machine operatives 0 88.98 0.66
8126 Water and sewerage plant operatives 0 94.39 0.05
8127 Printing machine assistants 0 28.82 0.03
8129 Plant and machine operatives n.e.c. 0 38.25 0.51
8131 Assemblers (electrical and electronic products) 0 91.38 0.16
8132 Assemblers (vehicles and metal goods) 0 89.81 0.14
8133 Routine inspectors and testers 0 90.51 0.98
8134 Weighers, graders and sorters 0 18.72 0.04
8135 Tyre, exhaust and windscreen fitters 0 76.12 0.08
8137 Sewing machinists 0 64.53 0.07
8139 Assemblers and routine operatives n.e.c. 0 59.85 0.21
8141 Scaffolders, stagers and riggers 0 63.8 0.07
8142 Road construction operatives 0 61.65 0.04
8143 Rail construction and maintenance operatives 1 78.75 0.01
8149 Construction operatives n.e.c. 0 83.65 0.39
8211 Large goods vehicle drivers 0 28.74 0.84
8212 Van drivers 0 23.7 0.38
8213 Bus and coach drivers 0 44.83 0.1
8214 Taxi and cab drivers and chauffeurs 0 16.73 0.01
8215 Driving instructors 0 14.03 0.02
8221 Crane drivers 0 92.75 0.08
8222 Fork-lift truck drivers 0 72.36 0.34
8223 Agricultural machinery drivers 0 31.94 0.01
8229 Mobile machine drivers and operatives n.e.c. 0 88.91 0.34
8231 Train and tram drivers 0 46.71 0.01
8232 Marine and waterways transport operatives 0 31.14 0.02
8233 Air transport operatives 0 43.01 0.01
8234 Rail transport operatives 0 61.18 0.03
8239 Other drivers and transport operatives n.e.c. 0 26.62 0.05
9111 Farm workers 0 11.95 0.01
9112 Forestry workers 0 34.34 0.01
9119 Fishing and other elementary agriculture occupations n.e.c. 0 16.08 0.02
9120 Elementary construction occupations 0 68.9 0.8
9132 Industrial cleaning process occupations 0 45.3 0.1
9134 Packers, bottlers, canners and fillers 0 37.43 0.09
9139 Elementary process plant occupations n.e.c. 0 61.39 0.38
9211 Postal workers, mail sorters, messengers and couriers 0 7.17 0.02
9219 Elementary administration occupations n.e.c. 0 13.27 0.03
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9231 Window cleaners 0 6.97 0
9232 Street cleaners 0 14.88 0
9233 Cleaners and domestics 0 8.65 0.09
9234 Launderers, dry cleaners and pressers 0 6.61 0.01
9235 Refuse and salvage occupations 0 67.51 0.13
9236 Vehicle valeters and cleaners 0 34.91 0.01
9239 Elementary cleaning occupations n.e.c. 0 8.31 0
9241 Security guards and related occupations 0 31.86 0.27
9242 Parking and civil enforcement occupations 0 22.46 0.02
9244 School midday and crossing patrol occupations 0 8.56 0.01
9249 Elementary security occupations n.e.c. 0 24.23 0.06
9251 Shelf fillers 0 5.27 0
9259 Elementary sales occupations n.e.c. 0 3.56 0
9260 Elementary storage occupations 0 28.56 0.31
9271 Hospital porters 0 2.07 0
9272 Kitchen and catering assistants 0 1.98 0.04
9273 Waiters and waitresses 0 5.91 0.08
9274 Bar staff 0 0.8 0.01
9275 Leisure and theme park attendants 0 8.72 0.01
9279 Other elementary services occupations n.e.c. 0 6.65 0.04
Notes: STEM density corresponds to the percentage of jobs in an occupation that are STEM. STEM
disciplines include Biological/Biomedical, Physical, and Computer Sciences, Technology, Engineering,
and Mathematics/Statistics.
Table 18: STEM disciplines from the CIP classification
CIP code CIP Standard Major Title
Biological & Biomedical Sciences





26.0401 Cell/Cellular Biology and Histology
26.0403 Anatomy






















11.0202 Computer Programming, Specific Applications
11.03 Data Processing
11.04 Information Science/Studies
11.06 Data Entry/Microcomputer Applications
11.07 Computer Science
11.08 Computer Software and Media Applications
11.0801 Web Page, Digital/Multimedia and Information Resources Design
11.0802 Data Modelling/Warehousing and Database Administration
11.0803 Computer Graphics
11.0899 Computer Software and Media Applications, Other
11.0901 Computer Systems Networking and Telecommunications
11.1001 Network and System Administration/Administrator
11.1003 Computer and Information Systems Security/Information Assurance
11.1005 Information Technology Project Management













40.06 Geological and Earth Sciences/Geosciences
40.0601 Geology/Earth Science, General
40.0602 Geochemistry
40.0603 Geophysics and Seismology






40.9999 Physical Sciences, Other
Technology
15 Engineering Technology, General
15.03 Electrical Engineering Technologies/Technicians
15.0305 Telecommunications Technology/Technician
15.0399 Electrical and Electronic Engineering Technologies/Technicians, Other
15.04 Electromechanical Instrumentation and Maintenance Technologies/Technicians
15.0401 Biomedical Technology/Technician
15.0499 Electromechanical and Instrumentation and Maintenance Technologies/Technicians, Other
15.0507 Environmental Engineering Technology/Environmental Technology
15.0613 Manufacturing Engineering Technology/Technician
15.0614 Welding Engineering Technology/Technician
15.07 Quality Control and Safety Technologies/Technicians
15.0701 Occupational Safety and Health Technology/Technician
15.0702 Quality Control Technology/Technician
15.08 Mechanical Engineering Related Technologies/Technicians
15.0803 Automotive Engineering Technology/Technician
15.1102 Surveying Technology/Surveying
15.1202 Computer Technology/Computer Systems Technology
15.1204 Computer Software Technology/Technician
15.1302 CAD/CADD Draughting and/or Design Technology/Technician
15.1306 Mechanical Draughting and Mechanical Draughting CAD/CADD




14.02 Aerospace, Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering
14.03 Agricultural Engineering
14.04 Architectural Engineering
14.0501 Bioengineering and Biomedical Engineering
14.0701 Chemical Engineering
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14.0801 Civil Engineering, General
14.0803 Structural Engineering
14.0804 Transportation and Highway Engineering
14.09 Computer Engineering
14.0902 Computer Hardware Engineering
14.0903 Computer Software Engineering






14.2101 Mining and Mineral Engineering
















3 Trend Growth Durations & Shifts
Abstract
Policymakers and investors often conceptualize trend growth as simply a
medium/long term average growth rate. In practice, these averages are usually
taken over arbitrary periods of time, thereby ignoring the large empirical growth
literature which shows that doing so is inappropriate, especially in developing
countries where growth is highly unstable. This paper builds on this literature
to propose an algorithm, called “iterative Fit and Filter” (iFF), that extracts the
trend as a sequence of medium/long term growth averages. iFF separates impor-
tant country-specific historical episodes and trend growth durations - number of
years between two consecutive trend growth shifts, vary substantially across coun-
tries and over time. We relate the conditional probabilities of up and down-shifts
in trend growth next year to the country’s current growth environment, level
of development, demographics, institutions, economic management and external
shocks, and show how both iFF and the predictive model could be employed in
practice.
3.1 Introduction
“The instability of growth rates makes talk of the growth rate
almost meaningless.”
Lant Pritchett [132]
Many developed and developing countries have been growing at a slower pace since
at least the late 2000s. Which ones will continue at a low trend growth rate for another
several years? Where could the situation get even worse before it gets any better, and
where is a rebound in trend growth imminent?
Such questions are of great interest to many policymakers and investors. However,
addressing them in practice is rather challenging for two main reasons. Trend growth
is inherently unobserved, with no consensus among economists on how it should be
extracted from growth time series data, and a large number of domestic and external
factors come into interplay at the very same time, and could either shift the current
trend growth rate up, or down, or counterbalance each other and make the country
vibrate around the existing trend for another several years.
This paper aims to develop an empirical framework which allows us to address the
following two questions: What is the trend growth rate at which a country is currently
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growing? How likely is it to shift and in what direction?
Although numerous sophisticated ways of extracting the trend component from
growth time series by applying linear, nonlinear, univariate, multivariate filters and
other techniques exist (cf., e.g., French [72]), very often, we still want to think about
trend growth as merely a medium/long term average growth rate. Despite its simplicity,
this latter definition leads to an important practical issue: given a time series of growth
rates over what periods of time should the averages be taken?
This issue is rarely addressed explicitly, and averages are often taken over subjec-
tively defined periods of time, decades, the whole sample of data that one has access
to, etc., thereby ignoring the large empirical growth literature that started in the 1990s
with the seminal contributions of Easterly et al. [49] and Pritchett [132], and which
shows that employing “arbitrarily chosen long-run average growth rates fails to take
account of a very important ‘stylised fact’ of economic growth, i.e., while the growth
process of “developed” economies is well characterized by such a single long run average
growth rate (with a “business cycle” around this trend) this is not true of most coun-
tries in the world, many of whom exhibit multiple structural breaks in growth rates”
(Kar, Pritchett, Raihan, and Sen [107], henceforth KPRS).
Our paper builds on the insights and techniques of this empirical growth literature
to first propose a methodology for extracting the trend as a sequence of medium/long
term average growth rates taken such that a shift in trend growth, whenever it hap-
pens, satisfies economic significance thresholds, and the trend shift dates identified are
optimally located in a growth time series. This method, called the “iterative Fit and
Filter” (iFF), generalizes the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach developed in KPRS [107]
to identify breaks in growth time series. iFF preserves the merits of the original FF, in
particular, the ability to identify a much larger number of breaks in the presence of high
growth volatility than purely statistical methods (Bai-Perron [19, 18]), but overcomes
the problem of having to postulate a somewhat arbitrary maximum number of breaks
in the first step and the fact that, unlike in purely statistical methods, the final break
dates identified by the original FF are not necessarily optimally located. A simple ex-
ample illustrates how both issues matter for whether or not a potential shift date is
identified as true.
iFF is therefore a general method which only requires the researcher to specify two
parameters: a minimum number of years over which the averages have to be taken
(minimum trend growth duration) and the economic significance threshold(s) for the
trend growth shifts (trend shifts significance filter). Both parameters should depend on
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how the researcher defines trend growth for the purpose of his analysis and the type of
trend growth dynamics he is interested in understanding and predicting. In this paper,
we are interested in medium/long term trend growth and therefore impose a minimum
trend growth duration of five years. We also employ the economic significance thresholds
proposed in the original FF which have the advantage of recognizing the non-linearity
in the growth process by distinguishing between a trend shift in the same direction (e.g.
up-shift after up-shift), in which case a 1% point change is enough for significance, and
a shift in the opposite direction (e.g. down-shift after up-shift) where the trend has to
change by at least 3% points for a significant shift.
Applying iFF with these parameters on a sample of 153 developed and developing
countries, we find that it separates important country-specific historical episodes, and
that trend growth durations - number of years between two consecutive trend growth
shifts - vary substantially both across countries and for a given country over time. We
discuss in some details the experiences of several countries both to illustrate what iFF
identifies in practice and to suggest how it could potentially be employed in economic
history research where arbitrarily taken averages are still very often the norm.
Despite the heterogeneity of country experiences, several characteristics seem to
clearly distinguish the overall trend growth process in developing countries from the
one followed by developed economies. For instance, we find that although growth is
twice as volatile in developing countries as in developed ones, trend growth is almost
three times as volatile and therefore accounts for a larger proportion of the overall
growth variance. The probability that we will have to wait for 10 years or more be-
tween two consecutive trend growth shifts in a developing country is only 31% versus
72% for a developed economy. Moreover, the median absolute magnitude of a trend
growth shift in a developing economy is 5.45% points versus 2.3% points in a developed
counterpart. These findings agree with previous research (e.g. Pritchett [132], Aguiar
and Gopinath [7]) that documents and investigates the distinction between the smooth
and stable growth paths of developed economies and the discontinuous growth patterns
in developing countries.
To address our second motivating question - “How likely is trend growth to shift
and in what direction?” - we model and estimate the conditional probabilities of trend
growth up and down-shifts next year, conditional on the country having already grown
at the current trend growth rate since the last trend shift. In competing risks models
(an extended form of duration/survival analysis with several possible types of events
instead of one), these latter objects are known as cause-specific discrete-time hazard
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rates (cf., for instance, Allison [11]).
Several empirical growth papers have already employed duration techniques. For
instance, Mora and Siotis [127] estimate a discrete-time duration model to analyse how
external factors affect recovery prospects in developing economies. Berg et al. [25]
and Hausmann et al. [90] employ continuous-time duration analysis to investigate the
determinants of the duration of growth spells and growth stagnations respectively. The
main advantage of the duration methodology is that it allows researchers to incorporate
unfinished/censored episodes into their analysis. In our case, this issue is crucial because
all current trend growth episodes are censored. The only thing we know about them
is that they have already lasted up until this year. What we do not know and are
interested in, is whether the country will continue growing at the current trend growth
rate for another several years or experience a trend growth shift next year and in what
direction. Duration techniques overcome this problem by focusing on the hazard rate,
which, in reality, is just a different representation of the distribution of durations but
is unaffected by random censoring (cf. for instance Allignol et al. [10]). The random
censoring assumption is satisfied if the fact that the growth episode is censored does
not provide additional information for whether the country is more or less likely to
experience a trend shift next year, which is the case in our setting since our sample
ends in 2015 for all countries.
Historically, duration analysis, especially for competing risks, was first mainly de-
veloped in a continuous-time setting (Allison [11]). However, already in his seminal
paper, where Cox [42] introduced the partial likelihood method for the estimation of
the proportional hazards model, he noted that a continuous-time approach may become
problematic if the data contains an “appreciable number of ties” - events recorded as
happening at the same time. It is, of course, possible to assume that time is continuous
and events are simply “grouped” into discrete time intervals and use approximations in
the estimation. In our case, however, we believe that considering time as intrinsically
discrete, i.e. “ties [as] real, not spurious” (Grambsch and Therneau [82]), is more appro-
priate since we are directly working with annual data and a large number of countries
experience trend shifts simultaneously.
Moreover, a discrete-time approach has the advantage of giving results that are eas-
ier to interpret economically. In discrete time, the hazards are conditional probabilities,
whereas in continuous time, they are rates and can therefore be bigger than one. For
instance, in our case, working in discrete time leads to modelling the conditional prob-
abilities of trend growth shifting up/down next year, conditional on the current trend
132
growth episode having lasted up to this year. If we were to employ a continuous-time
approach, we would be estimating the conditional rates at which trend growth episodes
end with up/down-shifts per survival year, something that seems to be less intuitive.
Examining a large set of covariates related to the growth environment, the level
of development, demographics, institutions, political stability, economic management,
and external shocks, we find, for instance, that while better institutions and higher
domestic savings may protect countries from trend down-shifts, higher youth and old
dependency ratios are detrimental to trend growth, increasing down-shift risks and
hindering up-shifts. Several systemic forces, such as higher average gold and rising
food prices (except for food exporters), as well as higher and rising US T-bill rates
increase the relative trend growth down-shift risks across the globe. A rise in domestic
conflict, credit and inflation may act as catalysts for trend growth down-shifts, whereas
devaluations, if not too large, may give a positive impetus to trend growth.
As Pritchett and Summers [133], we also find that “regression to the mean is the
empirically most salient feature of economic growth”. Whatever the specification, a one
percentage point higher trend rate increases the relative down-shift risk and reduces
the relative up-shift risk by over 20%, while, on its own, the trend growth rate explains
almost 10% of all trend shifts.
We then use the insights from our exploratory analysis to construct a parsimonious
model which relates the up and down-shift hazards to 20 different covariates, and esti-
mate the 2016 conditional probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth for 120
countries in our sample. These hazards estimates, together with the 2015 estimates of
trend growth extracted using iFF for all 153 countries, are contained in Table 25 (cf.
Appendix), which constitutes the main output of this paper.
For instance, we find that China has been growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last
trend shift in 2007). 2007 was a trend down-shift, hence a further down-shift would be
identified as a ≤ 5.81% p.a. average growth rate over the next ≥ 5 years, whereas an
up-shift would be a ≥ 9.81% p.a. average growth rate over the same period. In 2016,
the conditional probabilities of trend down and up-shifts are 17.3% and 1% respectively.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the trend extrac-
tion methodology (iFF) and examples of what it identifies in practice. In Section 3.3,
we establish some stylized facts about trend growth durations and shifts in developing
versus developed countries. Section 3.4 builds our predictive model by first explaining
the econometric framework, then undertaking an exploratory analysis of the potential
determinants of trend growth durations and shifts.
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3.2 Extracting Trend Growth
Trend growth is unobserved. The assumptions that we impose in order to extract
the trend component from growth time series should reflect the way in which we think
about the growth process and therefore define what trend growth is. For instance,
the well-known Hodrick-Prescott filter [95] extracts trend growth by taking a weighted
moving average of the growth time series and therefore assumes that trend growth
evolves continuously over time. In this paper, we embrace the basic definition of trend
growth as a medium/long term average growth rate and therefore think about the trend
as evolving discretely. This section develops a simple iterative algorithm that builds
on the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach proposed in KPRS [107] and extracts trend
growth by first identifying economically significant trend shift dates. We start with a
precise definition of trend growth in our context, then motivate and describe the trend
extraction method, and finally discuss several examples of what it gives in practice.
3.2.1 Defining trend growth
We conceptualize economic growth {g(t)}t∈Z as a process that vibrates around a
medium/long term average growth rate - the trend {τ(t)}t∈Z :
g(t) = τ(t) + c(t) (3.1)
where the cycle c(t) is a zero-mean transitory fluctuation.
At time t, the trend can shift up:
∆τ(t) ≡ τ(t+ 1)− τ(t) > 0
or down:
∆τ(t) < 0
making growth vibrate around a new higher or lower level. Note that ∆τ(t) is a forward
difference; the trend shift happens in t, but the country starts growing at the new trend
growth rate only from period t+ 1.
Suppose that the country is observed for T periods of time over which it experiences
m ≥ 0 trend shifts. As a convention, we set T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T .40
40GDP per capita is observed in [0, T ], so growth rates can be computed for periods 1 to T .
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Let T = {T1, ..., Tm} be the set of shift dates. We want to extract trend growth as






g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1 (3.2)
where Dj = Tj − Tj−1 is the jth trend growth duration - number of years for which the
country grows at the trend growth rate at which it started growing in period Tj−1 + 1.
To agree with our basic definition of trend growth as a medium/long term average
growth rate that captures some fundamental developments in a country’s growth process
which go beyond business cycle fluctuations, we want to ensure that:
1. The averages are taken over a medium/long term, i.e for all j = 1, ...,m+ 1:
Dj ≥ δ
where δ is the minimum trend growth duration - the least number of periods over
which the average has to be taken.
2. Trend shifts are economically significant, i.e. for any t ∈ T :
|∆τ(t)| ≥ F
where F is a threshold that we impose. Intuitively, trend shifts have to be large
enough, since they should signal some new fundamental developments in the coun-
try’s growth process.
The choice of both the minimum trend growth duration δ and the threshold(s) F should
depend on the type of trend growth movements that we are interested in.
In this paper, we work with annual growth data and think about trend growth as
a medium/long term average growth rate, therefore setting δ = 5. If our interest were
only in long term growth, we could set, δ = 10 therefore taking averages over at least
decade long intervals.
Similarly, if we believe that an at least 2 percentage points change in a medium/long
term average growth rate is economically significant, we can set F = 2. If our sole
interest were in dramatic trend shifts, we could raise F to 5.
The thresholds could also be non-linear. In this paper, we employ the filter proposed
in KPRS [107], which sets F = 2 for a first shift, then distinguishes between a trend
135
shift in the same direction (e.g. up-shift after up-shift) with F = 1, and a trend shift
in the opposite direction (e.g. down-shift after up-shift) with F = 3. The idea is that
once the trend has already shifted up (down), shifting further up (down) by even 1
percentage point is already economically significant. At the same time, in order to
avoid confusing trend shifts and business cycles, the medium/long term average would
have to change by at least 3 percentage points if shifting in the opposite direction.
There is no single best answer and, as discussed below, no consensus in the academic
literature on what the “right” parameters should be. The framework in this paper is
therefore designed specifically to be very flexible and general.
In any case, once we have decided on δ and F , all we need to extract trend growth
according to eq.3.3 is to identify the trend shift dates T .
3.2.2 Identifying trend shift dates
The statistical and filter approaches Although the ultimate purpose is usually
different from extracting trend growth per se, the timing of shifts/breaks in growth time
series has been an important preoccupation in many papers. In order to investigate
the factors that initiate and halt growth accelerations (Hausmann et al. [89], Berg et
al. [25]), growth collapses (Hausmann et al. [90]) or both (Jones and Olken [105],
Kerekes [109]), researchers always start by proposing a way of identifying in historical
growth data the episodes that are relevant to their study. Since these episodes start
with a significant and sustained acceleration/collapse in the average growth rate, their
identification relies of the timing of the dates at which such shifts happen.
This empirical growth literature can be broadly classified into two main streams:
the papers that use the statistical approach based on the Bai-Perron (BP) methodology
[18, 19], and those that employ “filters” - subjectively defined rules that vary from paper
to paper.
Given a time series of annual growth rates, the statistical approach (sometimes
called the BP methodology) first identifies the sets of break dates that produce the
best fit for a given number of breaks, from one up to a maximum. The researcher
can impose this maximum number directly and/or specify a minimum number of years
between consecutive breaks (akin to the minimum trend growth duration in our case)
so that the maximum number of breaks gets determined indirectly by the length of the
time series. As mentioned above, there is no consensus on what these numbers should
be - Jones & Olken [105] assume a minimum of 5 years between breaks, Berg et al. [25]
report results for both 5 and 8, Kerekes [109] opts for 10. In any case, the statistical
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method then proceeds sequentially: starting from the null hypothesis of no breaks in
the time series, it tests whether allowing for additional break(s) significantly improves
the goodness of fit.41 Again, there is no complete agreement on which statistical tests
should be employed to gauge this significance - for instance, all previous references
[105, 109, 25] employ different tests. This sequential testing continues until we can
no longer reject the hypothesis of m ≥ 0 breaks against the alternative of (one) more
break(s) or until reaching the maximum number of breaks allowed/possible.
Whatever the testing procedure, the fundamental problem with the purely statisti-
cal approach is that it sometimes identifies economically insignificant changes in long
term growth averages as statistically significant (“false positives”), while omitting some
economically significant changes because of statistical insignificance (“true negatives”).
For instance, a 2 percentage points change in the medium/long term average growth
rate may be identified as statistically significant in a country where the underlying
growth process has low volatility so that even small changes seem to be big when viewed
through the “statistical” lens. At the same time, a 4 percentage points change can be
dismissed in another country where the growth process is inherently more unstable so
that important changes appear as “random” from a statistical perspective.
To understand the practical consequences of using the BP methodology for our
purpose (extracting trend growth), we implemented a statistical approach based on a
standard F -test (Zeileis et al. [164, 163]) and found a statistically significant break for
Canada in 1979 with its average real GDP p.c. growth rate changing from 2.7% per
annum between 1951 and 1979 to 1.3% p.a. for the 1980-2015 period. We also found
only one break for China, in 1977, i.e. we completely missed seven shifts in the Chinese
trend growth rate, illustrated in Figure 3.3, which are not only economically large (over
3% points changes each) but, as discussed below, also coincide with major events in the
Chinese economic history.
This “low power” issue inherent in the statistical methodology is widely recognized
in the literature, e.g. Bai and Perron [20] confirm the presence of “true negatives”
through Monte Carlo simulations. Jones and Olken [105] explicitly recognize that the
sets of break dates they identify are “conservative”, while Berg et al. [25] complement
the statistical tests with economic criteria to go from statistical breaks to economically
meaningful growth spells by removing some irrelevant breaks.
The “filter” approach avoids this “low power” issue by looking specifically for eco-
41The standard practice is to allow for one additional break only. However, sometimes the alternative
hypothesis is “one or more” as in Berg et al.[25], i.e. a “double maximum” test, cf. discussion in Kerekes
[109].
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nomically meaningful changes in the medium/long term growth rate, found by sys-
tematically applying a set of researcher-defined rules to growth data. For instance,
Hausmann et al. [89] identify growth accelerations as “increases in per-capita growth
of 2 percentage points or more, [...] sustained for at least eight years and [such that]
the post acceleration growth rate [is] at least 3.5 percent per year.” Another example
is Hausmann et al. [90], who define growth collapses as “intervals that start with a
contraction of output per worker and end when the value immediately preceding the
decline is attained again”. Clearly, the main disadvantage of the filter approach is
the lack of a common framework, which identifies up and down-shifts in a consistent
manner.
The original Fit & Filter (FF) A recent paper by Kar, Pritchett, Raihan and
Sen [107] summarizes the shortcomings of both approaches and proposes to combine
them in order to overcome their limitations while preserving their advantages. The
authors call the result “Fit & Filter” (FF) because the approach “involves the best
fit of the BP method to the data in the first stage, and the application of a filter to
the breaks identified in the first stage in the second stage.” Hence, FF overcomes the
“low power” of the statistical approach by not using its second step (the statistical
tests), while providing a unified way of identifying both economically meaningful up
and down-shifts.
Another important advantage of the original FF is that, unlike the standard statis-
tical and filter approaches, it takes into account the nature of the previous shift: a first
candidate break is classified as “genuine” if the average growth rate before and after the
break changes by at least 2% points. For any subsequent break, the filter distinguishes
between a break in the same direction (e.g. acceleration after acceleration), in which
case a 1% point change is enough for significance, and a break in the opposite direction
(e.g. deceleration after acceleration) where the shift has to be at least 3% points large
to be qualified as genuine.
Recognizing this nonlinearity in growth dynamics is important because of the re-
version to the mean phenomenon (Easterly et al. [49], Pritchett & Summers [133]) -
the idea that it is much easier for countries that have experienced a trend up-shift in
the past, to then experience a trend down-shift, i.e. to revert back to the world average
growth rate, rather than experience yet another up-shift. Hence a further accelera-
tion in their trend growth rate of even as little as a 1% point is already a substantial
achievement. A similar argument would hold for down-shifts.
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To help the reader understand how the FF approach works in practice, here is a
concrete example from the original paper [107]:
In the case of Brazil, the first step identifies four candidate break years:
1967, 1980, 1992 and 2002. In 1967, growth accelerated from 3.7% (for
1950–1967) to 6.3% (for 1967–1980). Since this is the first potential break
and is above the 2% threshold, we conclude that it as a genuine break. In
1980, growth decelerates from 6.35% to -1.1% (for 1980–1992), a deceleration
of 7.4% and easily passes the “deceleration following acceleration” threshold
of 3%. In 1992, growth accelerates from -1.1% to 1.4%, a change of 2.5%.
However, as this is an acceleration following a deceleration, it would have
to be above 3% in order to pass the filter and hence we do not include 1992
as a “genuine” growth break. In 2002, growth accelerated again, this time
to 2.5% and since this was an acceleration following a previous candidate
acceleration it only had to pass the 1% threshold.
KPRS [107] document that FF achieves a substantial improvement over the statistical
method in identifying a larger number of “true negatives”, especially in developing
countries where the volatility of growth is itself a consequence of a trend growth process
with many shifts, and in omitting the “false positives” in developed countries with
smooth trend growth paths. Furthermore, the breaks identified often seem to coincide
with major events in the economic history of the respective countries. Hence, it seems
that FF is fully appropriate as a method of extracting trend growth as a sequence of
medium/long term averages taken over periods that are historically meaningful, and
such that shifts in trend growth are economically significant.
Despite this, the original FF has two issues which became apparent as we tried to
generalize it and employ for our purpose. Both arise because of the way in which FF
uses the first step of the BP methodology, i.e. the “Fit” part. As explained above, this
first step simply finds the optimal location of a given number of breaks (from one up
to a maximum allowed/possible) in a given time series by minimizing the residual sum
of squares (best fit). The statistical approach then uses these sets of optimal dates and
their associated residual sums of squares sequentially in the second step (the statistical
tests). By contrast, there is no sequential testing in the FF: it only uses the optimal
set of dates identified for the maximum allowed and hence the choice of this maximum
matters a lot.
The authors assume 8 years between breaks and simply “postulate that a country
with: (i) Forty years of data, can have a maximum of two breaks. (ii) More than 40
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years and up to 55 years, can have a maximum of three breaks. (iii) More than 55
years, can have a maximum of four breaks.” However, with five more years of data and
assuming a minimum of 5 years between breaks instead of 8, what maximum number
should we postulate to apply the filter?42
Retaking the example of Brazil. Postulating seven gives 1956, 1962, 1967, 1973,
1980, 1987, and 1992 as potential breakpoints, all of which pass the filter. Choosing
eight as the maximum yields 1956, 1962, 1967, 1973, 1980, 1992, 2003, 2010. However,
now 1992 and 2010 miss the filter thresholds.
This example illustrates the two crucial issues with the original FF:
1. the choice of the maximum matters for whether we identify a break date as genuine
or not: 1992 is a genuine break point if we assume a maximum of seven break
dates, but becomes fake if we raise this maximum to eight;
2. the final set of dates identified as genuine by FF is not necessarily optimal: if
FF identifies six out of eight breaks as genuine, the locations of the six genuine
breaks are not necessarily such that the residual sum of squares is minimized
(best fit) over all possible sets of six break dates since they were selected as part
of the eight-dates set that gives the best fit among all sets of eight dates. These
are two different optimization problems and the optimal set of m break dates
is not necessarily a subset of the optimal set of m + 1 break dates (cf. Bai and
Perron [19] for the dynamic programming algorithm used to solve these problems).
This issue creates a disadvantage for the FF as compared to the statistical/BP
methodology where the final set of break points identified is always optimal since
only optimal sets are used in the sequential testing and if a set is rejected, all the
dates within this set are rejected and the non-rejected alternative is just another
set of optimally located dates.
The iterative Fit & Filter (iFF) In order to make FF robust to these issues, we
propose an iterative algorithm that builds on the original FF and that we therefore
call the “iterative Fit & Filter” (iFF). iFF can be easily programmed in any standard
statistical software package by following the steps described in the insert on the next
page. The computer code that implements it in R is available on request.
42We use the Penn World Table version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. [57]) extended to 2015 with IMF World
Economic outlook data, while KPRS use PWT version 7.1 that stops in 2010. Also note that we use
real GDP p.c. data while KPRS employ GDP p.c. in Purchasing Power Parity.
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Algorithm 2 Iterative Fit & Filter (iFF)
Notation: Let bxc denote the largest integer that does not exceed x.














g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1 (3.3)
and Dj = Tj − Tj−1 is the jth trend growth duration - number of years for which the
country grows at the trend growth rate at which it started growing in period Tj−1 +1.
Step 1: Determine the maximum possible number of trend shifts m1. Given the
length of the time series T and the minimum trend growth duration δ, the growth
time series can be divided into at most bT/δc segments, hence:
m1 = bT/δc − 1
Step 2: Let Tˆ = {Tˆ1, ..., Tˆm1} be the set of m1 shift dates that minimize the residual
sum of squares:
Tˆ = arg min
T
RSS(T )
over all possible sets of m1 trend shift dates T = {T1, ..., Tm1} such that Tj−Tj−1 ≥ δ
for all j = 1, ...,m1 + 1. In practice, this set can be found by using the dynamic
programming algorithm described in Bai and Perron [19].
Step 3: Use the optimal trend shift dates Tˆ and eq.3.3 to compute the trend
{τ(t)}Tt=1 and the set of trend shifts: {∆τ(t)}t∈Tˆ .
Step 4.1: If all trend shifts satisfy the threshold(s) of the filter, i.e. for all t ∈ Tˆ .
|∆τ(t)| ≥ F
we have found an optimally placed set of trend shift dates such that all resulting
trend shifts are economically significant. {τ(t)}Tt=1 computed in Step 3 is the trend.
Step 4.2: While at least one of the trend shifts is not economically significant, we
re-iterate Steps 2 and 3 with:
mk+1 = mk − 1
instead of m1 until either we end in Step 4.1 with an optimally placed and econom-
ically significant set of mk trend shifts Tˆ , or mk+1 = 0 and we conclude that there
are no trend shifts and simply compute the trend as the average growth rate over the
T periods.
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The researcher no longer has to postulate any maximum number of breaks. The
only choice parameters are the minimum trend growth duration and the filter, which,
as we discussed in section 3.2.1, should depend on how trend growth is defined for the
purpose of the research question.
Given the specified minimum duration δ, Step 1 simply determines the maximum
possible number of breaks from the length T of the time series and calls it m1. We then
search for the set of m1 dates that minimizes the residual sum of squares (Step 2) and
such that the minimum number of years between any two trend shifts is δ, i.e. we take
averages over at least δ years.
We then use the identified candidate shift dates to compute the candidate trend
growth process and the set of candidate trend shifts (Step 3). We check whether or
not all trend shift dates pass the filter threshold(s).
If yes (Step 4.1), we are done: we have found the trend process that satisfies
our definition of trend growth - conditions (1) and (2) in section 3.2.1. The optimal
trend shift dates delimitate the periods over which the averages have to be taken when
extracting the trend from growth time series.
If not (Step 4.2), there is at least one trend shift that is not economically significant.
To see why we need to re-iterate steps 2 and 3 in this case, suppose that 4 out of 5 trend
shifts satisfy the threshold(s). The only thing that we can conclude at this point is that
there is no way of segmenting our growth time series with 5 trend shifts that are both
optimally placed and economically significant. The four trend shifts that happen to be
economically significant are not necessarily optimally placed because their location in
step 2 was determined by minimizing the residual sum of squares over all possible sets
of five trend shift dates. To determine the optimal location of four trend shift dates, we
would need to minimize the residual sum of squares over all possible sets of four trend
shift dates, i.e. re-do step 2 with m2 = 4.
We re-iterate our search as long as a trend process with all trend shifts satisfying
the economic filter is not found. Intuitively, in each iteration k, we ask the following
question: is it possible to divide our growth time series so that mk trend shifts are
placed optimally (Step 2) and are economically significant (Steps 3 & 4)? If no trend
shift dates are identifed as economically significant, we simply conclude that the country
experiences no trend shifts in the sample over which we observe it, and therefore our
best guess of its trend growth rate over this sample is the full sample growth average.
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Figure 3.1 Trend growth in the United States (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
3.2.3 iFF in practice: trend growth & economic history
We now examine some real world examples of what iFF applied to growth time
series data yields. Annual real GDP p.c. growth rates are constructed using the Penn
World Table (PWT) version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. [57]) and extended to 2015 with the
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) data. Our sample contains twenty developed
countries and we use developing when referring to any country that is not developed
(i.e. our developing countries include newly industrialized countries, emerging markets,
frontier markets, and least developed countries).43
Table 25 in the Appendix summarizes the most recent (as of 2015) trend growth
rate and the last trend shift date and magnitude for all 153 countries in our sample, as
well as the hazards (conditional probabilities) of trend up and down-shifts which are
the focus of the next section. Figures 3.1 to 3.3 illustrate the complete trend growth
paths (red) for the USA, France, and China.
43PWT version 9.0 provides data for 182 countries, up to and including 2014.
Data goes back to 1950 for some countries. The database is freely accessible at
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-9.0 and fully described in Feenstra et al. [57].
To construct our real GDP p.c. time series, we divide rgdpna (Real GDP at constant 2011 national
prices (in mil. 2011US$)) by pop (Population (in millions)). We remove 28 countries with population
less than 600,000 in 2014 and the State of Palestine because it is absent from major datasets like
the IMF WEO and the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) that we employ below.
The set of developed countries includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
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Figure 3.2 Trend growth in France (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
Between 1951 and 2015, trend growth in the USA, as well as Australia, Canada,
Sweden and the UK, can be summarized by a single rate of around 2% p.a. At the
same time, other developed countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain etc., and, in
particular, many developing economies have experienced more interesting trend growth
dynamics that often coincide with important country-specific historical and political
developments.
For instance, in France (figure 3.2), 1974/75 marks the end of a thirty years period
known as “The Glorious Thirty” (“Les Trente Glorieuses”, cf. Fourastie´ [70] who coined
the term or Lejeune [116] for a more recent reassessment of the period). Damaged by
the two World Wars, France experienced a period of “catch up” growth driven by
the reconstruction and the industrialization of the country, rising productivity and
consumption levels. However, as this model of growth reached its limits, the country,
hit by the 1973 oil shock, entered a period of stagflation, rising unemployment, and
slower productivity growth. Trend growth per capita dropped from 4.2% p.a. to 1.7%
p.a.
In France, as in Finland, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Norway and Spain
(cf. Table 25), 2007/2008 appears as a down-shift in trend growth, while in other
developed economies it is “only” a very large negative fluctuation around a per-existing
trend. This may be because this pre-existing trend growth rate was already very low,
e.g. Portugal has been growing at close to 0% since 2001, or because the country
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Figure 3.3 Trend growth in China (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
recovers from the Great Recession relatively quickly and is not as harshly hit by the
2011/12 recession, e.g. Germany.
Note that as time passes and iFF is fit on new enlarged samples, the trend shift
dates (especially the latest ones) may be re-assessed. Indeed, with hindsight it will
become more obvious whether or not 2007 was a watershed in the economic history of
France. As of 2015/16, it seems that the country experienced a downward sustained
shift in 2007 not only because of the global financial crisis - although this has certainly
been an important catalyst. The profound need for structural reforms in France and
a rising level of domestic discontent have rendered the country vulnerable to external
shocks. France needs to “change [its] model”, to paraphrase the title of a recent book
by Aghion, Cette and Cohen [6] in which the authors discuss a set of reforms that could
help France become an innovation-driven economy and experience an up-shift from its
current 0% trend growth rate.
Another interesting example is China.
After a period of restoration from WWII (1949-1952), the Communist Party of
China (CPC), under the leadership of Mao Zedong, launched the first five-year plan in
1953. Modeled after the Soviet example and aided by Soviet planners and engineers,
the CPC re-organized industries into cooperatives and farmers into socialized collective
units. The main goal of the plan was to achieve high economic growth with a particular
focus on developing heavy industries (steel, concrete, iron, machinery, ...). Investment
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in the industrial sector was financed by extracting surpluses from agriculture where
prices were set artificially low. Although, the economy did expand at a trend growth
rate of 5.5% p.a., an important sectoral imbalance emerged, and in 1958, the CPC
decided to abandon the Soviet model and instead to take a “great leap forward” in the
production of all sectors simultaneously.
Collectivization was pushed further with the prohibition of private plots and the
establishment of communes. Decision-making and planning were decentralized. The
construction of Soviet-like large and capital-intensive plants was pursued but at a slower
tempo and now complemented with locally built and run, small-scale, low-technology
projects. These “backyard” projects yielded substandard products while diverting an
important proportion of farm labour, and together with the inefficiency of the com-
munes, the withdrawal of the Soviet financial and technical support, and several natural
disasters, resulted in what is known as the “Great Famine” - a substantial disruption
of China’s agriculture which starved to death at least 15 million people (unofficial es-
timates range higher, between 20 and 30 million) between 1959 and 1962.
Indeed, although the CPC started to repel the “Great Leap Forward” program
already in 1960 with private plots being returned to the farmers, the communal system
being reduced, unemployed workers and investment being transferred from industry to
agriculture; it is only in 1963 that the agricultural situation had sufficiently improved
and some resources started being redirected back to the industrial sector.
Another consequence of the disruption produced by the “Great Leap Forward” was
the appearance of a group of politicians who recognized that China needed to switch
to a model of development where material incentives play a greater role, and against
whom Mao Zedong initiated the Cultural Revolution in early 1966. Political instability
continued until Mao’s death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s arrival to power in 1977.
Xiaoping announced a modernization program which pushed the country onto a new
development path of “reform and opening up” (“Gaige Kaifang”) from 1978 onwards.
Indeed, 1978 is very often considered as a watershed in the economic history of modern
China, “the year when China started economic reform” (Zhu [165]). The goal was not
to eliminate state planning and control, but to increase the role of material incentives
by introducing market mechanisms into the system. The program aimed at expand-
ing foreign trade (by encouraging exports, easing negotiations and cooperation with
foreign firms and legalizing trading and credit arrangements) and eliminating existing
deficiencies and distortions (e.g. between light and heavy industries).
Zhu [165], who implements a growth accounting exercise to decompose the sources
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of Chinese growth before and since 1978, shows that in the before period, all growth
was due to physical and human capital accumulation, financed by massive government
investment and a rise in education levels. On the contrary, since 1978, a rise in pro-
ductivity became the main driver of growth.
Productivity in agriculture was stimulated through a substantial rise in official agri-
culture prices and the creation of the “household responsibility system” in 1979. Under
the latter, farmers had to sell a certain amount of grains at official prices to the gov-
ernment, but could then transact anything beyond the quota at market prices and for
their own enrichment.
The results were considerable: fig. 3.3 shows that the economy expanded at 6.6%
p.a. and per capita. Trade increased from 8.5% of GDP in 1977 to 23% in 1985. All
sectors were expanding except for manufacturing, whose value added as a percentage
of GDP even fell from 39.3% in 1977 to 34% in 1985, because heavy industry was
purposefully restrained.44
The reforms were introduced gradually, first in a few localities, then, if successful,
nationally, and completed by 1984 when most households were under the responsibility
system, and most communes had been dissolved. The efficiency gains “from workers
using the same technology with a much more rewarding set of incentives, were largely
exhausted” by 1984 (Zhu [165]), and a period of relative stagnation began with trend
growth shifting down to 2.2% p.a. in 1985.
A new liberalization wave emerged around 1990 with trend growth shifting up to
8.3% p.a. Government interventions were further reduced, markets for agricultural in-
puts and outputs further liberalized and incentives for the adoption of new technologies
set in place. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991
respectively. The “open door” policy was introduced in 1992 with the aim of creating a
legal basis for Chinese-foreign joint ventures. Special economic zones were introduced
to facilitate the influx of foreign investment.
Although China was less affected by the Asian Financial crisis than other economies,
e.g. Indonesia and Thailand which experienced trend down-shifts to negative growth
rates in 1996, the Chinese trend growth rate did slow down to 4.4% p.a. in 1995.
Indeed, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP fell from 6% in 1994 to 3.2%
in 2000 and monetary conditions were tightened with the annual broad money growth
rate falling from 31.5% in 1994 to 12.3% in 2000.
The last up-shift in China’s trend growth rate to 10% p.a. in 2001 coincides not
44Figures quoted in this passage are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
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only with a global economic recovery but also China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization, which “introduced international economic laws [into the country] and
ushered a period of rapid regulatory reform by creating agencies such as the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to govern increasingly globally integrated
markets” (Yueh [162]).
Recently, there has been a lot of debate in the press and the academic literature
(e.g. Pritchett & Summers [133]) about whether or not the Chinese economy is slowing
down. Our analysis indicates that China, hit by several natural disasters (the 2008
Chinese winter storms and floods in the South, the Sichuan earthquake) and the Global
Recession (e.g. Chinese trade fell from 64.8% of GDP in 2006 to 41.2% in 2015), has
already experienced a down-shift in trend growth in 2007 and is currently growing at
6.8% p.a.
Whether a further slowdown will happen in the future is an open question and we
shall try to contribute to the ongoing debate below, in section 3.4.3.
These examples suggest that iFF inherits from the original FF the ability to identify
in a systematic way important episodes in the economic history of a country and could
therefore be a useful tool for economic historians, many of whom still often rely on
their judgment or arbitrary time periods when presenting and interpreting summary
statistics. For instance, to decompose the 1978-2007 period into subperiods, Zhu [165]
simply takes three ten years long periods: 1978-1988, 1988-1998, and 1998-2007, while
our analysis suggests a rather different decomposition of the 1978-2007 period into eco-
nomically and historically meaningful subperiods. In future work, iFF could therefore
be employed to undertake a much more thorough economic history analysis for a larger
number of countries.
3.3 Trend Growth Durations & Shifts: Stylized Facts
Although the previous examples illustrate the great variety of trend growth dynam-
ics within and between countries, it is also important to try to establish some stylized
facts about the trend growth processes identified. In this section, we look at the tempo-
ral and spatial distributions of trend growth shifts, and the distribution of trend growth
durations in developed versus developing countries.
3.3.1 Trend growth shifts
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Figure 3.4 Temporal distribution of trend shifts
Note: Percentages of countries experiencing up and down-shifts in trend growth p.a.
Temporal distribution Although we have growth data for 153 different countries,
these countries are observed over different periods of time between 1950 and 2015, so
that the effective number of countries in our sample varies over time.45
Hence, the number of trend shifts happening in a given year is not directly compara-
ble over time. Instead, in order to investigate the temporal distribution of trend shifts,
Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of countries experiencing trend up and down-shifts
each year.
The earliest and latest shifts happen respectively in 1955 and 2010 since we as-
sume a minimum trend growth duration of 5 years. The alternation between red bars
dominating green ones and vice versa suggests that up and down-shifts do not coin-
cide. Indeed, the correlation between the percentages of up and down-shifts each year
is -0.12; not very big but negative, possibly indicating the presence of systemic trend
growth spillovers that could be investigated in more details in future work.
Earlier studies (e.g. Ben-David & Papell [23]) have found that for developed coun-
45For instance, data for all post-Soviet nations only starts in 1990 (growth data from 1991). These
countries have so far been almost always excluded from similar studies on the grounds of not sufficiently
long time series - e.g. Hausmann et al. [89] require at least 20 data points, Pritchett & Summers [133]
exclude all countries with “less than 25 years of data”. We believe it is important to integrate this
group of countries into our study, not only because we now do have 25 years of growth data for them,
but also because their post-Soviet experiences certainly contain a lot of valuable information for helping
us understand what affects trend growth durations & shifts.
149
tries most up-shifts take place in the 1950s and the 1960s during the postwar reconstruc-
tion period, which coincides with a significant liberalization of trade and the creation
of institutions such as Bretton-Woods and GATT, while most down-shifts take place in
the early 1970s, with the first oil price shock in 1973 acting as an important catalyst.
Our research confirms and extends these previous findings. All twenty developed
countries are observed between 1950 and 2015 and, overall, experience 11 up-shifts and
31 down-shifts. Most up-shifts (8 out of 11) happen during the 1950s and 1960s, and
35% of all down-shifts take place in the 1970s. However, a novel finding is that 32%
of all down-shifts happen in the 2000s highlighting the magnitude of the impact of the
Great Recession in the developed world.
Many Latin American countries experience trend down-shifts in the late 1970s/early
1980s, e.g. Venezuela in 1977, Argentina and Brazil in 1980, Mexico and Chile in 1981
(cf. Diaz-Alejandro [47] for a thorough analysis of the Latin American debt crisis).
Most down-shifts of the late 1990s are related to the Asian Financial crisis: Thailand
and Indonesia in 1996, Malaysia and Singapore in 1997...
The 15% of up-shifts in 1995 mostly come from countries that were part of the
Soviet Bloc - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia
... which started to recover from the disruptions in their economies produced by the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Another important wave of up-shifts happens in
the early 2000s. Some are further up-shifts in emerging eastern Europe (Tajikistan &
Ukraine in 2001, Armenia in 2000...), others are recoveries from the Asian crisis (Indone-
sia and Thailand 2001). Many commodity exporters experience up-shifts in 2002/2003
(Argentina, Peru, and Colombia in 2002, Bolivia and Venezuela in 2003) as a recovery
from a period of historically low commodity prices between 1998 and 2002 which led to
significant falls in tax revenues and important economic disruptions in these countries
(cf. Tenreyro [152] for a retrospective analysis of the 2001-2002 Argentine crisis and
Spatafora and Samake [151] for an empirical investigation of how commodity prices and
fiscal outcomes are related).
The late 2000s, especially 2007/2008, stand out as the most important years of trend
growth down-shifts in modern history. Of course, we should not forget that this is close
to the end of the sample and results could change later on, with hindsight. However,
this finding seems plausible given the magnitude of the growth disruptions provoked by
the Great Recession in both developed and developing countries.
150
Figure 3.5 Spatial distribution of trend growth shifts
Up-shifts per annum
Down-shifts per annum
Note: Countries not in sample are in white.
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Spatial distribution Each country in our sample has between 25 and 65 years of
growth data. Hence, similarly to the number of trend shifts per annum, the numbers of
trend shifts per country are not directly comparable. Instead, to investigate the spatial
distribution of trend up and down-shifts, Figure 3.5 illustrates the respective numbers
of shifts per annum.
Several interesting observations emerge. First of all, developing countries are more
prone to both up and down-shifts than developed ones. This finding is not new. In his
seminal contribution, which spurred researchers to pay much more attention to within
country growth dynamics, Pritchett [132] already argued that “a single time trend
does not adequately characterize the evolution of GDP per capita in most developing
countries”.
The correlation between the numbers of up and down-shifts p.a. is 0.33, suggesting
that for some countries trend growth is unstable in both directions, and that, at least
to some extent, all countries are capable of both up and down-shifts. In particular,
the figures buttress the findings of Frances, Paap and van Dijk [71] who examine the
question of whether Africa is less capable of growth than Latin America or Asia. They
implement a data-based classification of countries into clusters and find that one third
of African countries are not assigned to the low growth cluster. Hence, it is wrong to
aggregate and simply label Africa as the “lost continent”. Figure 3.5 indeed shows that
although some African countries do exhibit very large numbers of down-shifts p.a., this
is not the case for all the continent. Moreover, many African countries also exhibit
a significant number of up-shifts and are comparable to Latin American and Asian
countries in terms of numbers of up and down-shifts. If anything, it seems that there
is more heterogeneity in both up and down-shifts p.a. in Africa than on any other
continent.
Middle East countries appear as very prone to down-shifts because of the numerous
conflicts that have taken place in these countries over the past half century.
One potential caveat to bear in mind when interpreting our findings, is that some
of our up-shifts are from negative growth to less negative growth, while some down-
shifts are from positive to less positive growth. In this simple approach, we also do not
distinguish between shifts of different magnitudes. Figure 3.6 therefore complements
the analysis by showing the spatial distribution of the median absolute trend shift
magnitude for each country in our sample. Once again, it seems that overall developing
nations experience much larger swings in their trend growth paths in both directions.
The median absolute trend shift in a developing country is 5.45% points against a mere
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Figure 3.6 Spatial distribution of trend shift magnitudes
Median absolute trend shift magnitude
Note: Countries not in sample are in white.
2.3% pts. for developed economies.
Note that the relatively large trend shift magnitudes of many post-Soviet nations
may be directly due to the fact that we have growth data for them only since 1991,
a period that coincides with a particularly turbulent part of their histories after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Their large up-shift intensities exhibited in Figure 3.5 are
also, at least to some extent, the result of recovering from a period of very negative
growth rates in the first half of the 1990s.
3.3.2 Trend growth durations
In practice, the much greater instability of trend growth in developing countries
documented above implies that the number of years over which it makes economic
and historical sense to take medium/long term averages of growth rates - trend growth
durations - in these countries are shorter.
To make this more precise, let’s think of the trend growth duration - number of years
between two consecutive trend growth shifts - as a discrete random variable that takes
values in {δ, δ + 1, δ + 2, ...}.
Our data consists of trend growth episodes, each starting in Tj−1 + 1 (the year after
the last trend growth shift or the beginning of the sample if Tj−1 = 0, where 0 is the
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Figure 3.7 Trend growth survivor functions
Notes: Developing countries trend growth survivor functions estimation based on 671 trend growth
episodes and 629 trend growth shifts. For developed countries the respective numbers are 62 and 42.
year when GDP p.c. data is first observed for the country so that growth rates are
computed from year 1) and ending in Tj with trend growth shifting either up or down,
or with the end of the sample if Tj = T . Hence, each trend growth episode has a certain
duration Dj = Tj −Tj−1. When Tj = T , the duration is censored since we do not know
when the current trend growth episodes will end. The only thing we know is that they
have already lasted for D˜m = T − Tm−1 years, m being the number of trend growth
shifts.
Treating our data as a random sample collected from the population of trend growth
episodes, the left panel of Figure 3.7 compares the probabilities that an developing (red)
versus a developed (blue) country has a trend growth duration of at least d years:




In survival/duration analysis, S(d) is known as the survivor function.46
The comparison is stark: while the probability of having 10 years or more between
two consecutive trend shifts in a developed country is 0.72, in a developing country it is
as low as 0.31. In developed countries, half of the trend growth episodes last for at least
46Many great reference on discrete time survival analysis exist, for instance, Allison [11], Rodriguez
[135], or Jenkins [100].
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18 years (S(18) = 0.5), while in developing countries this number is around 7 years.
Also, note that 20% of all trend growth episodes from developed countries in our
sample are censored at 66 because a number of developed countries experience no trend
shifts between 1950 and 2015, i.e. we only know that these countries have been growing
at the same constant trend growth rate for at least 66 years over which we observe
them.
Since we have assumed δ = 5, the probability of all trend growth durations lasting
at least 5 years is one: Pr(D ≥ 5) = 1.





where α(d) is the discrete-time hazard - the conditional probability that a trend growth
shift happens exactly d years after the last one, conditional on the current trend growth
episode having already lasted d years:
α(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d|Dj ≥ d) = Pr(Dj = d)
S(d)
(3.5)
The intuition behind eq.3.4 is that for a trend growth episode to last for, say, at
least eight years, the country must “survive” at the same trend growth rate for at least
five years. This is always true since Pr(D ≥ 5) = 1. Conditional on this, it must
survive the sixth year without trend shifts. This happens with probability (1− α(6)).
Given all this, if no shift happens in the seventh year - an event that has probability
(1− α(7)), the trend growth episode will have lasted 8 years or more: S(8).47
Since, any trend growth episode can end with either a trend up-shift or a trend down-
shift, the overall discrete hazard can be decomposed into two cause-specific hazards:
α(d) = αU(d) + αD(d)
47The non-parametric estimates shown in Figure 3.7 are constructed as follows (discrete version of







where rk is the number of trend growth episodes lasting for k years, while nk is the number of episodes
that could potentially last k years, i.e. are “at risk” of ending k years after beginning. In survival
literature, rknk is often called the “exit rate”.
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where
αU(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d,∆τ(Tj) > 0|Dj ≥ d) (3.6)
αD(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d,∆τ(Tj) < 0|Dj ≥ d) (3.7)






and similarly for SD(d).
Interestingly, while in developing countries, one has to wait for about the same
number of years before an up or a down-shift in trend growth occurs; in developed
economies, we have to be much more patient before up-shifts than before down-shifts.
Concretely, the probability that we will have to wait 10 years or more until observing
a trend up-shift in a developing country is 0.57. This number for a down-shift is very
close: 0.59. By contrast, in developed countries the respective numbers are 0.88 and
0.82 and, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, the difference between the two probabilities grows
very quickly as we consider longer horizons. For instance, the probability that we will
have to wait 20 years or more before observing an up-shift in a developed economy
is still very high 0.76 and well above the probability of waiting the same time until a
down-shift: 0.62.
The intuition behind these findings can be related to standard economic growth
theories as follows. In the process of convergence towards developed-economy status,
countries experiences a similar number of up and down-shifts. Once developed and
located at the technology frontier, however, generating up-shifts becomes much more
difficult: “catch-up” growth is no longer available and growth spurts have to either
come from exogenous technical progress (neo-classical growth model, Solow [150]), or
an increase in savings as a proportion of GDP (AK model, Romer [136]), or innovation
(Schumpeterian model, Aghion and Howitt [5]). At the same time, down-shifts can still
happen because of exogenous shocks, or as a direct consequence of growth slowing down
due to convergence (think about the post WWII reconstruction period slowdowns in
most European countries).
Finally, Table 19 summarizes some stylized facts from this section about how the
growth processes differ in developing and developed economies.
Although, overall, growth is twice as volatile in developing countries as in devel-
156
Table 19: Trend growth in developing vs. developed countries
Developing Developed
Std. Growth* 5.3 2.5
Std. Trend Growth* 3.4 1.2
Trend Var. as % of Growth Var.* 41.4 29.5
Up-shifts p.a.* 0.046 0
Down-shifts p.a.* 0.044 0.015
Median absolute shift magnitude* 5.45 2.30
Pr(10 years or more between shifts) 0.310 0.719
Pr(10 years or more until up-shift) 0.568 0.877
Pr(10 years or more until down-shift) 0.590 0.821
Number of Countries 133 20
Number of Up-shifts 322 11
Number of Down-shifts 307 31
Notes: *Median across countries. Std. (standard deviations) in percentage points.
oped ones, the trend is almost three times more volatile and therefore accounts for over
41% of the total growth variance against slightly less than 30% in developed economies.
This corroborates recent research by Aguiar and Gopinath [7] which shows that “emerg-
ing markets are characterized by a volatile trend that determines the behavior of the
economy at business cycle frequencies”. The result implies that understanding the de-
terminants of the trend growth dynamics in developing countries is more important
than in developed economies even in the medium term.
Several conclusions emerge from assessing the overall characteristics of trend growth
durations and shifts. The trend growth path is much more unstable in developing
economies as a group and represents a higher proportion of the overall growth process.
Developing countries experience more trend shifts with larger trend shift magnitudes.
However, contrary to developed countries, where waiting for up-shifts takes longer, up
and down-shifts in developing economies happen roughly at the same rate. Despite
these stylized facts, figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the vast heterogeneity in country
experiences within groups, while the country-specific examples discussed earlier (sub-
section 3.2.3) suggest that an important amount of variation in the duration of trend
growth episodes exists for a given country over time. This implies that a discrete divide
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into developing/developed is too simplistic and calls for a more systematic assessment
of the domestic and external macroeconomic factors that make trend growth durations
vary so much within and between countries.
3.4 Predicting Trend Growth Shifts
Section 3.2 developed a methodology (iFF) for determining the trend growth rate
at which a country is currently growing by extracting the trend from growth time
series as a sequence of medium/long term growth averages taken over economically
and historically meaningful periods of time. The purpose of the present section is to
address our second motivating question: “How likely is trend growth to shift and in
what direction?”
3.4.1 Econometric framework: a trend-shifting model of growth
We start by extending the conceptual framework introduced in section 3.2.1 to
achieve a comprehensive description of trend growth dynamics.
Remember that we conceptualize growth g(t) as a process that vibrates around a
trend:
g(t) = τ(t) + c(t) (3.9)
The cycle c(t) is a zero-mean transitory fluctuation and the trend τ(t) is defined as






g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1 (3.10)
where Dj = Tj−Tj−1 is the duration of the trend growth episode that starts in Tj−1 +1.
The trend is subject to competing domestic and external forces, summarized in the
vector xt−1, which, if strong enough, can shift the trend up or down at time t and make
growth vibrate around a new higher or lower level from t + 1 onwards. In order to
rule out a reverse effect from the trend shift in year t to the level of the time-varying
variables in year t, we only use time t− 1 information to predict time t trend shifts.
In particular, our goal is to model the conditional probabilities of trend growth
shifting up or down at time t, given that the last trend shift (or the beginning of the
sample) happened d years ago :
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Pr(Tj = t,∆τ(Tj) > 0|Tj − Tj−1 ≥ d,xt−1) (3.11)
Pr(Tj = t,∆τ(Tj) < 0|Tj − Tj−1 ≥ d,xt−1) (3.12)
as functions of the competing forces xt−1.
Without the conditioning on xt−1, equations 3.11 and 3.12 are nothing else than the
up and down-shift hazard rates αU(d) and αD(d), i.e. equations 3.6 and 3.7, rewritten in
calendar time t instead of duration time d by noting that d = t−Tj−1 andDj = Tj−Tj−1.
This arises because we think of trend shifts as recurrent events and adopt what in
the survival literature is sometimes called a “reset-clock” approach. After each trend
shift, we reset the clock to zero, and once the minimum trend growth duration has
elapsed, the country becomes once again “at risk” of experiencing yet another trend
shift.
An important assumption underlying “reset-clock” specifications is that “the pro-
cesses affecting the occurrence of the first event are the same as those for the second,
third, and later events” (Allison [11]). In our case, however, trying to disentangle the
competing forces that have systematically been important determinants of trend growth
durations and shifts is precisely the goal, hence this assumption seems fully appropriate.
A potentially more important limitation of a “reset-clock” specification is the as-
sumption that the hazards do not depend on all the event history, i.e. only on when the
last trend shift happened but not when the previous shifts had happened. However, this
assumption can be easily relaxed by introducing explanatory variables that represent
the dependency of the hazard on the country’s previous history (Allison [11]), which is
what we do by including among our covariates variables like the trend growth rate and
growth volatility, estimated on rolling samples, i.e. from the beginning of the sample
up to and including time t − 1, thereby taking into account all the previous growth
history of the country.
Another issue in models with repeatable events is the intra-subject correlation aris-
ing from having multiple observations (and potentially also multiple events) per country.
In what follows, we adopt a so-called “marginal approach” (cf. Grambsch and Therneau
[82] (chapter 8)), which does not include country random or fixed effects, but corrects
the standard variance estimates for intra-country correlations. Different approaches
could be explored in future work.
In reality, we have already started investigating the determinants of trend growth
durations in the previous section where we examined how survivor functions change
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depending on whether the country is a developing or a developed economy. Since we
were only interested in the effect of one specific characteristic - an indicator for being a
developing economy, we could proceed in a simple, intuitive way: divide our sample into
developed and developing countries, construct the survivor functions non-parametrically
as explained in footnote 47, plot the results and inspect them visually.
Unfortunately, this simple approach does not work if our goal is to examine the
simultaneous effects of several discrete and continuous characteristics on the hazards.
Moreover, it does not give us one quantitative statistic that summarizes the effect
of a characteristic and which would allow us to gauge its statistical and economic
significance, and to compare it to the effects of other characteristics.
A simple way around these issues, is to assume a specific functional form that relates
the hazards to the characteristics xt−1. Since the discrete-time hazards are conditional
probabilities, the functional form needs to be such that the estimated hazards lie be-
tween 0 and 1 and the hazards of the three possible outcomes - up-shift, down-shift and
no shift - sum to one.
In Cox’s [42] original paper, where he proposed the partial likelihood method for
the estimation of the proportional hazards model for continuous-time survival analysis,
he also suggested that a logit specification could be employed in the discrete case and
reduces to a proportional hazards model when the time interval considered gets very
small. Later, the model was extended to the competing risks situation by relating the
covariates xt−1 to the hazards through a multinomial logit specification (e.g. Allison












where, for ease of notation, we write αS(t) := αS(t − Tj−1|xt−1) with S = U,D. The
parameters βS capture the cause-specific effects of the covariates on the S outcome
relative to no shift.
To see the intuition behind this functional form, suppose a country reaches year t
without having yet experienced a novel shift in its trend growth since the last one, and
the minimum trend growth duration has elapsed. What can happen in year t? The
trend can either shift up, shift down or not shift at all. The problem is therefore akin
to a conditional multinomial choice model where the conditional probabilities of the
three possible events/choices are:
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αU(t), αD(t) and 1− α(t)
Note that equation 3.13 indeed ensures that the estimated conditional probabilities
lie between 0 and 1, and sum up to 1, since the conditional probability of no shift
(reference category) is:







Appendix 3.6.1 explains in details how the likelihood function in our case should be
constructed and therefore how the model parameters can be estimated by maximum
likelihood.
To see how the parameters should be interpreted, suppose we have two covariates:
x1t−1 and x2t−1. The probability of experiencing an up-shift in year t relative to ex-
periencing no-shift in year t, conditional on having experienced no shifts since Tj−1
is:
αU(t)
1− α(t) = exp(β
U
1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1) (3.15)
exp(βU1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1) is often called the relative risk associated with covariate
values x1t−1 and x2t−1 . More precisely, exp(βU1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1) is the risk of an up-






= βU1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1 (3.16)
hence βU1 measures the change in the multinomial log-odds of an up-shift in trend
growth relative to no shift due to a one unit change in x1t−1 holding x2t−1 fixed.
Another, perhaps more intuitive, interpretation arises from writing:
exp(βU1 (x1t−1 + 1) + β
U
2 x2t−1)
exp(βU1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1)
= exp(βU1 ) (3.17)
i.e. when x1t−1 increases by one unit while x2t−1 is fixed, the relative up-shift risk is
multiplied by exp(βU1 ) . For instance if exp(β
U
1 ) = 0.8, the risk of an up-shift relative
to no-shift falls by 20%. A value of 1 means there is no effect on the relative up-shift




3.4.2 Results: time-to-shift determinants
The economic history examples discussed above point to two types of variables that
could be of potential interest:
• some characteristics of the growth, political, institutional, external ... environ-
ment which either create favorable (detrimental) conditions for trend up-shifts,
or protect the country from (make it more vulnerable to) down-shifts;
• certain shocks which act as catalysts.
There is an important trade-off in selecting variables for such a large heterogeneous set
of countries. On the one hand, we want to be able to estimate the model on a relatively
large sample so that our results are not driven by a selected few experiences. On the
other hand, not including certain variables may lead to an omitted variable bias and
affect our coefficient estimates and significance.
In what follows, we examine a large set of covariates which can be regrouped into
five dimensions:
1. Growth environment: we investigate the effects of the trend growth rate, the
number of years since the last shift, the cyclical component and growth volatility
(standard deviation of annual growth rates). All these variables are estimated on
rolling samples, i.e. for instance, we only use growth data up to and including t
to estimate the trend in year t. Using rolling samples is important because the
estimates of trend growth may change as we fit iFF on enlarged samples if different
shift dates are identified. Hence, using trend growth estimated on the complete
sample would be forward-looking. A similar argument can be advanced for the
other three variables. For instance, using a time-invariant estimate of growth
volatility based on the whole sample of data introduces a look-ahead bias as it
implies that at any point in time we know what would be happening to growth
in the future. It is true that using rolling samples, especially when these are
relatively small, introduces measurement error and could attenuate our estimated
coefficients. However, given our interest in employing this model as a predictive
tool, the look-ahead bias issue seems more important.
2. Development and Demography: instead of a discrete classification of countries
into “developed” and “developing”, we employ a set of variables which capture
both material and non-material aspects of development: the real GDP p.c. in
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Purchasing Power Parity48, fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, the level of
urbanisation, primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratios, the percent-
age of total population aged less than 14 and the percentage of total population
aged 65 and above. We examine these variables both in levels and changes over
the past 2 years.
3. Institutions and political stability: we use the POLITY database described in Gurr
et al. [85]. In particular, the Polity 2 score, measured on a scale from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), changes in the Polity 2 score over the
past two years, and the durability of the regime’s authority (number of years
since the last substantive change in authority characteristics defined as a 3-point
change in the Polity score, cf. [85]). To capture political stability, we employ the
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). In particular, the Weighted
Conflict Index, which is a weighted sum of the number of assassinations, general
strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-
government demonstrations from the Domestic Conflict Event Data part of the
CNTS. The compilation methods and the construction of the index are explained
in Wilson [160]. We look at the level and growth in WCI. The latter is winsorized
at 100% and a dummy variable equal to 1 when the WCI increases by 100%
or more is included. We also use several variables from the Political Data part
of CNTS: the number of Coups d’Etats, Major Constitutional Changes, Major
Cabinet Changes, Changes in Effective Executive, and the number of Legislative
Elections.
4. Economic management : we consider the annual inflation rate (GDP Deflator),
domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP), gross capital formation (%
of GDP), gross domestic savings (% of GDP). We examine these variables both
in levels and percentage point changes. Two variables capture trade: exports
plus imports (as % of GDP), and the difference between the annual growth rates
of imports and exports. We also look at the annual depreciation of the official
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar. The variable is winsorized above
at 100%, and a dummy tracks winsorized observations. We allow the effect of
the depreciation to be different in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime by
including a term which interacts the depreciation with a dummy equal to one if
48Real GDP per capita in PPP is constructed using the PWT (rgdpe/pop) and extended to 2015 with
World Bank data. All remaining variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators,
unless another data source is explicitly specified.
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the exchange rate is fixed.49
5. External environment & shocks: we take the annual average and the annual per-
centage point change in the daily US T-bill (secondary market, 3 month rate).
For commodity prices, we use the IFS monthly gold, food and oil price indices.
We consider the annual averages, and the growth rates between January and De-
cember. We also interact the annual growth in food/oil prices with a dummy
equal to 1 if the country is a food/oil exporter and another dummy equal to 1 if
the country is a food/oil importer. The overall impact of the annual growth in
food/oil prices in year t− 1 therefore enters the hazard functions as follows:
(β + βXI
X
t−1 + βM I
M
t−1)xt−1
where IXt−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the food/fuel exports represent at least 20%
of merchandise exports in year t− 1. Similarly, IMt−1 is an indicator function that
takes a value of 1 in t−1 if food/fuel imports represent at least 20% of merchandise
imports in that year.
Given the trade-off between sample size and omitted variable bias, we proceed sequen-
tially, examining one/two additional categories of variables at a time while keeping
those that have been previously identified as significant. We fit the models both with
and without five-year dummies to check whether the effects estimated are robust to
the inclusion of some time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We do not use a full
set of year dummies because it leads to significant over-fitting and non-convergence
of the likelihood function, especially in more complex specifications. Moreover, in our
exploratory exercise, unlike the predictive model of the following subsection, we shall
use the same sets of covariates for both up and down-shift hazards since, a priori, we
do not know which covariates enter which hazard function.
Note that all result tables show exponentiated coefficients, i.e. the interpretation is
in terms of relative risk ratios, as explained above.
We start with a baseline specification which only includes the Growth environment
variables: Table 20, models (1) and (2).
The most significant variable in economic and statistical terms is the Trend growth
rate. Considering the first specification, a one percentage point higher trend growth
rate reduces the relative up-shift risk and increases the relative down-shift risk by about
49We use the IMF AREAER database for the classification of exchange rate regimes.
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Table 20: Growth environment, development and demography
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.789*** 1.201*** 0.774*** 1.204*** 0.763*** 1.237*** 0.774*** 1.243***
(-9.85) (7.11) (-9.90) (7.93) (-7.01) (5.14) (-6.85) (6.29)
Years since last shift 0.925*** 0.959*** 0.927*** 0.957*** 0.934*** 0.959*** 0.937*** 0.958***
(-6.40) (-4.25) (-5.69) (-4.08) (-4.52) (-3.80) (-4.34) (-3.72)
Cycle 0.934*** 1.125*** 0.932*** 1.112*** 0.905*** 1.156*** 0.905*** 1.147***
(-4.11) (5.81) (-4.31) (4.82) (-4.80) (5.18) (-4.66) (4.75)
Growth Volatility 1.056*** 1.042 1.061*** 1.040 1.027 1.019 1.026 1.020
(2.71) (1.55) (2.91) (1.30) (1.44) (0.86) (1.40) (0.81)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.477*** 1.383* 0.473*** 1.351*
(-3.32) (1.88) (-3.06) (1.68)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.883 1.689*** 0.940 1.621***
(-0.70) (4.04) (-0.34) (3.76)
Infant Mortality 0.989 1.002 0.987 1.000
(-1.38) (0.22) (-1.60) (0.00)
Life Expectancy 0.966 0.974 0.952 0.965
(-1.04) (-0.98) (-1.50) (-1.27)
Urban Population (% total) 1.001 1.005 1.002 1.006
(0.06) (0.75) (0.16) (0.93)
Fertility (change) 0.670 1.167 0.719 1.003
(-1.13) (0.35) (-0.86) (0.01)
Infant Mortality (change) 1.008 1.015 1.017 1.015
(0.32) (0.70) (0.64) (0.71)
Life Expectancy (change) 1.096 0.993 1.151** 0.960
(1.54) (-0.10) (2.24) (-0.60)
Urban Population (ppt. change) 0.959 1.046 0.968 1.020
(-0.67) (0.85) (-0.53) (0.40)
Primary Enrol. (% gross) 0.999 1.008* 1.001 1.007
(-0.19) (1.73) (0.18) (1.61)
Secondary Enrol. (% gross) 1.003 0.997 1.003 0.998
(0.44) (-0.49) (0.38) (-0.29)
Tertiary Enrol. (% gross) 1.002 1.007 1.001 1.008
(0.17) (0.89) (0.12) (0.99)
Primary Enrol. (ppt. change) 0.988 0.994 0.983 0.999
(-0.86) (-0.53) (-1.23) (-0.10)
Secondary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.016 1.016 1.014 1.014
(0.98) (1.39) (0.79) (1.31)
Tertiary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.057* 1.010 1.038 1.021
(1.88) (0.37) (1.18) (0.83)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% of total) 0.934* 0.938* 0.917** 0.943*
(-1.76) (-1.90) (-2.17) (-1.76)
Pop. ages >=65 (% of total) 0.857*** 0.971 0.841*** 0.965
(-2.86) (-0.68) (-3.10) (-0.80)
Pop. ages 0-14 (ppt. change) 1.069 1.004 1.042 1.028
(0.66) (0.04) (0.39) (0.27)
Pop. ages >=65 (ppt. change) 1.497 1.146 1.488 1.235
(1.25) (0.55) (1.24) (0.84)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 4062 4062 2856 2856
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.152 0.180 0.204
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level.
Changes taken over past two years. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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20%. This result illustrates the regression to the mean phenomenon - the idea that an
extended period of high growth is rarely sustainable for a long time and more likely
to be followed by a period of average rather than even higher growth. Pritchett and
Summers [133] have extensively studied this phenomenon in a recent paper, concluding
that empirically it is the “most salient feature of economic growth”. Our study confirms
this finding since trend growth remains the most significant variable throughout the
analysis. On its own (regression not shown), the trend growth rate explains almost
10% of trend up and down-shifts.
The duration of the current trend growth episode (Years since last shift) has a
negative impact on both up and down-shift relative risks. Intuitively, if the country
has been growing at the same trend growth rate for a longer period of time, it is more
likely that this rate corresponds to a long run equilibrium from which the country is
less likely to be destabilized. This variable might also be capturing to some extent the
level of development since, as shown in Figure 3.7, trend growth durations are longer in
developed economies. Indeed, as we introduce variables from our development bucket
into the regression, the magnitude of the effect of duration on up-shifts drops from one
additional year since the last trend shift reducing the relative up-shift risk by 7.5%
(model 1) to decreasing it by 6.6% (model 3).
The effect of the Cycle goes in the same direction as that of the trend: decreases
the likelihood of up-shifts and increases that of down-shifts. Mechanically, the reason
can be explained as follows: the cycle is computed as growth minus the rolling estimate
of the trend. Hence, a higher cycle indicates that our rolling estimate of trend growth
is going up and that a trend down-shift from this higher estimate is even more likely.
Therefore, the cycle accentuates the effect of the trend that we have just discussed.
Higher Growth volatility increases both up and down-shift relative risks although
the effect is statistically insignificant for down-shifts and becomes also insignificant for
up-shifts as development variables are introduced. Economically, the effect goes in the
expected direction though - countries with higher growth volatility have shorter trend
growth episodes - hence, we decided to keep this variable as a control.
Including five-year dummies in specification (2) does not greatly affect the magni-
tude and significance of the growth environment variables, suggesting that these vari-
ables are robust to some unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
Models (3) and (4) incorporate Development and Demography variables.
A higher level of Real GDP p.c. in PPP decreases the likelihood of up-shifts and
increases that of down-shifts. This result agrees with our earlier discussion of economic
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convergence at the end of section 3.3.2: as countries become more developed, growth
slows down. Relative to the no shift outcome, countries start experiencing less up-
shifts and more down-shifts. The larger and more significant effect on the up-shifts was
expected from our previous discussion and the right panel of Figure 3.7. The coefficients
are more difficult to interpret this time since we are looking at the log of the real GDP
p.c. The unexponentiated coefficients are -0.74 and 0.32; hence a 10% higher real GDP
p.c. this year is associated with a 7% fall in the up-shift relative risk and a 3% rise in
the down-shift relative risk next year.50
Real GDP p.c. only captures the material aspect of development. For instance,
in 2015, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates ranked above the devel-
oped country with the highest real GDP p.c. - Norway. Hence, the simple devel-
oped/developing divide gets blurred when we think about development in continuous
terms. Unfortunately, very few variables reflecting the non-material side of development
appear to be significant. This is not surprising given the results from previous stud-
ies. For instance, Berg et al. [25] examine the significance of primary and secondary
education, adult and child mortality (levels and within growth spell changes) for the
duration of growth spells. They only find three out of eight variables to be significant
at the 10% level.
A high level of Fertility appears to be detrimental to trend growth: one extra
child per woman increases the down-shift relative risk by over 60%. Historically, very
high fertility rates (7-8 children per woman) characterize several African countries, e.g.
Rwanda, Kenya, Oman, Jordan, in the 1970s and 1980s. The damaging effect of fertility
could arise because high fertility is often the flipside of a lower level of female education
and employment which are detrimental to growth and that we are not controlling for
in the regression because this type of data is less common and less reliable.
Higher percentages of Population aged 0 to 14 or 65 and above reduce the relative
risk of up-shifts, with the effect being bigger and more significant for the 65 and above
age bracket. The effect is consistent with larger dependency ratios preventing the
savings rate to rise and engender a trend growth up-shift as in a standard AK growth
model (Romer [136]). Conditional on fertility, Population aged 0 to 14 also appears to
protect from down-shifts to some extent, perhaps indicating a potential positive effect




Hence, for instance, a 10% higher real GDP p.c. multiplies the up-shift relative risk by
exp(−0.74 ln(1.1)) ' 0.93, a 7% decrease.
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on trend growth arising from a future younger and larger active labour force.51
An argument often put forward for the case that China still has decades left to
run at high growth rates before slowing down is that its level of urbanization, which
currently stands at 55.6% of the total population, is much lower than that of the USA
(81.6%). Given the results in Table 20, we can neither buttress nor reject this argument
because none of the variables related to urbanization are significant. However, it seems
that the effect of an increase in Urban population, although insignificant, goes in the
direction of increasing the likelihood of down-shifts while decreasing that of up-shifts.
A one percentage point increase in the Tertiary education gross enrollment ratio
over the past two years raises the up-shift relative risk by 5.7% suggesting, as expected,
that more higher education is beneficial for trend growth. The small positive effect of
Primary education on the down-shift relative risk is less intuitive. Both education effects
are only significant at the 10% level and not robust to the inclusion of five-year dummies
in specification (4). On the other hand, the beneficial effect of an improvement in Life
expectancy, only appears as significant once time effects are included. This weakness
in robustness to the inclusion of other covariates is confirmed in the next set of results,
shown in Table 21, where all three variables completely loose significance once we control
for the quality of Institutions, political stability and Economic management.
Acemoglu et al.[1] provide an extensive overview of the various channels through
which weaker institutions may disrupt long term growth. In agreement with this,
we find that a one unit lower Polity 2 score (less democratic institutions) increases
the down-shift relative risk by around 5%. Changes in the Polity score are also very
important: as expected, a one unit Amelioration over the past two years reduces the
down-shift relative risk, while a one unit Deterioration increases it. Interestingly, the
Polity score and changes thereof have no significant effect on the up-shifts, perhaps
indicating that good institutions on their own are not enough to substantially lift trend
growth. The Durability of the Polity regime reduces both up and down-shifts suggesting
that political stability leads to growth stability.
Only one out of the six variables from the CNTS database examined happens to
be significant: a dummy equal to 1 if the Weighted Conflict Index (WCI) rises by
more than 100%. Conflict rise >=100% multiplies the relative risk of down-shift by
2. The finding that the remaining political stability variables are insignificant seems a
bit surprising. We investigated whether this may be due to the fact that it takes more
51See Higgins [94] for an investigation of how demography and national savings are related and a
discussion of the dependency debate.
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Table 21: Institutions, political stability, and economic management
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.747*** 1.388*** 0.756*** 1.376*** 0.787*** 1.372*** 0.778*** 1.379***
(-6.72) (6.58) (-6.70) (6.48) (-6.80) (7.24) (-7.38) (7.28)
Years since last shift 0.947*** 0.981 0.951*** 0.983 0.939*** 0.986 0.943*** 0.986
(-2.91) (-1.50) (-2.68) (-1.30) (-3.55) (-1.22) (-3.18) (-1.22)
Cycle 0.891*** 1.235*** 0.887*** 1.218*** 0.926*** 1.208*** 0.919*** 1.198***
(-3.59) (4.47) (-3.62) (4.18) (-2.78) (5.95) (-2.96) (5.35)
Growth Volatility 1.025 0.998 1.025 1.001 1.017 1.012 1.023 1.011
(1.28) (-0.10) (1.26) (0.03) (0.85) (0.79) (1.11) (0.70)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.527*** 1.560* 0.501*** 1.481 0.553*** 1.687*** 0.527*** 1.604**
(-2.80) (1.77) (-3.02) (1.47) (-3.78) (2.79) (-3.84) (2.44)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.710 1.873*** 0.777 1.749** 0.801 1.380** 0.762* 1.406*
(-1.62) (2.83) (-1.16) (2.36) (-1.48) (2.03) (-1.65) (1.81)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.956 0.952 0.923** 0.957 0.944** 0.997 0.941* 0.994
(-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.99) (-0.76) (-2.05) (-0.07) (-1.93) (-0.12)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.939 1.022 0.898* 1.026 0.932* 1.058 0.913* 1.066
(-1.09) (0.30) (-1.74) (0.32) (-1.67) (0.99) (-1.95) (1.05)
Primary Enrol. (% gross) 0.997 1.008 0.997 1.007
(-0.44) (1.41) (-0.38) (1.16)
Tertiary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.047 1.025 1.027 1.043
(1.18) (1.03) (0.62) (1.61)
Life Expectancy (change) 1.088 0.982 1.105 0.973
(1.00) (-0.28) (1.14) (-0.41)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.993 0.955** 0.999 0.953** 0.973 0.947*** 0.976 0.948***
(-0.30) (-2.27) (-0.04) (-2.27) (-1.48) (-3.24) (-1.26) (-2.85)
Amelioration Polity 2 1.007 0.667*** 0.995 0.677*** 0.980 0.858*** 0.984 0.872**
(0.17) (-3.12) (-0.12) (-3.04) (-0.52) (-2.69) (-0.42) (-2.25)
Deterioration Polity 2 0.933 1.147** 0.911 1.164** 0.997 1.157*** 0.988 1.151**
(-1.15) (2.19) (-1.48) (2.22) (-0.07) (2.60) (-0.28) (2.53)
Durability Polity regime 0.983*** 0.982*** 0.982*** 0.981*** 0.977*** 0.980*** 0.977*** 0.980***
(-2.92) (-3.69) (-2.99) (-3.67) (-3.62) (-4.05) (-3.56) (-3.98)
Coups d’Etats 0.433 2.177 0.415 2.572
(-0.76) (0.88) (-0.81) (1.06)
Major Constitutional Changes 0.853 1.660 0.910 1.529
(-0.39) (1.25) (-0.22) (1.02)
Changes in Effective Executive 1.048 0.963 1.076 0.946
(0.18) (-0.10) (0.28) (-0.15)
Legislative Election 0.998 0.836 0.998 0.856
(-0.01) (-0.68) (-0.01) (-0.57)
Weighted Conflict Index (WCI) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.25) (-0.61) (0.69) (-0.73)
WCI growth, win. 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.001
(0.69) (0.43) (0.20) (0.74)
Conflict rise >=100% 0.931 2.420*** 0.992 2.260** 0.874 1.963** 0.867 1.942**
(-0.18) (2.70) (-0.02) (2.39) (-0.43) (2.39) (-0.44) (2.33)
Log(1+inflation) 1.441 3.959*** 1.392 3.123** 1.259 3.011*** 1.235 2.558**
(0.82) (2.71) (0.79) (2.39) (0.60) (2.70) (0.56) (2.48)
Capital formation (gross, % GDP) 0.983 0.991 0.982 0.995
(-1.31) (-0.66) (-1.27) (-0.35)
Capital formation (ppt. change) 0.996 0.995 0.999 0.994
(-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.05) (-0.19)
Domestic savings (gross, % of GDP) 1.002 1.004 1.004 1.003
(0.30) (0.48) (0.56) (0.36)
Domestic savings (ppt. change) 1.038* 0.958* 1.038* 0.970 1.022 0.959*** 1.024 0.970**
(1.96) (-1.76) (1.91) (-1.21) (1.28) (-2.92) (1.24) (-2.02)
Domestic credit to private (% GDP) 0.997 1.004 0.996 1.003
(-0.59) (1.12) (-0.68) (0.87)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 0.996 1.026*** 0.996 1.030*** 0.996 1.033*** 0.998 1.036***
(-0.33) (2.78) (-0.30) (2.61) (-0.37) (3.81) (-0.19) (3.55)
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(5) (6) (7) (8)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Depreciation (LCU/$), win. 1.015** 0.976* 1.014** 0.983 1.014*** 0.987 1.013*** 0.991
(2.56) (-1.78) (2.39) (-1.35) (3.06) (-1.58) (2.85) (-1.13)
Depreciation x Fixed Exchange 0.998 1.019 1.000 1.015
(-0.23) (1.28) (-0.06) (1.04)
Depreciation >=100% 0.0673*** 0.443 0.0802*** 0.446 0.156*** 0.405 0.182** 0.402
(-2.88) (-0.51) (-2.87) (-0.56) (-2.61) (-0.60) (-2.48) (-0.71)
Imports gr. - Exports gr. 1.004 1.018** 1.006 1.017** 0.999 1.016*** 1.001 1.016***
(0.50) (2.52) (0.73) (2.46) (-0.22) (2.90) (0.08) (2.99)
Trade (% of GDP) 1.010*** 1.001 1.012*** 1.001 1.003* 1.000 1.004** 1.000
(2.98) (0.44) (3.38) (0.38) (1.86) (0.21) (2.44) (0.29)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2194 2194 2625 2625
Pseudo R2 0.243 0.264 0.213 0.237
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
than one year for the event to have an impact on trend growth by re-fitting the model
with the same variables either lagged two years or aggregated over the past two years,
however, no more significant effects appeared. We also investigated the components of
the WCI separately, but again with no success. Perhaps, this result is at least in part
due to the quality of the data. The CNTS derives most of the events used to construct
the WCI from the New York Times (cf. Wilson [160]), and it is very likely that many
events, especially in the developing world, go unrecorded. It is also worth mentioning,
however, that previous studies have also found the effect of conflict not to be robust
to the inclusion of other covariates. For instance, Hausmann et al. [90] find that an
indicator for war becomes insignificant for the probability of growth collapses when
variables like inflation and the change in the Polity score are included in the regression.
We examine several aspects of Economic management starting with monetary stabil-
ity as measured by the log of 1 plus the annual Inflation rate, a standard transformation
in the empirical growth literature. Higher inflation significantly increases the likelihood
of down-shifts. This result is not surprising; many examples in economic history indi-
cate that inflation is a symptom of economic mismanagement. For instance, all four
trend growth down-shifts in Brazil, illustrated in Figure 3.8, were preceded by very
high inflation rates: 31% in 1961, 19% in 1972, 56% in 1979 and 145% in 1986, while
the success of the “Plano Real” (1994-2002), which managed to stabilize the Brazilian
economy at the current trend growth rate of 1.8% p.a. since 1993, relied to a large ex-
tent on having achieved monetary stability through measures like a peg of the Brazilian
real to the US dollar and a general indexation of prices (e.g. cf. Feijo et al. [58]).
Another important determinant of macroeconomic stability is the exchange rate. We
look at the Depreciation of the official nominal exchange rate against the US dollar. The
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Figure 3.8 Trend growth in Brazil (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
coefficient estimates indicate that a one percentage point larger Depreciation raises the
up-shift relative risk by about 1.5%, and this effect does not disappear if the exchange
rate is fixed. One particular channel through which a devaluation this year can boost
growth next year is by making the country’s exports more competitive. However, the
dummy indicator for a devaluation of 100% and more (Depreciation>=100% ) almost
completely annihilates the up-shift relative risk.
Just as human capital accumulation, physical Capital formation does not seem to
be a significant predictor of trend growth dynamics. This agrees with two studies
that employ growth accounting techniques (parametric in Jones and Olken [105], non-
parametric in Kerekes [109]) to investigate the sources of important growth changes and
conclude that factor accumulation only plays a negligible role in them so that “even
medium-run growth rate changes are mainly the result of productivity changes”[109].
Two other variables that matter for trend shifts are domestic indebtedness and
savings. Both variables are significant in percentage point changes but not in levels. The
positive effect of a rise in Domestic savings on up-shifts disappears as other insignificant
covariates are dropped from the up-shift hazard function, cf. specifications (7) and (8).
However, the protective effect from down-shifts remains significant: a one ppt. increase
in domestic savings this year reduces the relative down-shift risk next year by around
3%. In developing economies, higher internal savings may help avoid the dramatic
economic disruptions caused by sudden outflows of foreign investment. In developed
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economies, increases in domestic savings can help finance innovation and therefore
prevent growth from shifting down.
Increases in domestic indebtedness played a prominent role in the most recent down-
shifts. However, as the following table suggests, the lesson that a rise in Domestic
credit to the private sector may not be good for trend growth could perhaps have been
assimilated already after the Latin American turmoil in the 1980s and the Asian crisis
of the 1990s.
Country Down-shift
Rise in domestic credit to private sector







We also find that while a higher proportion of GDP in Trade is prospicious to trend
growth up-shifts, a rising trade deficit (Imports growth - Exports growth) is a symptom
of future trend down-shifts.
The remaining specifications in Table 21 show that adding five-year dummies and
dropping insignificant covariates does not qualitatively alter the effects just identified
in most cases, even though the precise quantitative estimates may change.
Table 22 keeps the variables previously identified as significant and adds the last
category: External environment & shocks.
The US T-bill rate is considered as the risk-free rate on the market and is therefore
an important determinant of borrowing costs. Model (9) indicates that both high US
rates and rises thereof are bad for trend growth. For instance, a one percentage point
higher US T-bill rate is associated with an 8.5% higher relative down-shift risk and
an 8.2% lower relative up-shift risk. Interestingly, as we include five year dummies in
specification (10), the significance of the US T-bill rate drops. The only effect that
remains significant is that of the average US T-bill rate on the relative down-shift
risk, which is now much bigger: 17% instead of the previous 8.5%. Although US rate
hikes are not significant for trend shifts once we control for unobserved time-varying
heterogeneity, their significance in the absence of such controls indicates that they may
be a good proxy for a part of this unobserved heterogeneity which is detrimental for
long-run growth, in particular for up-shifts.
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Table 22: External environment & shocks
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.757*** 1.368*** 0.759*** 1.379*** 0.761*** 1.368*** 0.765*** 1.374***
(-7.61) (6.96) (-7.74) (6.68) (-7.43) (6.85) (-7.49) (6.64)
Years since last shift 0.942*** 0.983 0.944*** 0.984 0.942*** 0.983 0.943*** 0.985
(-3.21) (-1.41) (-3.06) (-1.29) (-3.29) (-1.41) (-3.11) (-1.27)
Cycle 0.923*** 1.173*** 0.926** 1.181*** 0.921*** 1.173*** 0.926** 1.178***
(-2.65) (4.41) (-2.47) (4.24) (-2.77) (4.35) (-2.51) (4.25)
Growth Volatility 1.031 1.011 1.031 1.012 1.029 1.011 1.028 1.012
(1.39) (0.74) (1.45) (0.77) (1.34) (0.72) (1.34) (0.75)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.536*** 1.630** 0.509*** 1.480** 0.546*** 1.645*** 0.514*** 1.494**
(-3.60) (2.52) (-3.62) (2.07) (-3.45) (2.58) (-3.48) (2.09)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.733* 1.416* 0.698** 1.404* 0.740* 1.407* 0.702* 1.390*
(-1.79) (1.91) (-1.96) (1.69) (-1.75) (1.88) (-1.93) (1.66)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.944* 1.002 0.951 0.995 0.948* 1.003 0.952 0.996
(-1.81) (0.05) (-1.45) (-0.11) (-1.71) (0.06) (-1.43) (-0.09)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.917* 1.061 0.926 1.070 0.920* 1.060 0.923 1.071
(-1.72) (0.95) (-1.44) (1.04) (-1.67) (0.95) (-1.48) (1.06)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.978 0.948*** 0.981 0.945*** 0.979 0.947*** 0.980 0.945***
(-1.07) (-2.83) (-0.94) (-2.71) (-1.07) (-2.87) (-0.98) (-2.73)
Amelioration Polity 2 0.989 0.780** 0.990 0.784** 0.987 0.778** 0.990 0.782**
(-0.28) (-2.06) (-0.25) (-2.15) (-0.32) (-2.05) (-0.26) (-2.12)
Deterioration Polity 2 1.008 1.190** 0.994 1.206** 1.004 1.191** 0.991 1.206**
(0.18) (2.39) (-0.12) (2.38) (0.09) (2.43) (-0.20) (2.40)
Duration regime 0.977*** 0.979*** 0.977*** 0.979*** 0.978*** 0.979*** 0.977*** 0.979***
(-3.48) (-3.73) (-3.50) (-3.70) (-3.44) (-3.81) (-3.47) (-3.79)
Conflict rise >=100% 0.907 2.396*** 0.884 2.208*** 0.926 2.373*** 0.898 2.212***
(-0.28) (3.05) (-0.34) (2.67) (-0.22) (3.02) (-0.30) (2.69)
Log(1+inflation) 1.297 1.993* 1.285 2.019* 1.312 2.067* 1.326 2.024*
(0.68) (1.77) (0.67) (1.79) (0.72) (1.89) (0.76) (1.81)
Domestic savings (ppt. change) 1.043** 0.947*** 1.047** 0.956*** 1.043** 0.947*** 1.048*** 0.957***
(2.41) (-3.73) (2.57) (-2.85) (2.37) (-3.77) (2.61) (-2.79)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 1.001 1.034*** 1.001 1.036*** 1.000 1.033*** 0.999 1.035***
(0.11) (3.29) (0.10) (2.81) (-0.05) (3.27) (-0.09) (2.77)
Depreciation (LCU/$), win. 1.011** 0.994 1.012** 0.995 1.011** 0.994 1.011** 0.995
(2.26) (-0.75) (2.35) (-0.71) (2.25) (-0.77) (2.19) (-0.65)
Depreciation >=100% 0.183** 0.382 0.185** 0.428 0.181** 0.341 0.184** 0.423
(-2.34) (-0.89) (-2.31) (-0.81) (-2.31) (-0.99) (-2.26) (-0.79)
Imports gr. - Exports gr. 0.998 1.013** 0.999 1.013** 0.998 1.013** 1.000 1.012**
(-0.38) (2.24) (-0.20) (2.08) (-0.29) (2.21) (-0.07) (2.06)
Trade (% of GDP) 1.004** 1.000 1.004** 1.001 1.004** 1.000 1.004** 1.001
(2.09) (0.10) (2.29) (0.31) (2.07) (0.10) (2.32) (0.34)
US T-bill (annual change, ppt.) 0.890* 1.089 0.977 1.103 0.873** 1.089 0.928 1.098
(-1.83) (1.55) (-0.30) (1.59) (-2.07) (1.59) (-0.99) (1.59)
US T-bill (annual average) 0.918* 1.085*** 0.912 1.170* 0.928* 1.092*** 0.900* 1.146*
(-1.86) (2.60) (-1.37) (1.74) (-1.67) (2.83) (-1.70) (1.77)
Gold price index (annual growth) 0.991 0.997 0.996 1.000
(-1.09) (-0.50) (-0.43) (-0.00)
Gold price index (annual average) 0.976*** 1.018*** 1.004 1.043*** 0.976*** 1.020*** 1.005 1.039***
(-3.02) (3.30) (0.19) (3.60) (-3.09) (3.57) (0.29) (3.78)
Food price index (annual growth) 1.012 1.044*** 0.996 1.032** 0.999 1.040*** 0.989 1.035***
(0.77) (4.10) (-0.23) (2.42) (-0.08) (4.83) (-0.82) (3.46)
Food(growth) x Exporter 1.007 0.968*** 1.010 0.969*** 1.007 0.968*** 1.010 0.969***
(0.44) (-2.66) (0.55) (-2.65) (0.44) (-2.69) (0.57) (-2.68)
Food(growth) x Importer 0.993 0.984 0.992 0.984
(-0.41) (-0.82) (-0.42) (-0.87)
Oil price index (annual growth) 0.996 1.000 0.994 1.003
(-0.91) (-0.05) (-1.38) (0.70)
Oil(growth) x Exporter 0.995 0.991** 0.995 0.992* 0.992 0.991** 0.992 0.994
(-0.69) (-2.12) (-0.69) (-1.86) (-1.24) (-2.31) (-1.32) (-1.42)
Oil(growth) x Importer 0.995 1.006 0.996 1.006
(-0.59) (1.23) (-0.48) (1.22)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2464 2464 2464 2464
Pseudo R2 0.241 0.259 0.238 0.255
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Gold is considered as a safe asset and a hedge in turbulent times. Hence, high
gold prices are an indication of high risk aversion. More risk averse investors will only
lend money at higher rates thereby potentially raising the costs of financing growth-
enhancing projects thereby hurting trend growth. Our analysis indicates that although
growth in gold prices is insignificant, high averages decrease the relative up-shift risk
and increase the relative down-shift risk, with the latter effect being robust to the
inclusion of five-year dummies.
Annual averages of gold, food and oil prices are highly correlated: 0.9 correlation
between gold and food, 0.94 correlation between gold and oil. In order to avoid multi-
collinearity issues, we therefore decided to only focus on food and oil price growth rates
and allow the effects to be different for respective exporters and importers.
Rising Food prices may increase global food insecurity and poverty, especially in
developing countries (cf. e.g. Azzarri et al. [16]), thereby being detrimental to trend
growth. Indeed, we find that a one percentage point higher annual growth rate in
food prices raises the down-shift relative risk by about 4.4%. This detrimental effect,
however, is reversed if the country is a food exporter. In Table 22, the only significant
effect of rising Oil prices is to slightly protect oil exporting countries from down-shifts.
In further regressions, not shown here but available on request, we investigated
several other variables that often appear in the empirical growth literature while keeping
the ones that we had already found as significant. The reason for not including these
variables in the main specifications presented above is that they reduce the sample size
dramatically thereby making results incomparable across specifications, while at the
same time often being insignificant.
For instance, we found terms of trade growth to be insignificant while shrinking the
sample size from 2464 to 1625. Foreign direct investment net inflows and outflows as
a % of GDP are once again insignificant both in levels and ppt. changes, but reduce
the sample size to 1768. We investigated the importance of the sectoral composition
of the economy by including five variables: the annual growth rates in the value added
by the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors, and the values added as a %
of GDP of the manufacturing and services sectors. The sample size dropped to 1802
and the only effect significant at 10% and robust to the inclusion of five year dummies
was that of the growth in the services sector on down-shifts: a one ppt. higher service
sector growth increased the relative down-shift risk by about 3.6-3.8%.
Finally, we also looked at short term debt as a percentage of total external debt,
finding that a one percentage point higher level increases the down-shift relative risk
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by almost 5%. The effect is significant at the 0.1% level, and robust to the inclusion of
five year dummies. However, unfortunately, including this variable shrinks the sample
size from 2464 observations to 1391, mainly because the World Bank provides data on
short term debt only for developing countries.
3.4.3 Assessing trend growth prospects
We now wish to turn the insights gained in the previous section about what makes
trend growth episodes more or less likely to end next year with an up or a down-shift
into a predictive tool that can be used to answer our second motivating question - “How
likely is trend growth to change and in what direction?” - in real time.
Ideally, we would like to employ all the variables identified as significant in the
previous section to give estimates of the conditional probabilities of up and down-shifts
in 2016 for most of the countries in our sample. Unfortunately, because of a large
number of missing values in 2015, this is not possible. For instance, at the time of
writing this paper, the World Bank had updated fertility data for only one country.
More annoyingly, some important countries like China and India missed data on either
domestic savings or trade.
Although we hope that future research will employ the trend-shifting framework
developed in this paper on better datasets and build more interesting and comprehen-
sive predictive models, in what follows, we adopt a less ambitious approach in terms
of variables included, but which nevertheless allows us to compare our 2016 hazard
estimates for 120 out of the 153 countries for which we have extracted trend growth
using iFF.
The up and down-shift hazard estimates reported in Table 25 in the Appendix
are constructed using the model shown in Table 23. To get to this model, we re-
estimated specification (9) without fertility, domestic savings and the trade variables,
then dropped all insignificant effects. Amelioration in Polity 2 score, inflation and
growth in oil prices for oil exporters became insignificant, while growth volatility now
significantly increases both up and down-shift risks, and a one percentage point higher
growth in oil prices decreases the relative up-shift risks around the world by 0.4%. All
the other effects go in the same direction as before except for the effect of Pop. ages
0-14 (% total) on down-shifts. A one percentage point larger population in the 0-14
ages bracket now increases the relative down-shift risk by about 7.7%. Note that the
protective relationship found in specifications (3) and (4) already became insignificant
as we introduced further controls in specifications (5) to (12). However, here the effect
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Table 23: Predictive model
Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.777*** 1.271***
(-8.22) (6.41)




Growth Volatility 1.047** 1.025*
(2.04) (1.68)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.633*** 1.610***
(-3.51) (3.67)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.913*** 1.077***
(-3.64) (3.17)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.897** 1.108***
(-2.43) (2.77)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.942***
(-4.33)
Deterioration Polity 2 1.132*
(1.75)
Duration Polity regime 0.987*** 0.988***
(-3.07) (-2.64)
Conflict rise >=100% 2.047***
(2.65)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 1.038***
(4.31)




US T-bill (annual average) 0.938* 1.068**
(-1.79) (2.47)
US T-bill (annual change) 0.903* 1.114**
(-1.89) (2.38)
Gold price (annual average) 0.984*** 1.019***
(-2.97) (4.05)
Food price (annual growth) 1.035***
(4.80)
Food price (growth) x Exporter 0.977**
(-2.21)




Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses.
Std. errors clustered at the country level. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Estimated up and down-shift hazards, summary statistics
Up-shift Hazard Down-shift Hazard
Correlation with Up-shifts 0.188 -0.071
Correlation with Down-shifts -0.075 0.206
Mean during Up-shifts 0.177 0.043
Median during Up-shifts 0.134 0.022
Mean during Down-shifts 0.035 0.236
Median during Down-shifts 0.018 0.133
Standard deviation 0.107 0.137
goes significantly in the other direction because we are no longer controlling for fertility.
Unsurprisingly, the two variables have a correlation of 0.91. Hence, once fertility is
excluded Pop. ages 0-14 starts capturing its negative effect discussed above.
Also note that we are not including five-year dummies. The reason is that in this
section, unlike the previous one where we were interested in establishing the robustness
of our variables to some unobserved time-varying heterogeneity, what we are really
looking for is to find a certain combination of observable domestic and external variables
which, taken together, have historically been significant predictors of up and down-
shifts and that we have previously identified as being robust to such unobserved time
effects. We could interpret our exercise as wanting to create indices of trend growth
instability based on a certain combination of observable domestic and external variables.
Unobserved time effects are not something that we can measure in real time and that
could help us predict when the current trend growth episodes will end.
The parsimonious predictive model explains almost 20% of trend shifts, which com-
pares well with the more complex specifications we had before and is quite high given
the unpredictable nature of such events. It is better at predicting down-shifts than
up-shifts since, as shown in Table 24, the estimated up-shift hazards have a 0.188 cor-
relation with the up-shifts, while the correlation between down-shifts and the estimated
down-shift hazards is higher: 0.206.52 This is not surprising since the up-shift hazard
is modelled as a function of 14 variables, whereas the down-shift hazard reacts to 17
variables.
The mean up-shift hazard is over four times higher during up-shifts than during
52These correlations are based on the whole sample of 5384 observations for which we can compute
the hazards and not only the 3017 observations used to estimate the model.
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down-shifts (0.177 vs 0.043) and the ratio is around 6 when looking at the median. A
more pronounced result holds for down-shifts (6.7 for the mean and 7.4 for the median).
However, the mean and median hazard estimates remain quite low, suggesting both that
trend shifts are very hard to foretell, and that the model could be improved upon in
order to achieve more accurate predictions of trend growth dynamics.
Another interesting way to gauge the performance of the model is to compare the
average up and down-shift hazards estimated with the temporal distribution of trend
up and down-shifts, analysed in section 3.3. Figure 3.9 superposes the average up and
down-shift hazards estimated for each year with the percentage of countries experiencing
up and down-shifts in that year. As we can see, the average hazards seem to follow
the pattern of the percentages of the respective trend shifts fairly well. In particular,
the average down-shift hazard often dominates the average up-shift hazard at the same
times as the percentage of down-shifts is larger than the percentage of trend up-shifts
and vice versa. More precisely, the correlations (1965 - 2010) between the average
hazards and the percentages of countries experiencing shifts are:
% Countries experiencing
Average Hazard Up -Shifts Down-Shifts
Up 0.378 -0.579
Down -0.383 0.629
It is interesting that although the average up-shift hazard is worse at describing the
pattern of when up-shifts happen than the down-shift hazard is for the down-shifts:
0.378 correlation vs. 0.629; the up-shift hazard is more sensitive to when down-shifts
happen (-0.579 correlation) than is the down-shift hazard for when up-shifts happen
(-0.383 correlation).
Note that because we assume a minimum trend growth duration of 5 years when
extracting trend growth using iFF, we do not find any trend shifts after 2010. Moreover,
all the hazard estimates since 2010 are out-of-sample by construction because none of
the observations after 2010 are used in the estimation. The evolution of these out-of-
sample hazard estimates suggests that many countries might have experienced down-
shifts in this period.
One such country is perhaps Brazil. According to Serrano and Summa [146], Brazil
has been living through a challenging period since 2011. Figure 3.10 plots the evolution
of the estimated hazards for Brazil, showing that there is indeed a spike in the down-
shift hazard in 2011. Table 25 tells us that Brazil has been growing at a trend growth
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Figure 3.9 Actual trend shifts & estimated hazards
Figure 3.10 Estimated hazards for Brazil
Note: Domestic credit to private sector data missing between 1986 and 1988.
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rate of 1.76% p.c. p.a. since 1993 (last trend shift in 1992). Taking this into account,
the conditional probabilities of Brazilian trend growth shifting either up or down from
this 1.76% trend in 2016 are quite low: 2.8% and 1.6%. A shift in trend growth is a
shift in the average growth rate for at least the next five years. These probabilities
therefore tell us that it is not very likely that the average Brazilian trend growth over
at least the next five years will be very different from 1.76% p.a.
Back in 2011, the rolling estimate of Brazilian trend growth computed using iFF on
growth time series up to and including 2010 was 3.29%. As shown in Figure 3.10, in
2011, we would have said that there was a 20% probability that Brazil would grow at a
trend growth rate that is at least 3 percentage points lower than this 3.29% trend rate
over the five years following 2011, i.e. an average growth rate of close to 0% or below
for the years 2012 to at least 2016.53 Today, in 2016, using data up to and including
2015, we estimate at 1.6% the probability of the event that Brazil experiences a trend
down-shift of at least 3 percentage points from its current estimate of trend growth at
1.76%, i.e. grows at a rate of -1.24% p.a. or below between 2017 and at least 2021.
Inspecting the evolution of the hazards visually in Figure 3.10, it seems that down
(up) shifts often coincide with spikes in down (up) shift hazards around the shift date,
or at least an important rise in the down (up) shift hazard and a fall in the up (down)
shift hazard. For instance, for Brazil, 1967 and 1992 are up-shifts, while 1973 and 1980
are down-shifts (cf. Figure 3.8).
This observation is not specific to Brazil. Figure 3.12 shows the trend growth path
for Argentina. However, by simply looking at Figure 3.11 we could have already guessed
that 1969, 1980, 1997 and 2007 were trend growth down-shifts, whereas 1990 and 2002
were up-shifts.
Argentina’s history provides an interesting concrete example which may help us
think about how this predictive model could be useful in practice. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.11, Argentina’s up-shift hazard was rising and the down-shift hazard falling be-
tween 2000 and 2003. In 2001, when rating agencies slashed the country’s credit rating,
the rolling estimate of trend growth was 1.49% p.a. since 1996. The probability of
Argentina experiencing a further one percentage point or more down-shift from this
trend rate was only 2%, while the probability of the country experiencing an at least
three percentage points up-shift for at least the next 5 years was already 8%. In 2002,
when Argentina declared default, the trend growth rate estimate (based on data up to
53Remember that 3 percentage points is the threshold imposed for a down-shift after an up-shift
when extracting trend growth. Figure 3.8 shows that 1992 was an up-shift for Brazil.
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Figure 3.11 Estimated hazards for Argentina
Figure 3.12 Trend growth in Argentina (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
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and including 2001) slipped to -0.45% p.a. since 1997, while the conditional probability
of an up-shift in trend growth rose to 26.2% and that of a down-shift fell to only 0.8%.
In 2003, as food prices recovered (annual growth rate of 12.7% in 2002), the up-shift
hazard jumped even further to 38%. Hence, as Tenreyro [152] argues: “the 2001-2002
Argentine crisis could and should have been averted [...] had international creditors
(and rating agencies) waited for a couple more years”, since even a simple model as
the one considered here would have pointed to a higher trend growth scenario over the
next few years as being much more likely that a further down-shift. And this, even
before the food prices started recovering: the 2002 hazards only use 2001 data when
food prices actually fell by 3.63%.
As a final example we consider China. Currently, we estimate that China has been
growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last trend down-shift in 2007, cf. Table 25). The
conditional probability of a further, at least 1% point, down-shift this year that would
make China grow, on average, at 5.8% p.a. or less over at least the next five years is
17.3%. On the other hand, a 3 percentage points trend up-shift is a 1% probability
event.
Note that the still very high trend rate at which China is currently growing is cer-
tainly contributing to the relatively large down-shift hazard.54 However, several other
factors taken into account in our model are also hampering China’s growth prospects.
To see this, we can compare China with other countries that are also growing at high
trend growth rates currently but have relatively low down-shift hazards. For instance,
India has been growing at 5.32% p.a. since 1994 but has a conditional probability of
experiencing a trend growth down-shift of only 5.2%. The difference between hazard
estimates arises because India has a much higher Polity 2 score than China (9 versus
-7). Moreover, in 2015, China experienced a much larger build up of domestic credit
to the private sector than India: 13.41% pts. rise in China vs. 0.85% pts. increase in
India. Finally, India’s growth is also much less volatile China’s: standard deviation of
3.24 against 6.15 in China.
In 2016, the average estimated down-shift hazard was still above its up-shift coun-
terpart: 0.07 versus 0.043. However, Figure 3.9 suggests that the down-shift hazard
has been on average falling and the up-shift hazard rising since 2013. A relatively mild
external environment in 2015 with, for instance, a US 3-month T-bill average rate of
only 0.05% that actually fell by 0.03 percentage points throughout the year, has cer-
54According to our estimates in Table 25, China is currently ranked fifth in terms of highest trend
growth rate, just below Ethiopia (8.02% p.a. since 2004) and slightly overtaking Myanmar (6.80% p.a.
since 2011).
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tainly aided this trend. However, future rises in US rates will negatively affect growth
prospects, while rising commodity prices may negatively impact non-commodity ex-
porters. Moreover, gold prices are still at historically high levels, indicating a high level
of risk aversion, which may also be detrimental to trend growth.
3.5 Conclusion & Future Research
Assessing a country’s growth prospects is challenging because trend growth is inher-
ently unobserved, and a large number of different domestic and external factors come
into interplay at the very same time and could either improve the country’s trend growth
rate, or worsen it, or counterbalance each other and make the country vibrate around
the current trend rate for another several years. Disagreement about a country’s growth
outlook often arises because different people weight these factors differently and/or use
different techniques to extract the trend component from growth time series data.
This paper embraces the basic definition of trend growth as a medium/long term
average growth rate and develops a comprehensive empirical methodology which allows
us to address the following two questions: What is the trend growth rate at which a
country is currently growing? How likely is it to shift and in what direction?
The methodology proposed has two components: a trend extraction method that
builds on the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach developed in Kar, Pritchett, Raihan,
and Sen (2013) to identify the dates at which trend growth changes significantly, then
extract the trend from growth time series as a sequence of medium/long term averages,
and an econometric framework, which employs an extended version of discrete-time
duration analysis to model and estimate the up and down-shift hazards - the conditional
probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth next year, conditional on the country
having already grown at the current trend growth estimate since the last trend shift.
We employ this methodology on most recent data (up to and including 2015) to
give trend growth estimates for 153 countries and up and down-shift hazard estimates
for 120 of them. The predictive model developed so far relates the up and down-shift
hazards to 20 different variables capturing the current growth environment, the level
of development, demographics, institutions, political stability, economic management,
and external shocks, and explains almost 20% of trend growth dynamics.
Future research could certainly extend the set of variables considered and build more




To construct the likelihood function in our case, let’s start by considering one specific
trend growth episode.
Remember that a trend growth episode starts in the year following the last trend
shift Tj−1 + 1 or the beginning of the sample if Tj−1 = T0 - the year in which we have
GDP p.c. data for the first time. It ends in the year of the new trend shift Tj or with
the end of the sample if Tj = T . The likelihood contribution of a trend growth episode
depends on how it ends.
Consider, an episode that ends at Tj with a trend up-shift. For this to happen, the
country must have survived at a constant trend growth rate from Tj−1 +1 to Tj−1, and
conditional on this, experienced a trend up-shift at Tj. Since Pr(Tj − Tj−1 ≥ δ) = 1,











Similarly for the likelihood contribution of a trend growth episode ending with a
trend down-shift. In the last case of a trend growth episode ending with the end of the
sample, the only thing that we really know is that the trend growth duration of the






Putting together LU , LD and LC , we can write the likelihood contribution of any
















where I[.] is the indicator function.
Now, let’s consider country i with trend shifts Ti = {Ti1, ..., Tim}. The likelihood










where n is the number of countries in our sample.








{IU logαU(k)+ID logαD(k)+(1−IU−ID) log(1−αU(k)−αD(k))}
(3.21)
where IU = I[∆τ(k) > 0] and ID = I[∆τ(k) < 0].
The vectors of parameters βU and βD can be estimated by substituting the hazard
functions 3.13 into eq.3.21 and maximizing it with respect to them.
Several sources in the survival literature, including Allison [11], Jenkins [100], and
Allignol et al.[10] explain how such discrete-time competing risk models can be es-
timated in practice by using standard statistical software for multinomial logits on
appropriately re-organized datasets.
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Table 25: Trend growth & conditional probabilities of trend shifts
Trend Last Shift Up-Shift Hazard Down-Shift Hazard
Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
Albania 3.01 2008 -4.26 0.034 0.048 0.049 0.123 0.059 0.049
Algeria 1.94 1994 4.29 0.07 0.02 0.025 0.177 0.072 0.088
Angola 0.75 2008 -7.97 0.036 0.015 0.019 0.272 0.204 0.169
Argentina 2.03 2007 -5.5 0.108 0.031 NA 0.087 0.136 NA
Armenia 0.64 2008 -11.94 0.1 0.1 0.155 0.213 0.09 0.026
Australia 1.92 1951 NA 0.006 0 0 0.012 0.013 0.011
Austria 0.08 2008 -2.06 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.047 0.041 0.034
Azerbaijan 1.05 2009 -19.1 0.161 0.107 0.162 0.332 0.121 0.069
Bahrain -0.09 1993 -3.89 0.136 0.035 0.044 0.074 0.165 0.067
Bangladesh 4.86 2003 2.11 0.065 0.029 0.029 0.085 0.116 0.081
Belarus 2.2 2008 -8.24 0.058 0.04 0.095 0.304 0.176 0.07
Belgium 1.55 1974 -2.11 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.03 0.053 0.041
Benin 1.31 1960 NA 0.049 0.001 0.001 0.048 0.017 0.011
Bhutan 5.23 1990 -5.87 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.134 0.064 0.059
Bolivia 3.14 2003 1.67 0.1 0.015 0.016 0.065 0.088 0.053
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.66 2008 -4.03 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Botswana 2.83 1989 -7.6 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.063 0.036 0.028
Brazil 1.76 1992 3.62 0.079 0.032 0.028 0.113 0.077 0.016
Bulgaria 0.92 2008 -5.94 0.079 0.031 0.035 0.11 0.069 0.054
Burkina Faso 3.01 1994 1.96 0.052 0.01 0.015 0.083 0.096 0.058
Burundi 4.74 2010 -5.32 0.143 0.013 0.041 0.099 0.113 0.12
Cambodia 4.46 2007 -3.38 0.049 0.03 0.032 0.149 0.246 0.103
Cameroon 2.45 2010 1.34 0.103 0.01 0.031 0.096 0.101 0.105
Canada 1.93 1951 NA 0.009 NA NA 0.019 NA NA
Central African Rep. -6.71 2010 -8.04 0.169 0.42 0.387 0.032 0.01 0.016
Chad 3.31 2010 -1.13 0.117 0.008 0.019 0.143 0.282 0.18
Chile 2.63 1997 -3.51 0.086 0.018 0.017 0.104 0.054 0.046
China 6.81 2007 -3.14 0.039 0.008 0.01 0.173 0.336 0.173
China. Hong Kong 1.96 2007 -4.5 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Colombia 3.43 2002 4.19 0.033 0.013 0.019 0.042 0.047 0.038
Comoros -0.57 1984 -1.55 0.075 0.019 NA 0.028 0.017 NA
Congo 2.13 1999 4.1 0.09 0.009 0.013 0.157 0.199 0.142
Costa Rica 2.63 1983 5.45 0.027 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.015 0.013
Coˆte d’Ivoire 3.01 2007 4.98 0.102 0.017 0.021 0.078 0.229 0.179
Croatia -1.5 2008 -5.97 0.074 0.067 0.07 0.102 0.06 0.041
Cyprus -3.32 2008 -5.86 0.041 0.121 0.106 0.1 0.016 0.041
Czech Republic 0.37 2007 -4.89 0.069 0.029 0.027 0.09 0.16 0.138
D.R. of the Congo 4.69 2009 2.74 0.265 0.016 0.016 0.078 0.202 0.167
Denmark 1.49 1969 -3.36 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.019 0.015
Djibouti 4.31 2005 3.04 0.106 0.027 NA 0.068 0.087 NA
Dominican Republic 4.32 2004 3.03 0.045 0.01 0.013 0.111 0.185 0.099
Ecuador 1.32 1976 -7.81 0.051 0.005 NA 0.092 0.038 NA
Egypt 0.31 2010 -2.65 0.029 0.051 0.055 0.129 0.204 0.111
El Salvador 1.76 1995 -3.11 0.091 0.015 0.014 0.035 0.034 0.024
Equatorial Guinea -4.32 2009 -18.91 0.094 0.028 0.208 0.492 0.228 0.012
Estonia 0.56 2007 -8.28 0.057 0.029 0.032 0.19 0.131 0.103
Ethiopia 8.02 2003 8.47 0.15 NA NA 0.081 NA NA
Fiji 1.99 1987 3.32 0.069 0.013 0.014 0.063 0.074 0.065
Finland -1.01 2007 -4.69 0.029 0.015 0.015 0.054 0.044 0.043
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Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
France -0.06 2007 -1.8 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.083 0.134 0.063
Gabon 3.49 2009 6.43 0.072 0.017 0.022 0.217 0.237 0.177
Gambia -0.02 1961 NA 0.052 0.002 NA 0.024 0.033 NA
Georgia 4.72 2007 -6.16 0.166 0.026 0.047 0.176 0.208 0.098
Germany 1.25 1991 -1.22 0.029 0.005 0.006 0.071 0.131 0.092
Ghana 4.88 2007 2.79 0.117 0.032 NA 0.068 0.101 NA
Greece -3.17 2007 -6.67 0.053 0.042 0.037 0.095 0.051 0.06
Guatemala 1.33 1986 4.77 0.049 0.006 0.006 0.07 0.046 0.034
Guinea -0.88 2008 -1.2 0.058 0.009 0.11 0.036 0.033 0.019
Guinea-Bissau 0.89 2003 3.45 0.13 0.065 0.066 0.051 0.04 0.042
Haiti 2.31 2010 3.67 0.193 0.046 0.096 0.042 0.066 0.079
Honduras 1.49 1986 3.11 0.04 0.011 NA 0.047 0.025 NA
Hungary 0.65 2006 -3.7 0.091 0.023 0.029 0.063 0.16 0.046
India 5.32 1993 3.27 0.038 0.004 0.004 0.033 0.071 0.052
Indonesia 4.09 2001 5.22 0.074 0.019 0.02 0.099 0.139 0.063
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 0 2007 -5.42 0.142 0.115 NA 0.179 0.232 NA
Iraq 2.05 2008 -10.35 0.017 0.064 0.051 0.475 0.124 0.097
Ireland -0.15 2007 -3.62 0.01 0.008 0.009 0.044 0.063 0.02
Israel 1.8 1973 -6.24 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.092 0.09 0.068
Italy -1.29 2007 -1.84 0.026 0.016 0.018 0.06 0.085 0.034
Jamaica -0.75 2007 -1.07 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.034 0.017 0.014
Japan 0.7 1991 -2.97 0.027 0.003 0.003 0.065 0.055 0.103
Jordan -0.12 2008 -4.44 0.112 0.046 0.041 0.158 0.104 0.105
Kazakhstan 3.09 2007 -6.32 0.117 0.024 0.031 0.232 0.189 0.124
Kenya 2.64 2003 3.39 0.053 0.019 0.019 0.069 0.149 0.073
Kuwait -3.43 2006 -9.25 0.15 0.253 0.143 0.244 0.027 0.18
Kyrgyzstan 3.27 1995 16.59 0.155 0.034 0.038 0.055 0.05 0.062
Lao People’s DR 5.23 1993 3.37 0.03 NA NA 0.103 NA NA
Latvia 0.65 2007 -10.65 0.095 0.032 NA 0.213 0.108 NA
Lebanon -3.06 2010 -8.95 0.2 0.295 0.241 0.179 0.036 0.06
Lesotho 3.73 2005 1.16 0.032 0.037 NA 0.08 0.055 NA
Liberia 4.98 2007 8.67 0.081 0.038 NA 0.166 0.124 NA
Lithuania 2.59 2007 -7.17 0.073 0.018 NA 0.189 0.151 NA
Madagascar -1.17 2008 -4.46 0.113 0.123 0.114 0.028 0.039 0.039
Malawi 0.66 2009 -3.1 0.112 0.058 NA 0.094 0.071 NA
Malaysia 2.56 1997 -3.73 0.035 0.016 0.021 0.141 0.111 0.073
Mali 2.01 1984 3.67 0.079 0.006 0.007 0.053 0.081 0.099
Mauritania 1.53 2007 -3.89 0.086 NA NA 0.157 NA NA
Mauritius 3.72 1988 -3.13 0.036 0.006 0.007 0.043 0.026 0.033
Mexico 1.15 1986 3.73 0.038 0.01 0.011 0.101 0.059 0.024
Mongolia 8.82 2010 3 0.075 0.013 0.016 0.111 0.13 0.055
Montenegro 0.89 2008 -4.01 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Morocco 3.24 1995 3.81 0.04 0.013 0.013 0.088 0.045 0.037
Mozambique 4.46 2001 -4.43 0.043 0.011 0.013 0.13 0.106 0.174
Myanmar 6.8 2010 -4.3 0.249 0.039 NA 0.253 0.417 NA
Namibia 3.34 2003 2.14 0.032 0.014 0.011 0.103 0.09 0.1
Nepal 2.86 1983 2.45 0.052 0.009 0.009 0.039 0.046 0.061
Netherlands 1.52 1973 -2.35 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.032 0.022 0.014
New Zealand 1.22 1966 -3.49 0.016 NA NA 0.017 NA NA
Nicaragua 2.51 1993 6.32 0.097 0.017 0.018 0.066 0.08 0.032
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Niger 1.87 2004 2.09 0.16 0.023 0.031 0.055 0.087 0.052
Nigeria 3.11 2006 -5 0.134 0.01 NA 0.162 0.305 NA
Norway -0.33 2007 -3.23 0.008 NA NA 0.031 NA NA
Oman -4.38 2010 -6.84 0.037 0.228 0.151 0.2 0.014 0.049
Pakistan 2.44 1960 2.18 0.029 0.001 0.001 0.057 0.038 0.011
Panama 5.74 2003 4.2 0.043 0.006 0.007 0.139 0.233 0.125
Paraguay 4.99 2009 1.85 0.062 0.018 0.025 0.1 0.119 0.09
Peru 4.37 2002 3.8 0.098 0.018 0.018 0.087 0.142 0.135
Philippines 3.76 2002 2.7 0.068 0.015 0.013 0.06 0.075 0.102
Poland 4.18 1993 6.87 0.073 0.007 0.008 0.071 0.069 0.053
Portugal 0.01 2001 -2.23 0.041 0.014 0.016 0.093 0.039 0.032
Qatar 1.6 2001 -5.93 0.168 0.042 0.041 0.109 0.154 0.088
Republic of Korea 3.63 1996 -4.74 0.034 0.01 0.011 0.19 0.132 0.091
Republic of Moldova 2.99 2008 -3.68 0.336 0.102 0.187 0.036 0.039 0.026
Romania 1.25 2008 -6.14 0.074 0.033 0.036 0.12 0.096 0.072
Russian Federation 0.33 2008 -6.89 0.144 0.069 0.146 0.186 0.091 0.026
Rwanda 4.29 2008 -1.29 0.069 NA NA 0.113 NA NA
Saudi Arabia 2.22 2002 4.16 0.077 0.009 0.008 0.159 0.114 0.182
Senegal 1.32 1993 3.93 0.084 0.013 0.015 0.045 0.046 0.039
Serbia 0.17 2008 -6.03 0.052 0.088 0.091 0.128 0.053 0.084
Sierra Leone 3.41 2004 -4.8 0.188 0.014 0.113 0.074 0.145 0.003
Singapore 2.68 1997 -3.8 0.035 0.009 0.009 0.179 0.096 0.062
Slovakia 1.45 2008 -5.52 0.068 0.043 NA 0.098 0.072 NA
Slovenia -0.91 2008 -5 0.053 0.038 0.044 0.087 0.108 0.046
South Africa 1.51 1993 3.18 0.032 0.017 0.019 0.039 0.029 0.017
Spain -0.75 2007 -2.82 0.037 0.029 0.028 0.084 0.04 0.04
Sri Lanka 6.05 2004 2.07 0.04 0.012 0.01 0.063 0.291 0.324
Sudan (Former) -1.22 2010 -5.02 0.094 0.073 0.082 0.123 0.105 0.066
Swaziland 1.26 1990 -4.44 0.019 0.008 0.009 0.108 0.094 0.067
Sweden 2.15 1951 NA 0.01 0 0 0.034 0.011 0.015
Switzerland 0.86 1973 -2.26 0.005 0 0 0.008 0.007 0.005
Syria -8.36 2009 -9.98 0.086 NA NA 0.169 NA NA
Taiwan 3.87 1995 -3.08 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tajikistan 3.07 2008 -3.42 0.061 0.048 0.084 0.174 0.144 0.053
TFYR of Macedonia 1.99 2008 -3.09 0.119 0.047 0.056 0.061 0.136 0.049
Thailand 3.67 2001 4.4 0.067 0.037 0.028 0.157 0.204 0.218
Togo 2.54 2009 3.48 0.124 0.035 0.042 0.062 0.104 0.08
Trinidad and Tobago 0.57 2006 -8.91 0.065 0.028 0.028 0.073 0.038 0.026
Tunisia 0.82 2010 -1.86 0.041 0.095 0.107 0.131 0.098 0.041
Turkey 1.92 2006 -3.85 0.053 0.044 0.041 0.105 0.132 0.198
Turkmenistan 9.56 2004 4.78 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tanzania 3.37 1998 2.38 0.051 0.008 0.011 0.083 0.145 0.13
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Uganda 1.48 2010 -3.5 0.101 0.022 0.034 0.112 0.274 0.139
Ukraine -1.58 2007 -9.95 0.249 0.242 0.317 0.113 0.036 0.013
United Arab Emirates 2.43 2010 11.47 0.211 0.093 0.101 0.088 0.087 0.05
United Kingdom 2 1951 NA 0.005 0.004 0 0.02 0.019 0.004
United States 2.03 1951 NA 0.001 0 0 0.008 0.002 0.001
Uruguay 4.91 2003 8.04 0.09 0.008 0.009 0.092 0.141 0.108
Uzbekistan 6.57 2003 3.91 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Venezuela -2.1 2008 -10.77 0.08 NA NA 0.084 NA NA
Viet Nam 5.65 1991 2.28 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.092 0.065 0.062
Yemen -4.57 2010 -6.5 0.046 NA NA 0.138 NA NA
Zambia 4.38 2002 3.22 0.094 0.009 0.011 0.092 0.124 0.1
Zimbabwe 12.13 2008 17.54 0.135 NA NA 0.069 NA NA
Notes: Trend growth estimates based on data up to and including 2015, except for Syria (growth data
stops in 2014). Hazard estimates based on model in Table 23. Trend rates extracted using iFF with the
following assumptions:
Minimum trend growth duration: 5 years
Trend shifts significance filter: 1% pt. change for a shift in the same direction. 3% pts. change for a
shift in the opposite direction.
Example of how to read the table: China has been growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last trend shift in
2007). 2007 was a trend down-shift, hence a further down-shift would be identified as a ≤ 5.81% p.a.
average growth rate over the next ≥ 5 years, whereas an up-shift would be a ≥ 9.81% p.a. average
growth rate over the same period. In 2016, the conditional probabilities of trend down and up-shifts are
17.3% and 1% respectively.
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4 Credit Risk Spillovers, Systemic Importance and
Vulnerability in Financial Networks
Abstract
How does the change in the creditworthiness of a financial institution or
sovereign impact its creditors’ solvency? We address this question in the con-
text of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Considering the network of Eurozone
member states, interlinked through investment cross-holdings, we model default
as a multi-stage disease with each credit-rating corresponding to a new infection
phase, then derive systemic importance and vulnerability indicators in the pres-
ence of financial contagion, triggered by the change in the creditworthiness of a
network member. We further extend the model to analyse not only negative, but
also positive credit risk spillovers.
4.1 Introduction
Why does the downgrade of a European country not only raise the CDS spreads
of that specific sovereign but also those of other Eurozone member states (Arezki et
al. [13])? More generally, how does the change in the creditworthiness of a financial
institution or state impact its creditors’ solvency?
This paper addresses such questions, investigating how a financial event that origi-
nates in one specific country can spread beyond its borders, infecting other states like
an epidemic. We model default as a process - a multi-stage disease. Each credit-rating
corresponds to an infection phase, during which default happens and therefore conta-
gion is transmitted with a certain probability (Section 4.2). The model is general and
could be applied not only to sovereigns, but to any financial institutions such as banks,
firms, etc. interlinked by mutual financial liabilities. However, as an example, we illus-
trate its workings in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. The seventeen
member states are the nodes in the network, and the weighted directed edges between
them measure cross-country investment flows (Fig. 4.1 ).
Our goal is to develop indicators of node importance and vulnerability by investi-
gating how the exogenous change in the creditworthiness of one of the financial network
members impacts the creditworthiness of all the other ones (Section 4.3). Firstly, we
derive some analytical indices from the early time properties of the model, then employ
computer simulations to measure systemic importance and vulnerability. These latter
indicators are systemic in the sense that they not only capture the immediate effect of
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the “exogenous risk that hits the system” (such as an aggregate exogenous shock or
an idiosyncratic shock to one of the nodes in the network), but also the “endogenous
risk generated by the system itself” (Zigrand [166]). The system here is the network
and the aim is to find indicators that will take into account how the structure of the
links shapes and propagates an initial exogenous shock. We also extend the model to
analyse how the same feedback mechanisms that generate endogenous risk, could set
off a process of positive contagion, reversing negative market sentiments (Section 4.4).
This paper can be related to the existing vast literature on financial contagion. At
the two extremes, contagion is classified as pure - when a herd of investors drives appar-
ently healthy and unrelated economies towards sunspot equilibria - or fundamentals-
based (Masson [121]). In reality, however, spillovers are complex and encompass both
features: they spread through real or financial channels, while still retaining some ran-
domness driven by market sentiments. We try to capture this duality by, on the one
hand, considering a financial network of cross-country investment flows, while on the
other hand making downgrades happen stochastically. Indeed, the probability that an
agent transmits the “default disease” to its network neighbours depends on both: its
actual credit rating (an agent with a lower credit-rating, i.e. in a more advanced in-
fection phase, transmits the negative contagion at a higher rate) and the interaction
intensities (a stronger mutual relation increases the transmission probability).55
One of the first models studying financial contagion on networks is Allen & Gale
[9]. The authors extend Diamond & Dybvig [46] to a four banks system, showing how
the completeness and distribution of interconnections determine the extent of spillovers
following a bank-specific shock. With evenly allocated deposits, contagion may be com-
pletely avoided, whereas in an incomplete system, a cascade of failures might emerge.
Allen & Babus [8] give an overview of some recent developments in this field. Espinosa-
Vega & Sole [55] build an interbank exposure model, simulating credit and liquidity
shocks. Their algorithm starts with the default of a country’s banking system shift-
ing the balance sheets of yet solvent banks and triggering new failures. In a similar
spirit, Elliott et al. [53] construct a theoretical model in which the market values of
organisations are interdependent through the network of cross-holdings. The default
of an organisation (bank or country) changes the values of all the other ones inducing
those, whose new values fall below certain specified “bankruptcy thresholds”, to fail as
55For a discussion of the relative importance of trade linkages versus macroeconomic similarities in
currency crises, see Eichengreen et al. [50]. Gerlach & Smets [80], Corsetti et al. [41], and Pesenti
& Tille [130] present theoretical models of contagious transmission with applications to the Asian
currency crisis and the ERM turmoil.
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well. The contagion process continues until either the algorithm converges with no new
failures, or no solvent organisation remains.
One of the main criticisms of such studies has been their limited scope given the “ex-
tremely rare” nature of “contagious failures” (Upper [156]). Here, instead of analysing
how financial contagion results from the initial default of a bank or country, we model
the default process itself, and investigate how financial contagion can be triggered by
simple changes in the creditworthiness of one of the network members.
The credit-rating determination of a bank (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick & Treepongkaruna
[27]) or a sovereign (Melliosa & Paget-Blanc [124], Afonso [3], Cheung [37]) have been
traditionally studied using econometric ordered-response models with creditworthiness
as the latent variable. The problem with this approach is that it completely ignores
the possibility of credit risk spillovers between financial entities. Unfortunately, once
we model agents’ interactions explicitly through a network, and admit that their cred-
itworthiness levels are interrelated and determined simultaneously, this econometric
framework can no longer be used because of endogeneity.
We propose a different approach to studying creditworthiness and credit risk spillovers
that takes inspiration from the epidemiology literature. Indeed, the highly intercon-
nected and complex nature of the global financial system has spurred researchers to
draw interesting and original parallels between financial networks, ecosystems (May et
al. [122]), epidemiology, and even engineering (Haldane [86]). Demiris et al. [45] explore
financial contagion in the context of a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model, em-
phasising its advantages over more conventional modelling approaches. In particular,
the SIR framework allows them to model explicitly the country-interdependencies that
are essential to the propagation of a crisis, measure crisis severity by a threshold pa-
rameter instead of composite macroeconomic indicators as in Kaminsky & Reinhart
[106], and evaluate potential policy interventions.
Beside these theoretical advances, an increased interest in complexity economics and
agent-based modelling have recently re-emphasized the usefulness of computer simula-
tions in understanding complex systems (Farmer & Foley [56]). For instance, Caporale
et al. [32] develop a multinomial model using time series data on stock returns during
the East Asian crisis (1997), and thereby disentangle potentially destabilizing connec-
tions that could signal the inception of a contagion process. Gai et al. [77] experiment
with different parameter configurations, studying how complexity and concentration
affect the resilience of a financial system. We follow this trend and use computer simu-
lations not only to derive indicators of systemic importance and vulnerability, but also
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Figure 4.1 Eurozone network, 2011 Total Portfolio Investment (TPI) shares
Notes: The weighted and directed link from country j to country i (vij) is the proportion of









to incorporate positive contagion, thereby making the model more complex, interesting,
and realistic.
4.2 Credit Risk Spillovers
4.2.1 The determinants of creditworthiness
Consider a network with n ∈ N nodes. As an illustration, Figure 4.1 depicts the
network of the seventeen Eurozone member states. Since the ultimate goal is to study
credit risk spillovers, the links between nodes should reflect the intensity of potential
contagion flows. Fig. 4.1 looks at the 2011 cross-border Total Portfolio Investment
(TPI) flows. The data is available from the IMF (Consolidated Portfolio Investment
Survey). TPI flows are reported on an annual basis and include long & short term
equities and debt-securities. We transform the data into investment shares since ab-
solute values of investment flows vary with the overall size of the economy and need
to be normalised. Formally, we define the weighted, directed link from j to i (vij)
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as the proportion of country i’s total investment flowing into j. Intuitively, the arcs
follow contagion flows so that the larger vij, the more significant the direct potential
spillover from j’s downgrade onto i’s creditworthiness. In Fig. 4.1, nodes are coloured








Investment shares vij can be summarized in an n×n adjacency matrix V (Table 26).
Note that vii = 0 (foreign investment only) and row i gives the distribution of country
i’s TPI across other Eurozone member states. For instance, Austria invests 21.46%
into Germany and only 0.64% into Greece. Rows do not sum up to 100% because
countries also invest in non-EZ states. In general, vij 6= vji, e.g. Italy invests 26.22%
into Luxembourg, while Luxembourg only invests 4.64% into Italy.









where β is a vector of parameters, and xit - a vector of economic indicators that include
variables like debt ratios, growth and inflation rates, default history, etc. in the case
of sovereigns. If banks were considered instead, xit would include variables like asset
quality, liquidity risk, capital adequacy, operating performance, etc. The parameter ω
captures how changes in i’s debtors’ creditworthiness will affect its own creditworthi-
ness given i’s portfolio allocation
∑
j vij. The model could be made more general by
allowing all parameters to depend on i, reflecting the fact that different characteristics
do not necessarily have the same importance in determining the creditworthiness of two
different financial entities. However, this would make the model more complex, and we
leave this extension to future research.
Even though in practice many credit-rating agencies have been recently accused
of assigning credit-ratings that do not reflect the true creditworthiness of a bank or
sovereign, theoretically we can assume that there exists a direct mapping from cred-
itworthiness to credit-ratings. Credit-ratings are ordinal qualitative variables often
designated by alphabetical letters. Standard & Poor’s ratings for example range from
AAA (no default risk) to C - the worst possible rating before the restricted default D.
Suppose there are k possible ratings in total (the actual number varies from agency
to agency). We can translate credit-ratings to a numerical scale with the highest pos-
sible rating denoted as k and the lowest possible one as 0. Financial institution i is
downgraded as its creditworthiness y∗it, defined by eq.4.1, drops below certain thresholds
α:
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Table 26: Adjacency matrix, 2011 Total Portfolio Investment (TPI) shares (%)
AUS BE CY EST FIN FR DE GRE IRE IT LUX MAL NTH PT SK SL SP
AUS 0 1.319 0.140 0.023 1.368 8.524 21.456 0.638 3.705 7.398 8.434 0.010 7.327 0.525 0.790 0.710 3.538
BE 2.265 0 0.032 0.002 0.838 18.459 6.689 0.455 5.700 4.845 19.111 0.006 14.661 0.730 0.195 0.226 5.172
CY 0.496 1.838 0 0 0.411 4.291 2.372 27.833 3.708 3.448 2.419 0 2.121 0.300 0.003 0.112 0.924
EST 3.113 3.352 0.311 0 7.328 14.679 7.328 0.096 6.346 7.807 11.997 0.024 8.357 0.431 0.455 0.216 1.461
FIN 1.425 0.668 0.036 0.094 0 8.007 10.144 0.291 5.159 2.243 8.755 0 5.742 0.398 0.022 0.079 2.156
FR 3.072 4.340 0.012 0.001 0.678 0 11.303 0.587 4.138 10.761 6.104 0.038 11.883 1.381 0.039 0.104 8.281
DE 3.865 1.415 0.042 0.002 1.053 12.668 0 0.516 5.263 7.299 16.218 0.004 9.968 0.935 0.180 0.127 6.878
GRE 0.929 0.330 3.393 0 0.052 3.284 2.727 0 2.394 1.857 7.902 0 2.242 0.296 0 0 0.641
IRE 0.358 0.544 0.009 0.008 0.594 5.374 7.174 0.144 0 5.724 2.248 0.011 3.820 2.633 0.017 0.009 2.031
IT 1.719 0.810 0.007 0 0.328 13.094 10.381 0.430 8.634 0 26.215 0.022 6.483 0.690 0.035 0.116 4.505
LUX 1.036 1.792 0.045 0.009 0.648 9.750 12.381 0.103 2.711 4.635 0 0.019 5.164 0.264 0.019 0.023 2.299
MAL 1.939 1.011 0.107 0 0.308 3.942 5.765 0.950 5.191 2.309 2.720 0 4.851 1.134 0.175 0.942 2.677
NTH 2.255 1.673 0.015 0.002 1.181 11.271 15.964 0.228 3.445 3.487 5.355 0.004 0 0.807 0.037 0.024 3.920
PT 1.372 1.762 0 0 0.416 9.599 5.298 1.327 20.645 9.603 6.566 0 7.113 0 0.050 0.028 11.795
SK 5.286 1.173 0.527 0 2.431 9.394 4.222 1.154 8.663 7.995 2.864 0 6.088 4.343 0 2.444 15.855
SL 6.269 3.923 0.040 0.015 0.805 13.337 18.605 2.721 2.348 8.654 4.082 0 7.023 0.953 1.227 0 2.259
SP 1.678 2.054 0 0 0.358 13.227 8.685 0.872 6.806 15.753 9.975 0 9.567 3.933 0 0 0
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF
cf. Table 8: Geographic Breakdown of Total Portfolio Investment Assets: Total Portfolio Investment, http://cpis.imf.org/




k if y∗it > αk
k − 1 if αk−1 < y∗it ≤ αk
...
0 if y∗it ≤ α1
where crit is i’s credit-rating at time t.
As mentioned in the introduction, eq.4.1 cannot be estimated econometrically through




jt - which in the context of the illus-
trative Eurozone network can be interpreted as country i’s creditworthiness-adjusted
portfolio investment - is unobservable. Since, in practice, credit-ratings are only an
imperfect measure of the underlying creditworthiness, replacing y∗jt by j’s observed
credit-rating at time t in eq.4.1 could make things even worse because of the second
important problem: endogeneity. Indeed, the whole idea of this paper is to argue that
y∗it and y
∗
jt will be determined simultaneously if vij and vji are non-zero.
To identify credit risk spillovers, we therefore take inspiration from the epidemiology
literature and model the default process as a multi-stage disease with each credit-rating
corresponding to a new infection phase.
4.2.2 The default process
From the “Susceptible - Infected” (SI) model to the “Solvent-Default” (SD)
one The SI model was initially developed to analyse human disease spreading on
contact networks (Kermack & McKendrick [110]). Although the process of infection is
much more complex than this two-states model, it remains a “useful simplification” to
the extent that it captures the contagion dynamics “happening at the level of networks”
(Newman [128]).
At any point in time, an individual is either susceptible or infected. Suppose that
you are susceptible - which happens with probability si. To catch the disease, one of
your neighbours must already be infected - the probability of this event is dj. Since
this infected neighbour transmits the disease at rate δ, the probability that you become







where the accolades on the right-hand side take into account the correlations (joint
probabilities) for nodes i and j to have the specified states, e.g. {sidj} is the “average
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probability that i is susceptible and j is infected at the same time” (Newman [128]).
Interaction intensities vij play a crucial role in eq. 4.2. Two individuals, interacting
with exactly the same people, could have completely different infection probabilities if
the first person’s contacts mainly include already contaminated individuals, whereas
the second one is more interlinked with still healthy people.
Translating the SI framework into a “Solvent-Default” (SD) one is rather trivial. We
can simply think of the interaction intensity vij as the strength of the potential contagion
flow from j to i. For instance, in the Eurozone network illustrated in Fig. 4.1, the vij’s
will be the TPI shares. Eq. 4.2 implies that two countries, Z and W, investing in
exactly the same sovereigns with the only difference that
∑
j vZj puts relatively higher
weights on countries with larger dj than
∑
j vWj, would have very different default
probabilities. In particular, Z’s default probability would be larger than W’s. Notice
that this discrepancy would occur not because of a difference in dj, but as a consequence
of different TPI shares’ distributions.
Unfortunately, this simple SD framework is inappropriate for the investigation of
credit risk spillovers, because it only models two states: Solvent and Default. In reality,
a solvent financial institution does not suddenly declare bankruptcy; it undergoes a
process of rating downgrades, which we shall model as a multi-stage disease.
Default as a multi-stage disease Modeling default as a multi-stage disease makes
the previous framework more complex, but allows financial institutions to differ in how
solvent they are.
We can think about each credit-rating downgrade as marking the beginning of a
new infection phase. Let θ(crit) ∈ [0; 1] be the rate at which institution i with credit-
rating crit transmits the “default disease” to its creditors. An institution with lower
creditworthiness, i.e. in a more advanced infection phase, is more likely to default itself.
It should therefore be more virulent and transmit the default contagion at a higher rate,
i.e. θ(crit) must be decreasing in crit.
For simplicity, suppose there are only four possible credit-ratings (k = 4): A, B, C,
and D. Let ait, bit, cit and dit denote the probabilities that institution i has rating
A, B, C, or D respectively at time t. Clearly:
ait + bit + cit + dit = 1
because an institution must be rated at any point in time.
Further, let the transmission rates be: θ(A) = 0 and θ(cr) ∈ (0; 1] for any cr 6= A.
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Given the network of n financial institutions or states, i can be downgraded from
A to B for two reasons. Firstly, as a result of a credit risk spillover from one of
its debtors. For this, i must start with rating A which happens with probability ait.
Moreover, one of its debtors must have rating crjt ∈{B, C, D} - which happens with
probabilities zjt = {bjt, cjt, djt} respectively - and transmit the contagion at rate θ(crjt).
Secondly, i could also be downgraded because of an exogenous deterioration in one of
its characteristics xit. The following differential equation describes the probability that






vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt) + βAdxi
dt
(4.3)
Similarly, the probability that i has rating B increases in i’s probability of being







vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j
vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt) + βB dxi
dt
(4.4)






vij {bitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j
vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) + βC dxi
dt
(4.5)
Finally, the last downgrade from C to D corresponds to the default after which the






vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) + βD dxi
dt
(4.6)
where the parameter on the exogenous shock β is allowed to depend on the credit rating
under consideration.
There is one important difference between this extended SD model and the existing
multi-stage disease ones from the epidemiology literature. In the latter, “the only
stochastic step [...] is transmission of the disease” (Jaquet & Pechal [99]) - i.e. once
an individual becomes infected, she will traverse all the disease stages deterministically
until reaching the final phase (e.g. becoming resistant) - whereas in the multi-stage




The model presented in the previous section has no closed form solution. To analyse
it, we have written a graph-based computer algorithm whose main component is a
function called spillovers. This function takes as arguments an adjacency matrix V, a
transmission-rates vector θ, and the vector of initial ratings rat0. Firstly, it associates
to each country i a transmission rate θ(cri) that depends on its rating. After computing
country-specific downgrade probabilities using eq.4.7, some countries are stochastically
downgraded:




Here, ω ∈ R+ captures the overall spillovers’ magnitude (the “severity” of the disease)
and allows to change the speed of the simulations without altering downgrade rankings.
Spillovers’ output is a new vector of ratings: rat1. The contagion function recalls
spillovers until all countries default - which happens at time Td - using the spillovers’
previous ratings output vector as the new input at each iteration step, and producing
a matrix with columns: rat0, rat1, rat2, ..., ratTd . Technically, one country usually
remains solvent. Since the simulation stops when all but one country default, this
solvent country also defaults at Td.
56Note that the infection phases of the node’s debtors do not have to be “more advanced” than its
own contamination phase in order to make him progress to the next infection stage. Consider the
following example: country X currently has rating B and has only two debtors: countries Y and Z,
both with ratings A, i.e. in “less advanced” infection phases than itself. If country Y is downgraded
from A to B, this will increase the probability of country X being downgraded to C, i.e. there will still
be a credit-risk spillover despite the fact that country Y was initially less infected than country X.
57Aside from the economic content of this paper, there is a need to properly understand the dynamics
and phase diagrams of a multi-stage epidemic model in which progression to the next infection phase
depends on interaction with other contaminated people. Although such a model could not be applied
in common epidemic settings such as the transmission of a viral infection, it could be very useful in
understanding contagious mental illnesses. For instance, Joiner & Katz [104] investigate 40 studies
conducted between 1976-1997 “that examined the relationship between two non-genetically related
individuals’ levels of depression or negative mood”, and find evidence of significant contagion for
all the 12 studies that analysed syndromal depression spillovers between “college roommates, dating
couples, young spouses, elderly spouses, and relatives.” Interestingly, they also find that only 13 of
the 28 studies dealing with negative mood, report significant spillovers, concluding that “depressive
symptoms are [...] more contagious than negative mood.” This agrees with the framework used in
this paper, whereby more advanced infection phases are presented as more virulent. Hence, the model
proposed here could help understand the transition from a moderate state of depression or even a
simple negative mood to more severe phases.
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Figure 4.2 Simulated contagion process
Notes: Given the initial vector of ratings (2012 Q4), this experiment simulates the contagion process
showing the evolutions of the ratings for each country.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates the computer simulation on the Eurozone TPI network with
the fourth quarter 2012 S&P’s credit ratings as rat0. We only use the first seventeen
S&P’s ratings, grouping together ratings below or equal to CCC, and translating them
into a numerical scale with the highest rating defined as AAA = 17 and the lowest as
CCC = 1. In this simulation, ω = 1 and θ is reported in the first column of Table 30
below.
As expected, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are the first sovereigns to default, whereas
the Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg are the last ones. Note that “Time” here
has no specific length and should simply be interpreted as regular time-intervals. The
total number of time-intervals depends on the values of θ and ω. In particular, setting
a higher ω speeds up the overall contagion process, whereas a smaller ω gives a more
precise ranking of country default times.
Fig. 4.2 also illustrates an interesting network phenomenon inherent to epidemics
- the “tipping point” (Gladwell [81]). The main idea is that changes often happen
very quickly and unexpectedly as some threshold is reached. Here “threshold” may
be interpreted as a country-specific exposure level after which its default process gains
momentum. As an example, consider the evolution of Germany’s credit-rating (red). It
remains above AA (15) for almost 400 periods, then suddenly plummets to CCC (1) in
less than 300 time-intervals. At the network level, such tipping points lead to contagion
waves and clustering of default times. In fig. 4.2, three main default clusters occur
around t = 400 (Portugal, Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, and Slovenia), t = 600 (Belgium,
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Figure 4.3 Contagion waves
Notes: Given the initial vector of ratings (2012 Q4), this experiment simulates the contagion process
recording the number of downgrades each period.
Italy, Ireland, France, and Germany), and soon after t = 1, 200 (Malta, Austria, The
Netherlands).
To investigate this issue further, we increase the spillovers’ magnitude to ω = 10,
and record the number of downgrades over time for a particular contagion realisation.
Fig. 4.3 shows the emergence of contagion waves. They happen as a set of countries
becomes increasingly virulent and starts transmitting downgrade spillovers at a faster
pace. With each iteration of the spillovers function, downgrade probabilities increase
for all countries, making them more likely to reach their “thresholds”. This process
continues until some sovereigns start defaulting. At this point, downgrade probabilities
drop and the contagion process slows down because the set of highly virulent countries
leaves the system. However, since downgrade probabilities for the remaining countries
are still positive, a new wave eventually emerges. In practice, this experiment suggests
that in order to lower the downgrade probabilities of still relatively healthy member-
states and limit spillovers, the set of most virulent countries should leave the system.
While further investigation of tipping points and contagion waves is an important
direction for future research, the next step and main goal of this paper is to use the
model and the computer algorithm presented in this section to derive indicators of
node/country importance and vulnerability.
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4.3 Systemic Importance and Vulnerability
4.3.1 Early-time properties: some analytical results
Consider again the model from Section 4.2.2 and suppose that all n financial insti-
tutions start with the best possible credit-rating A, i.e. ai0 = 1 for any i. Now, let
one of the institutions be exogenously downgraded. Afterwards, in order to disentangle
credit risk spillovers from exogenous economic fundamentals’ deterioration, set dxi
dt
= 0
for any i and t.
Which institutions are most likely to be downgraded from A in this early period?
To answer this question, note that since cit = 0, dit = 0, and ait + bit = 1 for any i, one
















where κr’s and µr’s are respectively the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix V
and ur(0)’s are some constants. Let κ1 and µ1 denote the largest eigenvalue and its
associated eigenvector respectively:
b(t) ∼ exp(ωθ(B)κ1t)µ1 (4.8)
Hence, thinking of b(t) as an indicator of early-time vulnerability, eq.4.8 shows
that it will be directly proportional to V′s right leading eigenvector µ1. In the network
literature, this metric is called (right) eigenvector centrality (Newman [128]).
A closely-related indicator can be constructed to gauge early-time importance. The
trick here consists in taking the transpose of the adjacency matrix: W = VT so that
wij = v
T
ij = vji. Now row i of W gives the distribution of all network members’
investment shares into i. Let σ(t) denote the vector of early-time importance. We want
an indicator that ranks higher those countries, whose major creditors are themselves








shows that the importance of node i is indeed increasing in the importance of its
creditors σjt and the proportion that they invest into i : vji. Rewriting in matrix
notation and performing the same exercise as above one gets:
σ(t) ∼ exp(ηλ1t)pi1
where λ1 and pi1 are the leading left eigenvalue and eigenvector of the matrix V. Hence
the vector of early-time importance will be proportional to the left eigenvector cen-
trality.
4.3.2 Late-time properties: simulation-based systemic indicators
One of the main goals of this paper is to measure systemic importance and vulner-
ability. To build indicators that take into account every possible feedback mechanism
generated by the network structure, we need to switch from the early-time when the
contagion process just sets off, to the time when the countries have traversed their
default processes almost completely.
Conceptually, the experiment remains the same: all n institutions start with the
best possible credit-rating A, and one of the institutions is exogenously downgraded.
Nevertheless, the key difference is that instead of asking which institutions are most
likely to be downgraded to rating B first, we now ask how long will it take for institution
i to default? How does this time compare to the time needed for other institutions to
default? What if we pick and downgrade another institution first?
A bit of imagination leads to define the following two possible indicators of systemic
importance:
• All-default time: T id gives the time when all of the nodes in the network default
after the initial exogenous downgrade of node i.
• First-default time: F id gives the time of the first default in the network after the
initial exogenous downgrade of node i.
Intuitively, the initial downgrade of a systemically more important country should lead




Table 27: Systemic Importance
Rankings Indices
LeftEig Fd Td LeftEig Fd Td
Germany 1 2 1 0.469 17.535 26.652
France 3 1 2 0.456 17.527 26.792
Luxembourg 2 3 3 0.465 17.555 26.799
Netherlands 4 4 4 0.353 17.961 27.197
Italy 5 5 5 0.320 18.019 27.431
Ireland 6 6 6 0.233 18.319 27.577
Spain 7 7 7 0.225 18.543 28.109
Austria 8 8 8 0.102 20.548 29.987
Belgium 9 9 9 0.090 21.085 30.776
Portugal 10 10 10 0.058 22.250 31.840
Greece 12 11 11 0.022 22.767 33.724
Finland 11 12 12 0.036 24.862 34.559
Cyprus 15 13 13 0.003 35.323 46.868
Slovenia 13 14 14 0.005 43.168 53.474
Slovakia 14 15 15 0.004 47.989 58.222
Estonia 17 16 16 0.000 369.900 379.521
Malta 16 17 17 0.001 429.148 438.018
Note: LeftEig = Left eigenvector centrality, Fd = First default time, Td = All default time
In the same spirit, the default time of node i after the initial downgrade of node j -
V ji - identifies i’s systemic vulnerability to j. If i is more vulnerable to l than to h, we
should observe: V li < V
h







4.3.3 Application to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
To see how these different analytical and simulation-based indicators relate to each
other, Tables 27 and 28 report the computed rankings and indicators for all 17 member-
states using the TPI shares as the adjacency matrix (Table 26). Countries are arranged
according to All-default (Td) and Vulnerability (V ul) rankings respectively.
Germany alternates with France in the role of the most systemically important
Eurozone country depending on the indicator used. Although Luxembourg is a small
country, it is consistently ranked second/third because other EZ members invest sub-
stantial shares into it: between 2.4% (Cyprus) and 26.2% (Italy). Remarkably, many
countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Spain) keep exactly the same positions in
all importance rankings. In terms of vulnerability, the picture is less clear-cut. Slovenia
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Table 28: Systemic Vulnerability
Rankings Indices
RightEig Vul RightEig Vul
Slovakia 3 1 0.308 70.149
Slovenia 1 2 0.310 70.238
Estonia 5 3 0.288 70.352
Belgium 2 4 0.309 70.432
Spain 4 5 0.296 70.496
Portugal 6 6 0.287 70.518
Austria 7 7 0.274 70.549
France 9 8 0.265 70.637
Germany 10 9 0.262 70.652
Italy 8 10 0.273 70.667
Netherlands 11 11 0.213 71.136
Cyprus 15 12 0.135 71.293
Finland 12 13 0.178 72.106
Luxembourg 13 14 0.178 72.198
Malta 14 15 0.136 74.018
Ireland 16 16 0.135 75.959
Greece 17 17 0.093 77.599
Note: RightEig = Right eigenvector centrality, Vul = Average vulnerability
and Slovakia are ranked highest by different indicators. Greece is ranked lowest prob-
ably because most of its investment flows into the UK with only 26.1% remaining in
the EZ. The interpretation of all the results is necessarily limited and future research
should test the model on larger datasets.
To check whether these results depend on the specific values assumed for θ and ω in
the computer simulations, Table 29 contains the results from two additional simulations:
with a different θ (simulation 2), and a different ω (simulation 3). We arrange countries
alphabetically and report all three simulation-based indicators. The parametrization of
all simulations is summarized in Table 30.
Rankings remain almost identical. Indeed as Table 31 shows, the ranking corre-
lations of All-default times, First-default times, and Vulnerability indicators across all
three simulations are almost perfect.
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Table 29: Robustness simulations
Simulation 2 (different θ) Simulation 3 (different ω)
Fd2 Td2 Vul2 Fd3 Td3 Vul3
Index R Index R Index R Index R Index R Index R
Austria 74.290 8 86.760 8 617.601 7 27.339 8 56.691 8 128.670 8
Belgium 81.050 9 94.200 9 617.332 3 28.277 9 57.834 9 127.504 1
Cyprus 232.962 13 253.988 13 618.879 12 62.441 13 90.615 13 132.343 11
Estonia 4231.200 16 4243.600 16 617.475 5 714.407 16 744.862 16 127.866 4
Finland 126.770 12 139.011 12 620.943 14 36.237 11 65.681 12 134.305 13
France 39.512 2 50.385 2 617.674 8 20.961 1 50.164 1 129.066 10
Germany 39.140 1 49.989 1 617.777 9 21.018 3 50.758 2 128.825 9
Greece 83.683 10 104.333 10 624.523 17 37.772 12 64.946 11 150.784 16
Ireland 49.159 6 62.703 6 622.238 16 22.818 6 52.158 6 151.436 17
Italy 44.847 5 57.869 5 617.872 10 22.062 5 51.954 4 128.310 7
Luxembourg 39.627 3 50.399 3 619.867 13 20.974 2 51.633 3 138.959 14
Malta 4525.400 17 4537.400 17 621.473 15 879.368 17 909.022 17 139.594 15
Netherlands 43.846 4 56.643 4 618.813 11 21.790 4 52.097 5 132.440 12
Portugal 93.860 11 107.579 11 617.499 6 30.652 10 59.459 10 127.976 5
Slovakia 364.315 15 377.453 15 616.502 1 83.556 15 115.409 15 127.579 2
Slovenia 301.904 14 315.323 14 616.656 2 74.789 14 106.016 14 127.666 3
Spain 51.559 7 64.515 7 617.398 4 23.247 7 52.769 7 127.978 6
Note: R = Ranking
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Table 30: Simulations parametrization
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Positive contagion
Shock ω 100 100 50
No. simulations 10,000 10,000 10,000
Credit-rating Transmission rates
CCC 0.2958 0.1372 0.2958 0
B- 0.1479 0.1143 0.1479 0.0007
B 0.0986 0.1067 0.0986 0.0027
B+ 0.0739 0.0991 0.0739 0.0060
BB- 0.0592 0.0915 0.0592 0.0107
BB 0.0493 0.0838 0.0493 0.0167
BB+ 0.0423 0.0762 0.0423 0.0241
BBB- 0.0370 0.0686 0.0370 0.0328
BBB 0.0329 0.0610 0.0329 0.0428
BBB+ 0.0296 0.0457 0.0296 0.0541
A- 0.0269 0.0381 0.0269 0.0668
A 0.0246 0.0305 0.0246 0.0809
A+ 0.0227 0.0229 0.0227 0.0963
AA- 0.0211 0.0152 0.0211 0.1130
AA 0.0197 0.0076 0.0197 0.1310
AA+ 0.0185 0.0015 0.0185 0.1504
AAA 0 0 0 0.1711
Note: For Malta and Estonia the no. of simulations is 1,000
Table 31 also sheds more light on the relationships between different indicators.
There is significant positive correlation within the two sets of importance and vulnera-
bility rankings, but negative correlation between them (bottom-left part). The positive
within correlations suggests that the indicators capture indeed the same node char-
acteristic (either importance or vulnerability). The difference in rankings reflects the
presence of endogenous risk generated by the network structure itself. The negative
between correlations shows that the sets of most important and most vulnerable coun-
tries do not overlap. Such a situation may lead to moral hazard problems if the most
systemically important players do not bear the full network costs of idiosyncratic shocks
affecting them, i.e. they do not internalize the negative externality generated on the
most vulnerable countries, and take on more risks than would be socially desirable.
207
Table 31: Ranking correlations for Importance and Vulnerability indicators
LEig Fd1 Td1 Fd2 Td2 Fd3 Td3 REig Vul1 Vul2 Vul3
LEig 1
Fd1 0.980 1
Td1 0.985 0.998 1
Fd2 0.980 0.995 0.998 1
Td2 0.980 0.995 0.998 1 1
Fd3 0.980 0.995 0.990 0.985 0.985 1
Td3 0.978 0.998 0.995 0.993 0.993 0.993 1
REig -0.115 -0.157 -0.159 -0.186 -0.186 -0.152 -0.149 1
Vul1 -0.199 -0.213 -0.216 -0.243 -0.243 -0.216 -0.211 0.961 1
Vul2 -0.132 -0.152 -0.154 -0.181 -0.181 -0.154 -0.149 0.968 0.990 1
Vul3 -0.208 -0.223 -0.221 -0.248 -0.248 -0.228 -0.211 0.953 0.961 0.961 1
4.4 Positive Contagion
“We spoke a lot about contagion when things go poorly but I
believe there is a positive contagion when things go well. ”
Mario Draghi, summer 2012
4.4.1 A world of two contagions
In the model analysed up to now, the only possible transition for countries was
downwards. For instance, in the simple model with only four ratings from Section
4.2.2, we had:
A→ B → C → D
In reality, however, countries can also be upgraded; and as Draghi’s quotation sug-
gests, the sign of contagion is probably determined on a daily basis by market news
and sentiments. An announcement like the “Draghi Put” or a successful summit might
lead to a round of positive contagion, whereas a failed government bonds auction or the
publication of exorbitant youth unemployment rates may induce negative contagion.
In this more realistic world of two contagions - positive and negative - the transition
pattern becomes:
A B  C → D
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Akin to negative credit spillovers, positive ones occur if institution/sovereign i’s
initial upgrade leads to an increase in the upgrade probabilities of its creditors. This
section extends the basic default model with only four credit ratings to allow for this
possibility.
For simplicity, let us ignore the exogenous factors that could lead to upgrades and
downgrades and concentrate on credit changes that happen because of credit spillovers.
Let ξ(crit) ∈ [0; 1] be the rate at which institution i with credit-rating crit transmits
a positive spillover to its creditors. In this case, the positive transmission rates vector
ξ shall be increasing in cr, reflecting the fact that it becomes easier for an institution
to transmit positive spillovers as its rating rises. Since a defaulted organisation cannot
transmit positive spillovers, we can further simplify the vector as: ξ(D) = 0, and
ξ(cr) ∈ (0; 1] for any cr 6= D.
For institution i to be upgraded from B to A thanks to a positive credit spillover
from one of its debtors j, it must itself have rating B at the outset - which happens with
probability bit, one of its debtors must have rating crjt ∈{A, B, C} - which happens
with probabilities ψjt = {ajt, bjt, cjt} respectively - and transmit the positive spillover
at rate ξ(crjt).
In a world of two contagions, the differential equation that describes the probability






vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt) + φ
∑
j
vij {bitψjt} ξ(crjt) (4.9)
where φ ∈ R+ captures the magnitude of the positive spillovers. Here we assume that
both contagions propagate through the same network - the network of investment shares
with adjacency matrix V. A more complex and realistic model would allow positive
and negative contagions to spread through multiple and/or different networks.
Similarly, the probability that i has rating B increases in i’s probability of being
downgraded from A to B, decreases in i’s probability of being downgraded from B to
C, decreases in i’s probability of being upgraded from B to A, and increases in i’s






vij {aitzjt} θ(crjt)− ω
∑
j









Since once defaulted, an institution can no longer be upgraded, the probability that
i has rating C increases in i’s probability of being downgraded from B to C, decreases
in i’s probability of being downgraded from C to D, and decreases in i’s probability of












vij {citψjt} ξ(crjt) (4.11)






vij {citzjt} θ(crjt) (4.12)
Note that this is a more general version of the model presented in Section (4.2.2)
where φ - the magnitude of positive spillovers - was equal to zero, i.e. the positive
contagion channel was shut down.58
4.4.2 Can positive contagion save the Eurozone?
“Where’s your positive contagion now, Mr. Draghi?”
J. Warner, The Telegraph (05/02/2013)
To analyse this more complex model through computer simulations we can define:




The new extended spillovers’ function in the computer algorithm now associates
to each country i two transmission rates θ(cri) and ξ(cri). After computing country-
specific downgrade and upgrade probabilities using equations 4.7 and 4.13, some coun-
tries are stochastically downgraded and upgraded producing a new vector of ratings.
Whether positive contagion ultimately dominates its negative counterpart will de-
pend both on the transmission rates vectors ξ and θ, and the respective spillover mag-
58Following our discussion in footnote (57) about how this multi-stage epidemic model might be
used in the context of contagious mental illnesses, note that this extended version with both positive
and negative contagions could allow researchers to investigate in a more systematic way how depressed
people’s well-being is enhanced or eroded by positive and negative social interactions.” (Kashdan &
Steger [108]). Different networks, reflecting the type and intensity of the interaction between people,
could be used to propagate the latter.
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Figure 4.4 Contagion dynamics (1)
Notes: ω = 1; φ = 0.3
Figure 4.5 Contagion dynamics (2)
Notes: ω = 1; φ = 0.3
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nitudes ω and φ. While future research shall investigate this important issue in a more
details, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate how, for given ξ, θ and ω, lowering the positive
contagion magnitude φ from 0.3 to 0.2 changes the scenario from one where most of
the countries finish with rating AAA, to a more morose one, with complex spillover
dynamics.59
This suggests that unless Mr. Draghi manages to make “things go well [enough]”,
we will have difficulty in noticing positive contagion.
4.5 Conclusion & Future Research
“The deadliest aspect of the Eurozone crisis is the tripwire
linking the riskiness of banks and governments.”
Acharya et al. [2]
Most of the literature on financial contagion in networks has concentrated on analysing
how an initial default of a bank or country triggers a cascade of further failures. The Eu-
rozone sovereign debt crisis however has demonstrated that although defaults are likely
to be prevented, credit-rating downgrades occur rather often. Since credit-ratings are
one of the key drivers of investment decisions, a model explaining credit risk spillovers
could help understand the observed reallocation of investors’ portfolios in response to
changes in the creditworthiness of interlinked countries or banks. To identify such credit
risk spillovers, this paper models the process of default as a multi-stage disease with
each credit-rating corresponding to a different infection phase. We use the model to
develop indicators of systemic importance and vulnerability by investigating how the
initial exogenous change in the creditworthiness of one of the members of the financial
network impacts the creditworthiness of all the other ones.
The illustration of the model in the context of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
yields interesting and intuitive results. For example, we find that France and Germany
occupy the highest positions in the systemic importance hierarchy. However, the inter-
pretation of all the results is necessarily limited by the small dataset. Future research
should include more countries and test the model on interbank data, as well as in-
vestigate more carefully such phenomena as tipping points and contagion waves. The
above quote from Acharya et al. [2] implies that governments and banks are closely
interlinked. Hence further research should not only analyse the networks of banks and
59The positive transmission-rates vector used is reported in Table 30.
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governments separately, but also investigate how an initial shock in one of the networks
could potentially engender contagion in the other one, or even change its structure.
The literature has focused almost exclusively on negative contagion. However, pol-
icymakers seem to be aware that the same endogenous feedback mechanisms that yield
negative financial contagion, could in principle be used to activate positive spillovers
and shift investors’ sentiments. Unfortunately, the extension of the model to include
such positive spillovers shows that even though positive contagion could be an attrac-
tive solution to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the main policy question remains
how to generate it permanently, halting its negative counterpart. Another task for
further research is therefore to examine how the ratio of positive to negative spillover
magnitudes determines the overall sign of contagion.
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